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Divided into the sections “Good Work,”
“Holy Living,” “Imagination,” and “Moving
Forward,” the collection intimately connects
the works of Wendell Berry to the reverence
found in Christian worship. Through his 
depictions of an agrarian society, Berry 
illustrates the values of simple pleasures and
hard work and asserts that the earth is God’s
gift to mankind. Wendell Berry and Religion
covers relevant topics such as ministry, birth
control, and the roles of universities and 
also examines the challenge of practicing 
Christian values in a materialistic culture. 
Wendell Berry is one of the most important
critical essayists currently writing, and his
religious and moral beliefs are evident
throughout his body of work. Showcasing
provocative essays from a diverse group of
writers, Wendell Berry and Religion examines
the thought-provoking conversations that
take place in Berry’s writings and reveals the
theological underpinnings of his work.
Joel James Shuman, associate professor 
and chair of the department of theology 
at King’s College, is the author of several
books, including To Live Is to Worship:
Bioethics and the Body of Christ, Reclaiming
the Body: Christians and the Faithful Use 
of Modern Medicine, and Heal Thyself: 
Spirituality, Medicine, and the Distortion 
of Christianity.
L. Roger Owens earned his PhD in 
theology and ethics from Duke University
and is copastor at Duke United 
Methodist Church. 
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An internationally renowned author and 
environmentalist, Wendell Berry has won
wide acclaim for novels, poems, and essays
that advocate healthy ecological practices.
Berry was born in rural Henry County, 
Kentucky, to fifth-generation farmers, who
instilled in their son a love of the land that
continues to this day. Berry’s humble 
beginnings are evident in his writings, which
emphasize the idea that individuals should
be considerate and appreciative of the land
and their communities.
Though Berry is not considered a religious
writer, his work often reflects the Christian
ideals of stewardship, reverence, and 
fellowship. In Wendell Berry and 
Religion: Heaven’s Earthly Life, editors Joel
James Shuman and L. Roger Owens 
examine the theological themes in Berry’s
work, rethinking his fiction, essays, and 
poetry in relation to Christian traditions 
and life in a modern and changing world.
Covering a wide range of topics, from 
modern medicine to the practice of law, 
the essays analyze how Berry’s writings 
draw on Christian values and principles
while simultaneously critiquing them.
Continued on back flap
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“Wendell Berry is our most important writer at work in this
country. . . . Wendell Berry and Religion will help people see
the roots of his work, beyond the idea that he is ‘writing
about farming.’”
—Bill McKibben, author of The End of Nature
“It may surprise some of Wendell Berry’s many followers that
his views have been greatly influenced by his Christian faith,
and it may surprise some Christians that their communities
and their theology very much need to be influenced by
Berry’s kind of Christianity. These are the insights we owe to
the contributors of this important book.”
—Albert Borgmann, author of Real American Ethics
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God saw everything that he had made, and indeed, it was very good.
—Gen. 1:31
We declare to you what was from the beginning, what we have heard, 
what we have seen with our eyes, what we have looked at and touched 
with our hands, concerning the word of life.
—1 John 1:1
I take literally the statement in the Gospel of John that God loves the 
world. I believe that the world was created and approved by love, that it 
subsists, coheres, and endures by love, and that, insofar as it is redeemable, 
it can be redeemed only by love. I believe that divine love, incarnate and 
indwelling in the world, summons the world always toward wholeness, 
which ultimately is reconciliation and atonement with God.
—Wendell Berry, “Health as Membership”
The title notwithstanding, this is not a book about Wendell Berry. It is not a 
biography, nor does it attempt a systematic critical analysis of his writing. As 
interesting and significant as those projects might be, they will have to be 
undertaken by someone else.1 Rather, these essays are intended to be contri-
butions to an ongoing conversation, in what I take to be the best and fullest 
sense of the term, meaning that they have to do, not simply with the ex-
change of discourse, but also with being among a particular group of persons, 
over time and in a particular place.2 In this case, the place and the persons in 
question are the Christian community—the church catholic3—and some of 
its members who recognize in the work of Wendell Berry a kind of wisdom 
that might help them and their fellow Christians work, live, and think more 
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faithfully in a world that, to the extent it recognizes their Christianity at all, 
finds it increasingly unpalatable.
The authors of these essays are all Christians who understand themselves 
to be writing in conversation with the work of a fellow Christian about things 
that matter. Yet, beyond the authors of these essays, it is unclear how many of 
the significant number of people who read Wendell Berry understand him as 
a Christian author. Indeed, Berry is often explicitly critical of Christianity in 
his work, especially with respect to the complicity of modern North American 
Christianity in the violent exploitation of the earth and its inhabitants by 
consumer capitalism and military-industrialism.4 That Berry is not frequently 
seen as a Christian writer, or that many self-identified Christian readers prob-
ably find him stranger than they do their own beliefs, says more about how 
attenuated Christianity has become in the popular imagination than about 
how well Berry’s work synchronizes with the mainstream of contemporary 
North Atlantic culture, whether secular or Christian.
As eclectic as the authors of these essays are, and in spite of whatever 
theological differences they may have with Berry or one another, they all share 
with him certain common convictions. First, all would agree that Christianity 
has often been insufficiently attentive to earth and flesh and so has seldom 
been fully able to resist the temptation represented by some form of the an-
cient heresy called Gnosticism. Second, all would agree that the highly priva-
tized, excessively therapeutic Christianity of North American modernity is 
especially guilty in this respect. Finally, all would agree that genuine Christian 
faithfulness and genuine human flourishing demand a decisive, explicit rejec-
tion of all things Gnostic, a demand that requires Christianity to be under-
stood as a good deal more than individual belief about the possibility of self-
transcendence—that is, “pie in the sky in the sweet by-and-by.”
Gnosticism refers broadly to a variety of ancient and modern departures 
from Christian orthodoxy that have in common the assumption of a funda-
mentally dualistic account of reality, most often based in some variety of rad-
ical distinction between matter and spirit (or soul, or mind). Generally speak-
ing, Gnosticism, which Harold Bloom has called “the American religion,”5 
holds that the material creation—the human body and the earth and the 
creatures on which human bodies depend for their existence—is, ultimately, 
unimportant. At best, it views materiality as morally inconsequential and sig-
nificant only in a temporary, strictly utilitarian sense; at worst, it understands 
the very existence of materiality as a transient manifestation of the human 
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soul’s alienation from God. The limits inherent in materiality are to be ig-
nored, struggled against, or fled, as much and as soon as possible. This earth-
ly life is a simulacrum, or a test, or perhaps even a fleshy prison. What truly 
matters is the life to come, in which we will have shed our bodies and exist as 
pure spirits in perfect union with a purely immaterial God. In the meantime, 
well, at least we have several hundred channels of cable television and shop-
ping malls and the Internet to keep us distracted.
Like a lot of heresies, Gnosticism is a sometimes subtle distortion of or-
thodoxy. According to Christian tradition, it is true that creation has been 
alienated from its Creator. Life in this world, characterized by exploitation, 
violence, suffering, sickness, and death, falls well short of the promised 
Kingdom of God. This side of the consummation of God’s work, it always 
will. Yet the limitations inherent in the materiality of creation are neither 
cause nor evidence of this alienation, and God’s redemptive work neither re-
quires nor encourages a flight from this life or this world. God, who delights 
in creation and desires its well-being, has given humanity the gift of sharing 
in that delight. That humanity has often failed to recognize the goodness of 
God’s gift is overshadowed by the fact that God’s intention for creation re-
mains one of thoroughgoing redemption. Moreover, God’s redemptive work 
is and always has been “fleshy,” which is to say that it is a gift given to the 
material creation in and through particular members of the material creation. 
As Dante writes at the beginning of the Paradisio:
The glory of Him who moves all things rays forth
through all the universe, and is reflected
from each thing in proportion to its worth.6
Creation is good, not simply because it is made and sustained by the God 
who is goodness itself, but also because it is the freely chosen theater and 
medium of that God’s action. As the third-century theologian Athanasius of 
Alexandria said in the classic anti-Gnostic essay On the Incarnation of the 
Word of God, creation is in some analogous sense God’s body.7
The idea that the God who saves is lovingly at work, in and through ma-
terial creatures who live as members of the material world, suggests that there 
is plenty to be done by the women and men whose desire is to live well and 
in harmony with the proper order of things and their Creator. Yet this is not 
as easy as it might at first sound, for, as history and the present state of world 
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affairs make all too evident, humankind has through the years done a lot of 
really bad work. This is a persistent theme in Berry’s writing: the wholeness 
toward which God beckons creation requires that women and men be en-
gaged in good work, yet not all work is good. Some work perpetuates and 
accelerates creation’s alienation from its true good: “Works of pride, by self-
called creators, with their premium on originality, reduce the Creation to 
novelty—the faint surprises of minds incapable of wonder. . . . Pursuing orig-
inality, the would-be creator works alone. In loneliness one assumes a respon-
sibility for oneself that one cannot fulfill. . . . There is the bad work of pride. 
There is also the bad work of despair—done poorly out of the failure of hope 
or vision. Despair is the too-little of responsibility, as pride is the too-much. 
The shoddy work of despair, the pointless work of pride, equally betray 
Creation. They are wastes of life.”8
The theological name for such wastes of life is, of course, sin, one aspect 
of which is the failure of women and men to discern God’s ongoing presence 
in and to all creation. Athanasius, to whom I refer above, argues that, apart 
from human sin, all women and men possess the capacity to know God at 
work, both in themselves and in the rest of creation. Yet, he says, “men’s care-
lessness, by little and little, descends to lower things,” such that humankind 
is, apart from God’s gracious intercession, destined ultimately to destroy itself 
and a good part of creation.9
This is, of course, the crux of Christianity—that God has, in and through 
the history of a particular people, been at work tending to creation, working 
to restore it to the wholeness for which it was originally intended. Christians 
believe that the center of this history is the Incarnation—the life, death, and 
resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth, the very logos of the Creator. Jesus’ resur-
rection from death is the ultimate sign of God’s care for creation, signaling 
the ultimate triumph of creative love over destructive hate. Yet to focus exclu-
sively on the resurrection is to overlook the significance of Jesus’ life and 
teaching. It is, says Athanasius, “by the works of his body [that Jesus teaches 
them] so that they who would not know him from his providence and rule 
over all things, may even from the works done by his actual body know the 
Word of God which is in the body, and through him the Father.”10 God be-
came a particular human person living in a particular place and time, and the 
things that person said and did in, through, and with his body made God 
present to creation in a unique and unrepeatable way.
Nor has that presence ceased. Not incidentally, the New Testament de-
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scribes the gathered Christian community as, among other things, the “Body 
of Christ.” Jesus has, according to Scripture, ascended into heaven and no 
longer walks the earth. Yet his life and teachings continue to be bodily present 
to the world through the gathered community of his disciples as they faith-
fully rehearse and perform his story. The name traditionally given to that re-
hearsal is liturgy, from a Greek word meaning roughly “to work publicly for 
the common good.” Christians are called collectively to become Jesus’ mani-
fest incarnate presence to creation by working together publicly for creation’s 
good.
Indisputably, Christians have not always worked for the common good 
of creation. Indeed, they have more than occasionally, and not always with 
good intentions, worked for its destruction. Yet this is an expression not of 
Christianity but of Christian unfaithfulness, the failure of Christians to fol-
low in the steps of the one they call Lord. That the earth continues abun-
dantly to bless us in spite of these failures is but a sign that God’s love exceeds 
our callousness and ineptitude. That confession, absolution, penance, and 
instruction remain significant parts of the Christian liturgy signals our hope 
concerning God’s willingness to continue, in spite of our failures, the work of 
transforming us and remaining present to the world through our work. These 
essays should be read, I believe, from this perspective; as the attempts of 
members of Christ’s body to discern together with one of our fellow members 
how to move forward, to try yet again to say something useful and interesting 
about the good work to which we and all women and men have been called.
Part 1: Good Work
This book divides into four parts, the first of which is called “Good Work.” 
“Good work,” Wendell Berry says, “finds the way between pride and despair. 
It graces with health. It heals with grace. It preserves the given so that it re-
mains a gift.”11 This is a persistent theme in Berry’s writing: women and men 
are created to work and to do so well. Properly understood, work does not 
simply make possible the continuation of human existence; it is also poten-
tially a source of pleasure and satisfaction and a means by which humans may 
rightly connect: to their Creator, to each other, and to the rest of creation. 
Thus, part of the great pathos of modernity is its uncritical emphases on ef-
ficiency and utility, which Berry rightly understands to involve a disparage-
ment of work as a human discipline. Such disparagement leads inevitably to 
6  Joel James Shuman
the failure of people to work well. One might well say that part of God’s re-
demptive work is to call women and men back to the task of good work—
work that is peaceable and compassionate toward other persons and the rest 
of creation. The essays in this part are all reflections on what have tradition-
ally been called the professions, teaching, medicine, law, and ministry, and on 
the institution in which professionals are trained, the university. Their au-
thors are all accomplished practitioners of their respective crafts, each of 
whom recognizes in his field of endeavor a history of failure that has, none-
theless, failed to destroy the discipline’s capacity to do significant good in the 
world. Each draws on Berry’s work in an attempt to imagine what it would 
look like for their professions to recommit to working for the common 
good.
Any consideration of how the professions might recommit to working for 
the common good has necessarily to take into account the way those profes-
sions train their members. The essays in part 1 of the book do just that. The 
first, written by the eminent theologian Stanley Hauerwas, asks Berry to help 
him imagine what a Christian university might look like. Hauerwas con-
cludes that it would have to be characterized first of all by propriety and 
truthfulness and that only through a firm commitment to these standards can 
it be saved from being beholden to corporations and their influence on the 
career interests of students, which are destructive of long-term fidelity to peo-
ple and place. Similarly, Brian Volck, a pediatrician who teaches in the medi-
cal school at the University of Cincinnati, suggests that, if medicine is to re-
main the profoundly moral practice it has traditionally been, it must find a 
way to train its students genuinely to care for their patients as human persons, 
which surely will require a turn away from the technology-centered hyperspe-
cialization characterizing so much of contemporary medicine.
Richard P. Church, an attorney, theologian, and farmer from the North 
Carolina Piedmont, considers in his essay the practice of law. He enters into an 
imaginative conversation with the attorney Thomas Shaffer, a persistent 
Christian critic of the procedural ethics typical of American jurisprudence, 
and the fictional Wheeler Catlett, the resident lawyer of Berry’s Port William 
membership. In Shaffer, Church sees a lawyer who has considered carefully 
what it would mean for a Christian attorney to practice law in a manner faith-
ful to his or her most basic theological convictions, while, in Catlett, he sees a 
life in community that both exemplifies and makes possible such faithfulness.
Kyle Childress, who for more than fifteen years has been the pastor of the 
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Austin Heights Baptist Church in Nacogdoches, Texas, is the author of this 
part’s concluding essay. Austin Heights is a relatively small congregation, and 
Kyle is an erudite, gifted minister who has frequently been asked when he is 
going to move on to a “better” position in a larger church. Developing Berry’s 
distinction (borrowed from Wallace Stegner) between perpetually upwardly 
mobile “boomers” and faithful, contented “stickers,” Kyle shows that genu-
inely good work demands not simply highly developed technical skill but also 
long-term fidelity to the people and place for whose good that work is to be 
done.
Part 2: Holy Living
One of Berry’s ongoing concerns is the health of people and places and the 
ways modern life threatens both. The authors in this second part of the book, 
“Holy Living,” join Berry in recognizing this as a theological concern. “The 
word ‘health,’” he notes, “comes from the same Indo-European root as ‘heal,’ 
‘whole,’ and ‘holy.’ To be healthy is literally to be whole; to heal is to make 
whole. I don’t think mortal healers should be credited with the power to make 
holy. But I have no doubt that such healers are properly obliged to acknowl-
edge and respect the holiness embodied in all creatures, or that our healing 
involves the preservation in us of the spirit and the breath of God.”12 Among 
the most repeated biblical exhortations to the people of God is the proclama-
tion that they should be holy. Those of us living today, when religion has been 
sequestered largely to the sphere of the private, can when we hear the word 
holy scarcely help think primarily of religiosity; a “holy” person is one whose 
personal religious behavior is especially evident and who refrains from certain 
(often trivial) proscribed activities. But this is a horribly reductive account of 
holiness, which, as Berry points out, shares a common linguistic heritage with 
the words heal, health, and whole. In this broader sense, a holy person is one 
attentive to his or her existence as a member of creation, which is constituted 
by an intricate constellation of dependences. Both health and holiness, then, 
have to do with living well in relationship—to other persons, other creatures, 
and God. The essays in this part of the book all focus in some way or another 
on better living in relationship.
In this part’s first essay, Elizabeth Bahnson argues that Christian women 
have good reasons to be suspicious of hormonal contraceptives. This is hardly 
a novel position; Catholic teaching has, since the promulgation of the 1968 
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papal document Humanae vitae, proscribed the use of all “artificial” contra-
ceptives, primarily on the grounds that they violate the natural moral order 
given by God. The argument that Bahnson makes is analogous, but sophisti-
catedly nuanced. Citing her own personal experience with oral contraceptives 
as well as an emergent body of medical and scientific research, she suggests 
that Christians should not use oral contraceptives because they are ultimately 
unhealthy, which is to say that they violate the wholeness of the bodies of 
women who use them and threaten the integrity of the ecosystems on which 
those women and their families depend for life.
Elizabeth’s husband, Fred, with whom she operates a small farm in the 
North Carolina Piedmont, contributes the next essay. Fred Bahnson manages 
the Anatoth Community Garden in Orange County, North Carolina, and 
argues that seemingly insignificant projects like community gardens are, in 
fact, important gestures in defiance of the modern food industry, which is 
part of a political economy that depends on violent, exploitative, and ulti-
mately unsustainable practices. Like the Jewish exiles in Babylon to whom the 
prophet Jeremiah wrote in the sixth century b.c.e., Christians have an obliga-
tion to “seek the shalom of the city where I have sent you into exile” (Jer. 
29:7). Bahnson shows how Anatoth is a means by which those who work 
there seek the shalom of their own cities while anticipating the consummation 
of God’s kingdom and the coming of the heavenly city.
The first two essays in this part presume what the third makes explicit, 
which is that the earth is God’s provisional gift to humankind, which is charged 
with its proper stewardship, what Berry calls its “usufruct.” The Old Testament 
scholar Ellen F. Davis suggests that the “agrarian” viewpoint held by Berry and 
his friends is as old as God’s instructions to the Israelites when he brought 
them out of Egypt and settled them in the land of Canaan. For Israel, Davis 
says, being holy meant using the land well and treating it as the gift it was, 
practices that set the Israelites apart from their apparently more sophisticated 
neighbors to the south and east. The Torah is full of instructions on precisely 
how to do this, and Davis shows the relevance of those instructions to those 
who would aspire to holy lives in a more contemporary context.
Ultimately, the land must be treated well because it belongs to God and 
is given to us as a gift and a loan. More immediately, however, we are charged 
to care for the land because the health of our bodies depends on that care. 
Our bodies are not simply contiguous, but continuous with the places they 
inhabit. In my own essay, I draw on Berry’s criticism of modern medicine’s 
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uncritical use of the machine metaphor as a way of understanding and treat-
ing the human body. Taken too literally, that metaphor disregards the mani-
fold relationships on which the body depends for its flourishing. As an alter-
native, I propose we begin thinking and speaking of the body not as a ma-
chine but as a beloved and ecologically interconnected “landscape of flesh.”
This part concludes with an essay that takes one of our most common 
assumptions and turns it upside down. In “The Dark Night of the Soil,” 
Norman Wirzba argues that the popular understanding of mysticism as a 
purely introspective flight from the everyday is deeply problematic. In the 
most basic sense, Wirzba maintains, mysticism involves neither esotericism 
nor excessive introspection. Rather, mysticism is a careful, cultivated atten-
tion to God’s presence in and to the world. To see the world through the eyes 
of the mystics, he says, is to see it clearly, as God intends us to see it. Thus, a 
cultivation of the practice of seeing clearly—again, one of the persistent 
themes in Berry’s essays and poetry—is a necessary step on the way to learn-
ing to live peaceably as a member of creation.
Part 3: Imagination
The task of theology is in good measure an enterprise of the imagination. “A 
man cannot despair,” Berry writes, “if he can imagine a better life, and if he 
can enact something of its possibility. It is only when I am ensnarled in the 
meaningless ordeals and the ordeals of meaninglessness, of which our public 
and political life is now so productive, that I lose the awareness of something 
better, and feel the despair of having come to the dead end of possibility.”13 
The writers represented in the first two parts of the book tend, with a few 
notable exceptions, to focus on Berry’s work as an essayist, a concentration 
understandable given the essays’ richness as a source of social critique. Yet 
Berry’s fiction and poetry are equally rich sources of wisdom about how better 
to live and work, for it is here that we discover Berry at his most fecund theo-
logically. It is in poetry and fiction that Berry explores questions theologians 
would call eschatological, meaning having to do with the present and ultimate 
fulfillment of God’s intent for creation. The authors of the essays in this third 
part of the book, “Imagination,” rightly see that Berry’s fiction and poetry (as 
well as his essays) help us live better by allowing us to imagine a better way to 
live; hence, they work to parse Berry’s views on love, forgiveness, hope, and 
life eternal.
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D. Brent Laytham sees in Berry’s fictional Port William membership, es-
pecially as described by the eponymous protagonist of the novel Hannah 
Coulter, a particularly profound instance of what Christian tradition has called 
the communio sanctorum, the “communion of saints.” Laytham argues that the 
membership’s stubborn, active remembrance of its departed members gives the 
community both a continuity across time and the hope that extends beyond 
time into God’s eternal future. Such remembering, Laytham insists, is funda-
mentally bound to place, and, in this, he draws interesting connections be-
tween Berry and the ancient Christian practice of venerating relics of the saints. 
Philip A. Muntzel continues Laytham’s exploration of hope in Berry by noting 
significant similarities between Berry’s “earthy” account of hope and that of 
Saint Thomas Aquinas. Both Laytham and Muntzel suggest that Berry, who 
refuses entirely to project hope into a time beyond history, holds a position 
largely consistent with the best of Christian teaching.
The next essay, by Scott Williams, tells the disturbing story of mountain-
top-removal coal mining, a practice that is enjoying significant growth, espe-
cially in Appalachia, as petroleum supplies dwindle and become more expen-
sive. Williams suggests that the apparently trivial act of flipping an electric 
switch implicates every modern person in a troublesome history of largely 
invisible violence—that of mining the coal used to generate the steam driving 
the turbines of the plants generating our electricity. He deftly anticipates the 
common rejoinder to pointing out such complicity, which is that it is inevi-
table, for who among us would seriously argue that electricity does not make 
the world a better place? Yet, for Christians, says Williams, who hold fast to 
the hope that God ultimately will finish the work he has begun in the resur-
rection of Jesus, “there is no inevitable violence.” To think otherwise is simply 
to lose faith, which is nothing less than a failure of imagination. God has 
given us the capacity of imagination in part that we might escape the illusion 
that violence is inevitable.
The part concludes with an essay by my coeditor, L. Roger Owens. This 
book is Roger’s idea, and his essay captures the spirit of both the book and his 
own work to discern how to be faithful to where God has placed him. As a 
United Methodist minister and a promising scholar with a Ph.D. in theology, 
Roger chose the rural parish over the university classroom, determined to be 
a pastor-scholar whose work was of use to the particular women and men to 
whom God sent him. In his essay, he uses Berry’s work to show that the proc-
lamation of the Christian Gospel cannot be other than local and particular.
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Part 4: Moving Forward
The book concludes with an essay by Charles R. Pinches engaging the ongo-
ing debate among Christians regarding how best to engage the realm com-
monly referred to as political. Pinches suggests that Berry’s accounts of mem-
ory, work, and membership offer a way forward that avoids the misguided 
division of Christians into withdrawn, tribal “sectarians” and cosmopolitans 
adept at engaging the secular on its own terms.
And so the conversation continues. Begun long ago in a thousand Port 
Williams, faithfully carried by innumerable women and men whose lives have 
evidenced their refusal to abandon hope, it points beyond itself toward the 
redemption of creation, to a new heaven and a new earth, and a new Jerusalem, 
and, of course, a new Port William.
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Part 1
Good Work

The Challenge Before Us
“There are also violent and nonviolent ways to milk cows,” I observed in a 
sermon on the occasion of the installation of Dr. Gerald Gerbrandt as presi-
dent of the Canadian Mennonite University on September 28, 2003.1 I made 
the comment to commend the parochial character of the Canadian Mennonite 
University. The Canadian Mennonite University, as its name suggests, is Men-
nonite and Canadian, and you cannot get more parochial than that. My com-
ment about milking, therefore, was meant to praise why such a university 
would have no reason to distinguish between theoretical and practical forms 
of knowledge.
My sermon—and I think it important to observe that this is a university 
that assumes it is appropriate to have a sermon as part of its inaugural event 
for its first president—expressed my hope that the Canadian Mennonite 
University would not be just another “Christian liberal arts college.” I think 
it is now clear that Christian liberal arts colleges have turned out to be more 
liberal than Christian. It is not my particular interest in this essay to try to 
understand why the Christian liberal arts college has failed to sustain itself as 
Christian; rather, I begin to explore what a Christian university might look 
like.2
To “begin to explore what a Christian university might look like” is, of 
course, a far too grand project. What I am really interested in is to try to spell 
out what difference there may be between violent and nonviolent ways to 
milk cows. The focus on milking cows might suggest I assume that university 
curricula should not be determined by presumptions about the necessity to 
sustain “high culture.” I think it important, however, that universities teach 
Plato, Aquinas, Dante, and Darwin because I think one of the tasks of the 
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university is to be a memory of a people. But too often Christian justifications 
of the university focused on the need to preserve the “classics” of Western 
civilization have created universities that serve class interests more than 
Christian purpose. Why and how Plato is read at the Canadian Mennonite 
University may be quite different than why and how Plato is read at Duke 
University.
I think, moreover, Wendell Berry’s criticism of the university is very im-
portant to help us understand the difference between violent and nonviolent 
ways to milk cows. Berry is an unrelenting critic of the contemporary univer-
sity. I am deeply sympathetic with his criticisms of the university as we know 
it, but his criticisms are so radical it is not unreasonable to conclude that he 
has no hope that the university can be reclaimed for humane—much less 
Christian—purposes. I hope to show that his work also suggests how we need 
to begin to live and, thus, think if we are to begin to imagine what a univer-
sity shaped by Christian practices might look like.
I have, like Berry, often been a critic of the contemporary university. Of 
course, to be a critic of the university is to mark oneself as a university person. 
After all, universities are often associated with people who believe thinking 
means you are “critical.” So, critics of the university often discover that their 
criticisms of the university are criticisms that only people trained at universi-
ties could produce. Therefore, our very critiques reproduce the practices that 
we critique. The truth of the matter is that, in America, it is very hard to sus-
tain a life of study without being parasitic on the university. I am more than 
willing, therefore, to acknowledge that my criticisms of the university, I hope, 
reveal my profound love of the university.
I hope I am a Christian, but the university has been more my home than 
the church. I went to Southwestern University in Georgetown, Texas, in 
September 1962. As they say, “the rest is history” because, from that time to 
the present, I have always lived in a university. The only way I know to make 
a living is to be at a university. I did not necessarily set out to be a university 
person. My life just worked out that way. I was brought up to be a bricklay-
er—honest work. I have tried not to forget what it means to be in the trades, 
but, for better or worse, I am an academic.
After Southwestern, I spent six years at Yale Divinity School and Yale 
Graduate School, where I received the bachelor of divinity degree and my 
Ph.D. I taught two years at Augustana College in Rock Island, Illinois, and 
fourteen years at the University of Notre Dame, and I am now in my twenty-
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second year of teaching in the Divinity School at Duke. My life has been 
made possible by people who care about sustaining the university. I no doubt 
owe the university more than I know.
Yet the history recounted in the last paragraphs is not one characteristic 
of those who have sought to have an academic career. I have always served the 
university. Because I am a Christian, I have worked to allow myself to be used 
by, as well as to use, the university. I am a theologian. Theology is not gener-
ally considered a legitimate field in the university. Of course, that was not the 
official position at Augustana or Notre Dame. Lutherans and Catholics still 
thought and think that theology should matter, though how it matters is in 
dispute. Theology is tolerated at Duke because we are a divinity school, but 
the Divinity School is regarded by many at Duke as a “cultural lag.” Theologians 
in the modern university bear the burden of proof, which turns out to be very 
good for theology because, if you are a theologian, you need to know what 
your colleagues in other disciplines know even though they do not have to 
know what you know.
Yet my identity as a theologian means I have always been in the univer-
sity but not of it. Berry has been more out of the university than in the uni-
versity. Berry, of course, would not be Berry without the university. He is a 
graduate of a university. He has a graduate degree. He has taught at the 
University of Kentucky and other universities from time to time. But he has 
clearly chosen to think and write outside the university. I may, therefore, have 
more of a stake in making the university work than Berry has. Nonetheless, I 
hope to show how he can help us begin to rethink what a university might 
look like in order to be of service to the church. Having said this, I should 
warn the reader that I may also be using Berry’s work to sustain a project that 
Berry thinks hopeless.
Berry on the University
“Abstraction is the enemy wherever it is found.”3 If any sentence could sum up 
Berry’s work and, in particular, his criticism of the modern university, it is this 
one. In order to appropriately appreciate his criticism of abstraction, however, 
it is wise, I think, to attend to his early but very important essay “Standing by 
Words.” Berry is very careful not to reproduce dualisms that only create the 
problem he is trying to help us avoid. He is not, for example, advocating 
subjectivity as an alternative to objectivity, nor is he recommending the par-
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ticular over the universal. Rather, he is trying to help us resist our tendency to 
speak nonsense.
Berry seldom betrays any knowledge of philosophy or philosophers. I 
suspect that, like many poets, he is suspicious of philosophers. But his under-
standing of language, the criticism of the abstractions that we are taught to 
speak at universities, cannot help but remind some of us of lessons we have 
learned from Wittgenstein. In “Standing by Words,” Berry argues that the 
disintegration of communities and persons in our time is a correlative of the 
loss of accountability in our use of language. According to Berry, for any 
statement to be complete or comprehensible, three conditions are required:
1. It must designate its object precisely.
2. Its speaker must stand by it: must believe it, be accountable for it, be 
willing to act on it.
3. This relation of speaker, word, and object must be conventional; the 
community must know what it is.4
Berry suggests that these common assumptions are becoming uncom-
mon through the development of specialization. As a result, language is in-
creasingly seen as a weapon to gain power over others or as a medium of play. 
Some—even poets such as Shelley—think our task is to heighten the subjec-
tivity of language in order to resist objectification. Yet, when that unhappy 
choice is accepted, only pathos can result, making language nothing more 
than a medium of self-pity.
It is extremely important to note that Berry is not denying the need for 
generalization. There is truth in T. S. Eliot’s claim that “the particular has no 
language”—but there are, nonetheless, two forms of precision that allow the 
particular to be communicated.
The first is the precision in speech of people who share the same knowl-
edge of place and history: “The old hollow beech blew down last night.” Berry 
calls this community speech, which he praises because it is precise and open to 
ongoing testing against its objects. Such speech is the “very root and founda-
tion of language.”5
The second form of precision is that which “comes of tension either be-
tween a statement and a prepared context or, within a single statement, be-
tween more or less conflicting feelings, or ideas.”6 To illustrate this form of 
precision, Berry contrasts Shelley’s complaint against our mortality, “I could 
What Would a Christian University Look Like?  19
lie down like a tired child,” with Robert Herrick’s, “Out of the world he must, 
who once comes in,” observing that the latter satisfies our need for complex-
ity and, thus, does justice to our actual experience.7 Such precision is hard-
won, requiring us to battle against our proclivities to engage in fantasies.
One form such fantasies take is the production of sentences that try to be 
objective by avoiding all personal biases and considerations. Berry thinks sci-
entists often use such language. He gives the example of conversations tran-
scribed during the Three Mile Island crisis as members of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission worked to “engineer a press release” to avoid fright-
ening the public that a meltdown might happen. Thus, one commissioner 
suggests they say “in the unlikely event that this occurred temperatures would 
result and possible further fuel damage.” Berry observes that what is remark-
able and frightening about such language is the inability of those who so 
speak to acknowledge what it is they are talking about.8
The perversion of speech illustrated by attempts to be objective serves the 
political purpose of securing the power of those who use it without their be-
ing held accountable. They say such speech aims to bring people together for 
some common project. Accordingly, they try to create the illusion we all speak 
the same language: “[This means] either that they will agree with the govern-
ment or be quiet, as in communist and fascist states, or that they will politely 
ignore their disagreements or disagree ‘provisionally,’ as in American universi-
ties. But the result—though power may survive for a while in spite of it—is 
confusion and dispersal. Real language, real discourse are destroyed. People 
lose understanding of each other, are divided and scattered. Speech of what-
ever kind begins to resemble the speech of drunkenness or madness.”9
Berry offers another example of this passion for objectivity that, interest-
ingly enough, has to do with cows. In an article entitled “The Evolution and 
Future of American Animal Agriculture,” G. W. Salisbury and R. G. Hart ar-
gue for the importance of the transformation of American agriculture from an 
art to a science. Art, they suggest, is concerned only with the “hows,” science 
with the “whys.” Accordingly, they recommend that a cow be described as an 
“appropriate manufacturing unit of the twentieth century.”10 Berry notes that 
such language relieves those who use it of any accountability indicated by a 
farmer’s statement: “Be good to the cow, for she is our companion.”11
The latter sentence requires a world that is organized in the hierarchical 
sequence of nature, agriculture, community, family, person. Such a hierarchy 
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is based on the assumption that these systems are interrelated and that what-
ever affects one will affect the other. The former sentence reverses this hierar-
chy so that it runs from industrial economy, to agriculture, to dairy, to dairy-
man. This latter hierarchy is meant to disintegrate the connecting disciplines, 
turning them into professions and professions into careers. Berry’s subsequent 
criticism of the university can now be seen as the development of his concern 
that in the university we are taught to speak in a manner in which we are no 
longer able to “stand by our words.” Thus my claim that the two questions 
you cannot ask in the modern university are, “What is the university for?” and 
“Who does it serve?” That the university has no “learned public” to serve— 
and a learned public might be one that milks cows—is at the heart of our 
problem.
Berry thinks the modern university is at least one of the institutions that 
should be held responsible for the corruption of our language. The university 
at once legitimates and reproduces the disintegration of the life of the mind 
and of communities through increasing specialization. According to Berry:
The various specialties are moving ever outward from any center of in-
terest or common ground, becoming ever farther apart, and ever more 
unintelligible to one another. Among the causes, I think, none is more 
prominent than the by now ubiquitous and nearly exclusive emphasis 
upon originality and innovation. The emphasis, operating within the 
“channels” of administration, affects in the most direct and practical 
ways all the lives within the university. It imposes the choice of work 
over life, exacting not only the personal costs spoken of in Yeats’ poem 
(“The Choice”), but very substantial costs to the community as well.12
Specialization of the disciplines, however, is crucial if the university is to 
receive the support it needs from a capitalist society. If universities are to 
grow—and the assumption is that they must always grow—they will need 
money. But it is equally important that they accept the fundamental eco-
nomic principle of the opposition of money to goods. Berry, who otherwise 
betrays no Marxist sympathies, seems to know in his bones that there is no 
abstraction more abstract than money. Not only is labor appropriated from 
the worker in the name of money, but the worker is also expected to use that 
money to buy goods that cannot be represented by money.
The incoherence of university curricula reflects the university’s commit-
ment to legitimate the abstraction effected by money. For example, it is cru-
What Would a Christian University Look Like?  21
cial that the university ensure that learning be organized not as a conversation 
between disciplines but rather as a place where disciplines are representatives 
of competing opposites. As a result, accountability is lost. The sciences are 
sectioned off from one another so that they might serve their respective cor-
porations: “The so-called humanities, which might have supplied at least a 
corrective or chastening remembrance of the good that humans have some-
times accomplished, have been dismembered into utter fecklessness, turning 
out ‘communicators’ who have nothing to say and ‘educators’ who have noth-
ing to teach.” Indeed, universities no longer are sources of literacy. Accordingly, 
the English department itself has become a specialty, and, even in those de-
partments, writing has become a subspecialty of the freshman writing pro-
gram. The result is the clear message that to write well is not necessary.13
Berry confesses he has no idea how the disciplines might be reorganized, 
but he is doubtful that anyone knows how to do that. However, he is con-
vinced that the standards and goals of the disciplines need to be changed. He 
observes:
It used to be that we thought of the disciplines as ways of being useful 
to ourselves, for we needed to earn a living, but also and more impor-
tantly we thought of them as ways of being useful to one another. As 
long as the idea of vocation was still viable among us, I don’t believe it 
was ever understood that a person was “called” to be rich or powerful 
or even successful. People were taught the disciplines at home or in 
school for two reasons: to enable them to live and work both as self-
sustaining individuals and as useful members of their communities, 
and to see that the disciplines themselves survived the passing of the 
generations.14
The incoherence of university curricula reflects the acceptance of the as-
sumption that there is nothing odd about unlimited economic growth or 
consumption in a limited world. Education is now job preparation for a ca-
reer in a profession.15 But work, whether it is done in the academy, a profes-
sion, or industry, is now designed so that the workers are separated from the 
effects of their work. They are permitted “to think that they are working no-
where or anywhere—in their careers or specialties, perhaps, or in ‘cyber-
space.’”16 The university, therefore, becomes a home for the homeless, those 
whom Wallace Stegner calls the “boomers.”17
The dominance of science in the modern university reflects the captivity 
of universities to industrial societies. For the abstractions of science are read-
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ily assimilated to the abstractions of industry in which
everything is interchangeable with or replaceable by something else. . . . 
One place is as good as another, one use is as good as another, one life is 
as good as another—if the price is right. This is the industrial doctrine 
of the interchangeability of parts, and we apply it to places, to creatures, 
and to our fellow humans as if it were the law of the world, using all the 
while a sort of middling language, imitated from the sciences, that can-
not speak of heaven or earth, but only of concepts. This is the rhetoric 
of nowhere, which forbids a passionate interest in, let alone a love of, 
anything in particular.18
For Berry, the assumption that education is the solution to all our prob-
lems is a correlate to the increasing violence of what is taught. Berry thinks 
the violence of education is, as we should suspect from his analysis in Standing 
by Words, to be found in the destruction of language and community. He 
observes: “Education has become increasingly useless as it has become in-
creasingly public. Real education is determined by community needs, not by 
public tests.”19
This distinction between community and public may seem odd given the 
assumption that the public names the goods of the community, but Berry 
understands the term public to mean simply all people abstracted from any 
personal responsibility or belonging. Thus, a public building is one that be-
longs to everyone, but no one in particular. A community, in contrast, “has 
to do first of all with belonging”: “It is a group of people who belong to one 
another and to their place. We would say, ‘We belong to our community,’ but 
never ‘We belong to our public.’”20
Berry does not deny that under certain circumstances the public and the 
community might be compatible, but within the economic and technological 
monoculture in which we live they cannot help but be at odds. A community 
is centered on the household, which means it is always concerned with a place 
and time. The public, when it is rightly formed, is concerned about justice and 
is centered on the individual. The problem we confront is that the emphasis on 
individual liberty has made the freedom of the community impossible. 
Paradoxically, as a result, the more the emphasis has been on individual free-
dom, the less liberty and power have been available to most individuals.21
In the novel Hannah Coulter, Berry describes the effects of the university 
on Caleb Coulter, the son of Hannah and Nathan. Hannah and Nathan are 
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hardworking farmers who have managed to create a life from an unforgiving 
ground. Caleb was the last born of their three children, all of whom went to 
college. Hannah observes that you send your children to college in order to 
do the best for them, but neither do you want to burden them with your ex-
pectations. She confesses that you hope they will go away and study and learn 
and then come back and you will have them for a neighbor. However, she 
observes, while their children were at the university, there always “came a time 
when we would feel the distance opening to them, pulling them away. It was 
like sitting snug in the house, and a door is opened somewhere, and sud-
denly you feel a draft.”22
Caleb even became Dr. Coulter, a professor who taught agriculture to 
fewer students who were actually going to farm. Hannah describes him this 
way:
He became an expert with a laboratory and experimental plots, a man of 
reputation. But as I know, and as he knows in his own heart and 
thoughts, Caleb is incomplete. He didn’t love farming enough to be a 
farmer, much as he loved it, but he loved it too much to be entirely 
happy doing anything else. He is disappointed in himself. . . . Caleb is 
well respected, and I am glad of that. He brings me what he calls his 
“publications,” written in the Unknown Tongue. He wants me to be 
proud of them. And I am, but with the sadness of wishing I could be 
prouder. I read all of his publications that he brings me, and I have to 
say that they don’t make me happy. I can’t hear Caleb talking in them. 
And they speak of everything according to its general classification. 
Reading them always makes me think of this farm and how it emerged, 
out of “agriculture” and its “soil types” and its collection of “species,” as 
itself, our place, a place like no other, yielding to Nathan and me a life 
like no other.23
The novel Hannah Coulter expresses Berry’s deepest worry about the con-
temporary university: what an education does to people. It is a mistake to 
accuse him of being antitechnological or against all forms of specialization. 
His problem with technology and specialization is that they tend to become 
ends in themselves, producing people with no ends. As he puts it in the essay 
“Health as Membership”: “[I am not] ‘against technology’ so much as I am 
for community. When the choice is between the health of a community and 
technological innovation, I choose the health of the community.”24 Technology, 
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particularly in industrial economies, too easily becomes abstracted from the 
purposes that it was to serve.
Nor is Berry against science. Science has a proper place in relation to the 
other disciplines, particularly when all the disciplines are equally regarded 
and given equal time to talk no matter what the market may be in jobs or 
intellectual property. Indeed, it is the task of the university to foster such a 
conversation between disciplines so that our whole humanity may be embod-
ied in and by the university. So Berry thinks the university has an appropriate 
task, but he is simply doubtful that any university presently in existence is 
committed to accomplishing that task.25
That task, moreover, requires that “a system” exist that secures the convic-
tion that the truth can be known, but never all truth. Such a conviction Berry 
calls religious to indicate that the world in which we find ourselves is a mys-
tery making possible accountable speech and behavior. For I hope it is now 
clear that Berry’s criticisms of the university are but an extension of his con-
cern that we hold one another accountable for what we say. From his perspec-
tive, the university has become the source of abstract speech that is no longer 
accountable to any community of purpose. Berry does not claim that the fate 
of the modern university is the result of the loss of mystery, but he is sure that 
all “answers” put forward in the university
must be worked out within a limit of humility and restraint, so that the 
initiative to act would always imply a knowing acceptance of account-
ability for the results. The establishment and maintenance of this limit 
seems to me the ultimate empirical problem—the real “frontier” of sci-
ence, or at least of the definition of the possibility of a moral science. It 
would place science under the rule of the old concern for propriety, cor-
rect proportion, proper scale—from which, in modern times, even the 
arts have been “liberated.” That is, it would return to all work, artistic or 
scientific, the possibility of an external standard or quality.26
His criticisms of the university are clearer than the alternative Berry of-
fers. That is probably the way it should be. Who knows what a Berry-inspired 
university might look like? It may well sound too artsy, but Berry, I think, 
would want the center of a university to be the practice of poetry. For only 
through poetry—speech tied closely to community, place, and time—can we 
avoid the abstractions that have become our way of life.
Berry reports that he was raised by agrarians but that he did not know he 
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was an agrarian until he was a sophomore in college. He seems to think it a 
good thing he was taught he was an agrarian. Indeed, he seems to indicate 
that learning he was an agrarian was a poetic development. Learning he was 
an agrarian meant he was able to distinguish between industrialism, which is 
based on monetary capital, and agrarianism, which is based on land. Moreover, 
it was partly his education that made it possible for him to trace the lineage 
of agrarian thought through Virgil, Spenser, Shakespeare, and Pope. According 
to Berry, it is from poets like these you learn you should not work until you 
have looked and seen where you are in a manner that honors nature not only 
as your grandmother but as your teacher and judge as well.27
As critical as Berry is of the university as we know it—and certainly any 
of us who live in the university recognize the university exists that he criti-
cizes—he still remains a lover of the university. After all, it was in a university 
that he learned to read Virgil, Spenser, Shakespeare, Pope, and Jefferson. Yet 
he seems to hold out little hope that the kind of university he would like to 
exist could be a reality. No doubt, he assumes that his university might exist 
in pockets of any university but that such an existence depends on people 
existing who defy the abstractions that are so tempting. It would be silly to 
suggest that the church might offer the possibility of making a Berry-like 
university a reality, but I at least want to explore how we might imagine that 
possibility.
Why Berry Needs a Church
Christians are a people who worship the God of the Jews. We are a people 
who worship Jesus, the Messiah, and the Incarnation of the Word of God. 
The God we worship is flesh, such that our cardinal action is to eat and drink 
the body and blood of Christ. The God we worship is, therefore, known only 
through a story as concrete as “The old hollow beech blew down last night.” 
We learn about the old hollow beech by being told by another it was blown 
down. In similar fashion, we know about Jesus by being told by another. 
Witness is constitutive of the character of what Christians believe. For the 
Christian witness to be truthful requires that Christians distrust all abstrac-
tions not disciplined by the Word that is Christ.
However, well before the development of the kind of abstraction Berry 
finds so destructive, Christians developed their own form of abstraction. Jesus 
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commanded his disciples: “Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, 
baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy 
Spirit, and teaching them to obey everything that I have commanded you” 
(Matt. 28:19–20). Jesus’ command to be a witness to the nations, a task that 
should force Christians to recognize as well as criticize the infinite and unend-
ing forms of abstraction, has also tempted Christians to confuse the preten-
tious universalism of the nation with the Gospel.
The politics of Christian abstraction has taken many different forms. But 
at least one name for such a politics is Constantinianism. Constantinianism is 
the attempt by the church to use the power of the state (and the state is an 
abstraction) to impose the Gospel on others without the vulnerability of wit-
ness. Because the church is obligated to be a witness to all nations, it has 
sometimes confused the universalism of the speech of empire, speech that by 
necessity is shaped by abstraction, with the concreteness of the Gospel.
Christians, particularly in modernity, have forgotten that our name for 
universal is catholic and that the office that enacts the catholic character of the 
church is called bishop. The task of the bishop is to ensure that the stories that 
make a church the church are shared by other churches across time and space. 
Therefore, our speech is tested by how other Christians have learned to speak 
to one another as well as to those who do not speak as we speak. Theologians 
are servants to the bishop charged with the task of maintaining the memory 
of the church so that the church may be one. Theologians are, therefore, “an-
swerable to a specific locality or very often multiple specific localities, such 
that [their] sense of perpetuating a history must be combined with [their] 
sense of carrying out an archaeology and mapping a geography.”28
If Christians are to support the development of a Berry-like university, 
we will need to be freed of our Constantinian pretensions. That freedom, 
moreover, will come only by the intensification of the catholic character of 
the church. For the abstractions that bewitch our speech as Christians can be 
located and resisted only by word care made possible by being challenged by 
our brothers and sisters across time and place. As John Howard Yoder has 
observed, the alternative to the confusion of paganism and Christianity so 
often the result of Constantinianism is “the concreteness of the visible com-
munity created by the renewed message. The alternative to hierarchical defi-
nition is local definition.”29
Modern universities, whether Christian or secular, have been servants of 
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the emerging nation-state system. That nation-state system, moreover, has 
been the enemy of locality. Local communities are not and cannot be efficient 
given the need to organize “populations.”30 The abstractions Berry identifies 
as the enemy are those necessary to legitimate the public organizations that 
claim to serve our interests. The very language of “interest,” of course, is but 
an exemplification of the kind of abstraction he deplores.
Berry’s appeal to a religious sense of mystery for maintaining some sense 
of the whole is important, but a sense of mystery cannot be sustained in the 
absence of a community in which the mystery is materially enacted. A univer-
sity able to resist the mystifications legitimated by the abstractions of our so-
cial order will depend on a people shaped by fundamental practices necessary 
for truthful speech. In short, without a church capable of demythologizing 
the false idealism that possesses our imaginations, there is no possibility that 
a university capable of educating a Caleb Coulter who might return home 
can actually exist.
These are, of course, highly theoretical remarks. Do they have any impli-
cations for what a church-based university might look like? Some are begin-
ning to try to imagine what such a university might entail. For example, 
many of the essays in the collection Conflicting Allegiances: The Church-Based 
University in a Liberal Democratic Society are not content to explore how the 
contemporary university might be reformed to be more responsive to Christian 
practice. As Michael Budde puts it: “The purpose of ecclesially based higher 
education is to make participants more fully into disciples shaped by the pri-
orities and practices of Jesus Christ; to help them discern their vocation as 
members of the transnational body of Christ; and to contribute to the mis-
sion of the church—to help the church serve more fully and faithfully as a 
foretaste of the promised kingdom of God, on earth as in heaven.”31
Budde observes that this is a difficult task because our imaginations are 
possessed by what we assume are normative assumptions about higher educa-
tion. So, for example, the very language of higher may be misleading just to 
the extent it presumes that knowing how to milk is not a “higher” knowledge. 
Budde, however, would readily agree that the use of higher to distinguish 
university subjects from the knowledge represented by the act of milking is 
part of the problem. Accordingly, many of the essays in Conflicting Allegiances 
challenge the (dis)organization of knowledges characteristic of the contempo-
rary university. For example, Therese Lysaught asks what form the life sci-
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ences might take if they were organized on the principle that Christians are 
obligated to love our enemy, even the enemy called death.32
The problem is not whether we lack the imagination to begin to think 
what a university shaped by Christian practice might look like but rather 
whether a church exists that can provide the material conditions that might 
make such an alternative university possible. By material conditions I mean 
not just money but also whether churches are constituted by the practices, 
that is, by habits nurtured by worship, that require the development of knowl-
edges that can challenge the abstractions that are legitimated in and by the 
current university. Have Christians learned to milk nonviolently? So, oddly 
enough, we will not know how to think about the character of the university 
without thinking about the character of the church.
But we cannot wait. Many of us, as I suggest above concerning my own 
life, continue to teach in universities that exemplify the pathologies Berry 
describes. Should Christians continue to teach in universities, including those 
often identified as “church-related,” in which students are shaped by abstrac-
tions that serve quite a different reality than that of the church? Do Christian 
academics, in spite of their criticisms of the university, legitimate those uni-
versities by their very presence?
Any attempt to justify Christian participation in the university as we 
know it is an invitation to self-deception. Yet, in his 2004 Oxford University 
Commemoration Day sermon, Rowan Williams provides some helpful re-
minders that can point us in a constructive direction. Williams observes that 
Oxford began as a cell of the Catholic Church for the study of canon law, but, 
by the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, its survival depended on forming 
people who would govern the kingdom. He notes that this will confirm the 
worst fears of some who assume that Oxford is primarily an institution com-
mitted to serving the elite. Yet he points out that it was assumed “that to 
govern a kingdom you needed to know how language worked, what the dif-
ference was between good and bad arguments, and how you might persuade 
people to morally defensible action.”33 Accordingly, you needed tools of 
thought that were organized in a hierarchy of learning.
Williams acknowledges that much has changed at Oxford. An abstract 
understanding of rationality has displaced what many now consider the au-
thoritarian character of the medieval university. Yet Williams argues that, to 
the extent the university maintains a commitment to disciplined argument, 
there remains a sense of the capacity to respond with justice and accuracy to 
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the inner structure of creation, thus testifying to the divine image constitutive 
of each of us. He therefore thinks he is justified to “insist upon the university’s 
role in nourishing honest and hopeful speech, for the sake of a properly rea-
sonable culture and politics.” He therefore concludes that what the church 
has to say to the university is:
Don’t be afraid of assuming that your task is to equip people to take 
authority. In a democratic age, this is not the authority of a royal coun-
selor or imperial proconsul; it is the authority of the literate and edu-
cated person to contribute to the public reason. And don’t be afraid in 
encouraging in whatever way is available the calling both to scientific 
research and to public service, administration and politics and social 
care; law and medicine, those ancient and persistent elements in the pat-
tern of public life; the service, in one calling or another of the Body of 
Christ. Avoid the false polarization between disinterested research and 
the world of target setting and assessment; remember that all properly 
intellectual work can be a form of witness to public values.34
I have no idea whether Berry would find Williams’s understanding of the 
task of the university compatible with his understanding of what universities 
ought to be about. However, I suspect he might find congenial Williams’s 
suggestion that the university’s task is to train literate people capable of recog-
nizing the difference between a good argument and a bad argument. No 
doubt, the study of poetry helps the development of such a skill, but so can 
the study of a science. I am sure, moreover, that at every university poets and 
scientists exist who are committed to such a task. What remains unclear is 
whether a people exist who care whether such poets or scientists exist. At the 
very least, Christians are obligated to care because we believe we have been 
given the great privilege to stand by the Word.
“To stand by the Word,” moreover, might help us maintain the connec-
tion between those who labor within the university and those who labor out-
side it. Fritz Oehlschlaeger, in a letter responding to my essay “Theological 
Knowledge and the Knowledges of the University,” observes that, even at its 
most strenuous, intellectual work is not as difficult as physical labor. How, 
then, he asks, can we ever justify those like ourselves who think the work we 
do in the university is important? Oehlschlaeger, who teaches in the English 
Department at Virginia Tech, responds to this question by observing:
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It seems to me this requires active memory and recognition by the intel-
lectual of the labor that sustains his/her ability to pursue knowledge. 
The best way to ensure this is for the intellectual to come into the pres-
ence of others, to make offering with them of their labor, and to receive 
the truly priceless food provided by the One whose love can only be 
understood as pure gift. Thus we learn that utility in meeting needs can 
never be a sufficient standard, as we cannot produce the very thing we 
need most. And the Eucharist perhaps also disciplines the intellectual to 
recognize his bonds to those whose labors make his work possible—so 
that any pursuit of knowledge for its own sake carries also the memory 
of the labor that sustains it. Intellectuals formed within a community 
nourished by the milk of Jesus seem much more likely to think of what 
they do as requiring a community to receive it. . . . Maybe there’s a role, 
then, for Christian intellectuals who might mediate among the disci-
plines and between disciplines and public in ways that would not occur 
to the market-driven knowledge-producers on today’s faculties.35
“Maybe there’s a role” is, I hope, hopeful speech.
Notes
This essay first appeared in Stanley Hauerwas, The State of the University: Academic 
Knowledges and the Knowledge of God (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007).
1. The sermon, entitled “On Milk and Jesus,” can be found in my Disrupting 
Time: Sermons, Prayers, and Sundries (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2004), 142–48.
2. For my analysis of some of the developments surrounding the relation of the 
church and the university, see my “How Risky Is the Risk of Higher Education? 
Random Reflections from the American Context,” Communio 30, no. 1 (Spring 
2003): 79–94, and “Pro Ecclesia, Pro Texana: Schooling the Heart in the Heart of 
Texas,” in The Schooled Heart: Moral Formation and American Higher Education, ed. 
Michael D. Beaty and Douglas V. Henry (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 
2007).
3. Wendell Berry, “Out of Your Car, Off Your Horse,” in Sex, Economy, Freedom, 
and Community: Eight Essays (New York: Pantheon, 1992), 23.
4. Wendell Berry, “Standing by Words,” in Standing by Words (Washington, DC: 
Shoemaker & Hoard, 1983), 25.
5. Ibid., 33.
6. Ibid., 34.
7. Ibid., 35.
8. Ibid., 38.
9. Ibid., 40.
What Would a Christian University Look Like?  31
10. G. W. Salisbury and R. G. Hart, “The Evolution and Future of American 
Animal Agriculture,” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 22 (1979): 394–409.
11. Ibid., 43–44.
12. Wendell Berry, Life Is a Miracle: An Essay against Modern Superstition 
(Washington, DC: Counterpoint, 2000), 61. Yeats’s poem (quoted in ibid., 56) 
reads:
The intellect of man is forced to choose
Perfection of the life, or of the work,
And if it take the second must refuse
A heavenly mansion, raging in the dark.
When all that story’s finished, what’s the news?
In luck or out the toil has left its mark:
The old perplexity an empty purse,
Or the day’s vanity, the night’s remorse.
13. Ibid., 123 (quote), 68.
14. Ibid., 130.
15. Wendell Berry, “Conserving Communities,” in Another Turn of the Crank 
(Washington, DC: Counterpoint, 1995), 13–14.
16. Wendell Berry, “Going to Work,” in Citizenship Papers (Washington, DC: 
Shoemaker & Hoard, 2003), 33.
17. Stegner cited in Wendell Berry, “The Conservation of Nature and the 
Preservation of Humanity,” in Another Turn of the Crank, 82. Berry reports boomers 
are people “who expect or demand that the world conform to their desires. They ei-
ther succeed and thus damage the world, or they fail and thus damage their family 
and themselves” (ibid.).
18. Berry, Life Is a Miracle, 41–42. Berry’s characterization of science unfortu-
nately too often is accurate, but science can be one of the most exciting disciplines 
through which to see the beauty of the particulars.
19. Wendell Berry, “Sex, Economy, Freedom, and Community,” in Sex, Economy, 
Freedom, and Community, 123.
20. Ibid., 147–48.
21. Ibid., 147–55.
22. Wendell Berry, Hannah Coulter (Washington, DC: Shoemaker & Hoard, 
2004), 120.
23. Ibid., 131–32.
24. Wendell Berry, “Health as Membership,” in Another Turn of the Crank, 90.
25. Wendell Berry, “Is Life a Miracle?” in Citizenship Papers, 189.
26. Berry, “Standing by Words,” 49–50.
27. Wendell Berry, “The Whole Horse,” in Citizenship Papers, 118–19.
32  Stanley Hauerwas
28. John Milbank, “The Last of the Last: Theology in the Church,” in Conflicting 
Allegiances: The Church-Based University in a Liberal Democratic Society, ed. Michael 
Budde and John Wright (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2004), 250.
29. John Howard Yoder, “The Disavowal of Constantine: An Alternative 
Perspective on Interfaith Dialogue,” in The Royal Priesthood: Essays Ecclesiological and 
Ecumenical, ed. Michael Cartwright (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1994), 253.
30. For my analysis of the significance of the creation of the nation of “popula-
tions,” see my “The Christian Difference; or, Surviving Postmodernism,” in A Better 
Hope: Resources for a Church Confronting Capitalism, Democracy, and Postmodernity 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2000), 35–46.
31. Michael Budde, “Assessing What Doesn’t Exist: Reflections on the Impact of 
an Ecclesially Based University,” in Conflicting Allegiances, 256.
32. Therese Lysaught, “Love Your Enemies: The Life Sciences in the Ecclesially 
Based University,” in ibid., 109–27.
33. Rowan Williams, “Oxford University Commemoration Day Sermon, 
University Church of St. Mary the Virgin, Oxford” (sermon delivered June 20, 2004), 
available at http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org1205?q=%22your+task+is+to+ 
equip+people+to+take+authority%22.
34. Ibid.
35. Fritz Oehlschlaeger to the author, September 21, 2004. Oehlschlaeger has 
begun the difficult task of thinking what a Christian reading of literature might 
mean. See Fritz Oehlschlaeger, Love and Good Reasons: Postliberal Approaches to 
Christian Ethics and Literature (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003). See also 
my “Theological Knowledge and the Knowledges of the University: Beginning 
Explorations,” in The State of the University: Academic Knowledges and the Knowledge 
of God (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007).
In a literature and medicine elective I help teach, fourth-year medical stu-
dents read fiction, memoirs, essays, and plays more or less about health, dis-
ease, physicians, and patients. Our purpose is not to teach literary theory but 
to connect these works with the lives of our doctors in training. Most at-
tempts are encouraging; some less so. From the beginning, we’ve read works 
by Wendell Berry. They are not well received.
One student, a budding surgeon, dismissed Berry’s “Health Is Member-
ship” as the “most revolting thing I’ve ever been forced to read.” Others were 
troubled with Berry’s attention to—as they saw it—trivial details of hospital 
experience, such as poor food and bad sleeping conditions. The strongest 
objections, however, focused on his criticism that, in emphasizing techno-
logical solutions derived from fallible and frequently misapplied science, 
medicine destroys human connections between patients, communities, and 
the land. “Who does this Kentucky farmer think he is, telling me how to be 
a doctor?” said one student, who would soon be an internist. To Berry’s claim 
that “medicine is an exact science until applied,”1 one doc, training in emer-
gency care, countered: “Medicine is an exact science, and it’s getting more 
exact all the time!” A second-generation immigrant, destined for psychiatry, 
went further, pounding her fist on the table as she declared: “The reason 
American medicine’s the best in the world is capitalism!” She did not elabo-
rate, nor did I ask by what criteria she assessed America’s medical superiority, 
though I might have referenced many public health measures, such as infant 
mortality, teen pregnancy, and health care access, in which the U.S. world 
ranking is absolutely shameful.
Still, I was grateful our students were responding to the essay, if not nec-
essarily as I would have liked. I also learned that challenging ideas are better 
33
Brian Volck
Mr. Berry Goes to Medical School
Notes toward Unspecializing a Healing Art
34  Brian Volck
received in story form than as direct statement, which may account for the 
enduring power of parables. While there were complaints about medically 
“unrealistic” descriptions in “Fidelity,” a story in which family members res-
cue the dying Burley Coulter from a Louisville hospital so that he may die 
with his people in his own country, the narrative spawned less protest than 
the essay. Yet it was clear that students about to begin the long, often grueling 
years of residency training are poorly disposed toward criticism of the profes-
sion, even if medical practice has precious little to profess these days.
Occasionally, I’m heartened by a student who takes a real liking to Berry’s 
work. One recalled his own days on a Kentucky farm and how he relished 
walking the woods in peace after a frenetic week in the hospital. I’ve even 
found residents reading Berry on their own, though they tend to be an odd 
sort in this business. After all, they’re reading something other than online 
medical references and journal articles, and a resident’s schedule rarely per-
mits leisure reading. Some come from small towns or farms; most find Berry 
attractive because he offers an alternative voice to that of the mainstream 
medical industry. Not that they buy all of Berry’s critique, however. I spoke 
with one young doctor while on a medical trip to Honduras, and he said: 
“Yeah, I really like what he has to say. Except that short story about stealing 
the guy from the hospital. That was just wild.”
Autonomy
Is Mr. Berry too wild for medical school? There is, in fact, very little about 
medical education or practice in the United States to suggest that health has 
anything to do with membership or community. Families visiting my univer-
sity-affiliated office come from an array of economic and ethnic backgrounds. 
Most of my patients can’t afford private medical insurance. Some travel many 
miles to be seen and wait for their appointment in a lobby full of strangers. 
At best, my patients and I weave in and out of each other’s lives. Our embod-
ied interactions are less communal encounters than isolated vignettes, scenes 
within larger, unrelated dramas.
So it’s a personal experience of absent community—a wholeness rup-
tured by the North American obsession with individual health—that I bring 
to the classroom when we read Wendell Berry. On a busy afternoon, for ex-
ample, after saying good-bye to a mother who brought her healthy newborn 
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in for a first visit, I walk down the hall and grab the next chart: a fifteen-year-
old male, here for a sports physical. Entering, I find he’s alone, staring at me 
from his seat atop the exam table, arms crossed, looking annoyed. He’s more 
wiry than muscular, with a heavy dose of mistrust and insecurity in his stony 
glare. I take a seat, start asking questions. His answers are telegraphically 
brief: no problems, school’s boring, basketball this winter. To stay in playing 
form, he avoids tobacco but doesn’t refuse marijuana, preferring it to alcohol. 
We talk about this; I give him the facts as I know them, along with pointed 
advice I both hope and doubt that he’ll take. He’s learned much from the 
economy, from movies, television, and music. I ask him to talk with his par-
ents, but he says that his mother has her own troubles and he hasn’t seen his 
father in months. Teachers and counselors aren’t his crowd. He’s experienced, 
used to making his own decisions.
I ask, “When’s the last time you had sex?” He glares and spits out a line 
he’s probably been rehearsing since his arrival: “I was supposed to get some 
this afternoon, and you’re keeping me from it.” I figure he’s showing off, 
though I don’t doubt he’s seen far more than I did at his age. My job, accord-
ing to experts in my field, is to suggest other ways of behaving (knowing full 
well that he has little incentive to change) and provide him with technologies 
to reduce the harm he causes himself and others. We talk safe sex, protection, 
and birth control. It’s old news to him. He knows where to get condoms, 
shows no interest in contraception. I don’t mention how rarely a teen mother 
in my practice seeks child support from the baby’s father. I ask instead what 
he wants from life, which turns out to be an NBA career, lots of consumer 
electronics, and a great deal of autonomy. His eyes tell me I’m pressing too 
hard. He sees no need for advice or life counseling. I’m here as his pediatric 
specialist, period. He wants what he came for. At the end of the visit, I sign 
his sports form—he is, after all, physically able to play—and urge him to 
make an appointment so we can discuss these things over again. If he returns, 
I’ll be shocked.
I step into the hallway, where the office social worker has been waiting for 
me. The functionally illiterate mother I referred to her last month has failed 
again to bring her child in for an appointment with me. The social worker 
asks how hard we should press to locate her, reminding me we don’t have a 
working telephone number for this family. Perhaps they’ve moved. We simply 
don’t know. What we do know is that County Child Protective Services is 
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stretched too thin to assist in cases like this, with no evidence of abuse or 
significant medical neglect. A family simply needs help, and I don’t know 
where to find that. Now I don’t even know where in this medium-sized city 
to find the family. At such times, I remember my wife’s comment during her 
course work in public health: “Why did I waste my time becoming a doctor 
when the real health problems have nothing to do with stuff learned in med-
ical school?” I hope this mother and her child are OK, that some neighbor 
looks in on them, takes care of them. I hope, but I’ve seen too much of life in 
the city to count on it.
I return to the doctor’s charting room, where one of my colleagues men-
tions another of my patients, a sixteen-year-old girl named Crys, whom he 
saw in follow-up yesterday, when I was out of the office. I’ve never met Crys’s 
father. Her grandmother used to bring her in when she was younger, but Crys 
resented her grandmother’s “nosiness.” Now she comes alone. If it’s some-
thing serious, she brings her mother. I’ve spent much time with Crys, inves-
tigating her many physical complaints, and reinforcing the importance of 
“good choices,” a consumer phrase she’s comfortable with. Sex holds little 
mystery for her. Sex, apparently, is something the men in her life expect from 
her, even if she gives no hint of enjoying it, so we focus on protection and 
birth control. We’ve talked over a number of methods, and she’s tried several, 
with lots of encouragement and scheduled follow-up visits. There is no knowl-
edge deficit with Crys; she knows more about contraception in her midteens 
than I did entering medical school. The news from my colleague is that he’s 
made an appointment for her with the teen pregnancy clinic. She might keep 
this baby. Of course, that’s what the girl told me a year ago, just before her 
first abortion. I remember taking a long time then with her and her mother, 
asking about community supports—extended family, friends, adoption agen-
cies, church. They listened to what I said and kindly told me that none of 
these fit their needs.
I suspect I’m sounding prudish right now, another amateur moralist mut-
tering about social chaos and sexual licentiousness. But a baby doctor can’t 
help but notice how much sexual behavior says about the health of a com-
munity. I’m not so naive as to imagine that teen sexual abstinence has been a 
historical norm. Long before Montagues and Capulets just said no, long be-
fore the word adolescent came into use, and long, long before this particular 
consumer demographic was scientifically mapped for maximal corporate ex-
ploitation, teenagers have been, to use the fashionable term, sexually active. 
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What troubles me, however, is the way in which the experience of sex is now 
shaped by consumer expectations—a technologically modified activity di-
vorced from sustained concern for people or place.
Adolescents didn’t make this up; they learned it from parents who, with 
the aid of specialized knowledge and technology, converted the household 
from a place of production situated within a community to an autonomous 
zone of consumption. When I ask young children where their food comes 
from, very few know that farmland precedes the grocery store. Most of my 
patients can tell me more about singers and sports stars than about their next-
door neighbors. Mothers kiss their children on the steps of the day-care cen-
ter, hoping they’ll be well looked after while Mommy’s at school or work. 
Fathers—the few involved in their children’s lives at all—are similarly caught 
in a brutal economy of getting and spending. But when, amid this frantic, 
autonomous using up of manufactured products and contrived experiences, 
do children find the time to ponder the mystery of their own lives or cultivate 
affection for the things of this world? How does anyone learn to love? It 
comes as no surprise, then, that whatever goes on behind closed doors be-
tween not quite adults just learning the obscure and complex power relations 
complicating every process of consent should be understood as nobody else’s 
business. It also comes as no surprise that marginalized families, like the il-
literate mother and her baby, vanish in an economy more concerned with 
exchange value than with the value of other lives. I fear too many think that 
love, like sex, comes naturally, as if a practice so complex demanded anything 
less than a people’s sustained effort. Like other worthwhile human practic-
es—peace or health, for example—love is hard work. To thrive, it has to be 
given far more than a chance. An impoverished attitude toward the social 
dimension of sex is just one sign of the division of health from community.
My patients generally buy the heavily advertised American dogma of au-
tonomy. So do their parents, seeing autonomy as central to health, with the 
corresponding fear that incapacity and age inevitably turn each of us into “a 
burden.” That we might already burden the world with our heedless con-
sumption or burden our neighbors with our unlimited material demands is 
never explored.
Where, then, would community and membership fit in this understand-
ing of health as functional autonomy? I’m still looking. North Americans 
generally bristle at all but voluntary, provisional, self-determined member-
ship. I’ve heard specialists in adolescent care talk about encouraging a desire 
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for intimacy in their patients as an antidote to casual hooking up. I’m not 
clear what intimacy might mean to some of my patients. Judging from the 
noxious spam clogging my email account, it has less to do with affection than 
with pharmacologically enhanced penis size.
An endlessly famished craving for autonomy leaves my patients discon-
nected from one another, increasingly defenseless against the scientifically 
calibrated power of advertising and the demands of a rapacious economy. The 
unstated price of our autonomy is an estranging solitude, a loneliness hidden 
even from ourselves by the diverting entertainments of iPods, video games, 
and cyberporn. This is the realization that I bring along when reading Wendell 
Berry. That’s why, I suppose, I sit up and pay attention when he writes in an 
aphoristic essay on, of all things, the specialization of poetry: “To be autono-
mous . . . is to be ‘broken off ’ and separate.”2 For Berry, the state of our lit-
erature reflects the state of our land, our economy, our neighborhoods, and 
our bodily health.
Specialization
Berry’s interest in “unspecializing” is not limited to poetry or medicine. 
Specialization is a hallmark of technology-dependent economies: complex 
mechanisms require specialized knowledge with which to manage successes 
and, even more important, failures. Technology and specialized knowledge 
promise control over certain aspects of my world, such as the rapidity with 
which I write and communicate or the relative ease with which I probe my 
patient’s bodies, using precise and increasingly expensive medical testing. At 
the same time, I’m vulnerable to sudden equipment failures beyond my abil-
ity to understand, much less repair. Unlike Berry, I write with a computer. If 
things go wrong, I fiddle with settings, reboot, or call a technical service num-
ber. Beyond that, I’m helpless. I could study the software loaded into the 
complex circuitry hidden by my screen, but the digital clock warns me that 
time is short; I have more pressing things to do. Similarly, the computer spe-
cialist bringing her children to my pediatric office is, no doubt, quite capable 
of understanding the diagnostic and therapeutic rubrics I use were she to 
carve time from her already overscheduled day to study them. She will, how-
ever, likely rely on my specialized learning to make a plan. Each has what the 
other wants, and we’re willing to pay for the service. Technology and special-
ization take away power and control even as they give.
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I am a pediatrician, specializing in the medical care of children. I consid-
ered a host of pediatric subgenres before accepting that I was and would re-
main a generalist among “baby doctors.” My students are also well on their 
way to specializing, choosing fields within which many will later subspecial-
ize. It makes sense within the complex medical system to narrow one’s focus, 
mastering the powerful tools of a single, well-defined discipline. The best 
subspecialists remain keenly interested in general care, but professional, intel-
lectual, and economic pressures drive all but a very few to limit their practice. 
The effect on the imagination is rather like the story of the elephant and the 
blind men, each of whom understood the elephant to be that part of the ani-
mal they had touched and, in a fashion, comprehended: the tusk, the trunk, 
the flank, the tail. As the joke goes, a nephrologist sees the heart as a pump 
supplying the kidneys with blood. Having dismembered the body into its 
component systems, it’s but a simple step to envision it as a machine assem-
bled from smaller, systemic modules. In this view, the heart is not just like a 
pump; it is one. Indeed, it can be replaced by a machine pump, though not 
for long and only at an astonishing cost. Likewise, kidneys are conceptually 
transformed into enormously complex filters, the eye a camera, and the brain 
a meat computer. Yet, as the Kentucky farmer reminds the body’s technicians: 
“The body is in most ways not at all like a machine. Like all living creatures 
and unlike a machine, the body is not formally self-contained; its boundaries 
and outlines are not so exactly fixed. The body alone is not, properly speak-
ing, a body. Divided from its sources of air, food, drink, clothing, shelter and 
companionship, a body is, properly speaking, a cadaver, whereas a machine 
by itself, shut down or out of fuel, is still a machine.”3
The paradox of specialized medicine, then, is that enormous power is 
gained from understanding the complexities of the body in increasing isola-
tion while the social body withers as the communal context of health is 
stripped away and ignored. The person assuming the role of patient (from the 
Latin patiens, “to suffer”) is measured, medicated, and, in a fashion, nour-
ished in isolation from the land that produces the food we eat. Not surpris-
ingly, such isolation and misplaced confidence in technology disturb the to-
tality of human experience, including our language. Specialized technique 
requires useful vocabulary: words producing desired effects. Doctors are, after 
all, highly trained professionals. But what my patients and their parents often 
want, in addition to expertise, is usable information in understandable lan-
guage in order to make informed decisions about care. Highly specialized 
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information is translated into laymen’s terms—how vocabulary reveals our 
pretensions!—while words springing from whole continents of human expe-
rience are banished from the medical encounter: love, friendship, mercy. 
Clumsy attempts to reintroduce words like intimacy quickly go astray. 
Intimacy, like love or friendship, can be a starting place, a journey, and a des-
tination (concepts rendered meaningless without a particular place in the cre-
ated world to stand on), but it is none of these things when grafted onto a 
purely instrumental activity. As for mercy, I’ve heard the word used in a med-
ical context but once: in that appalling oxymoron mercy killing, an unscien-
tific term now sanitized for public use as physician-assisted suicide.
What the Kentucky Farmer Knew (and I Had to Learn)
Unlike our medical students, I came to Berry’s work after several years in the 
profession, already mystified by medicine’s absurdities. Berry made explicit 
what I, at best, half understood, revealing the mischief arising when technol-
ogy-dependent, specialized medicine separates bodies from their properly 
communal context. Of course, Berry isn’t the only one to find something 
amiss in modern medicine, though others often misdiagnose the problem. 
The contemporary emphasis on individualized health assumes that patient 
isolation is a side effect best treated homeopathically, using increments of the 
existing malady. The wounds created by illusions of autonomy are patched 
over with new choices for the autonomous medical consumer: LASIK, open-
sided MRI, doctor-approved complementary medicine, and birthing rooms 
remodeled to resemble suburban boudoirs.
Yet this banquet of choice is typically available only to a fortunate few 
living in technology-rich Northern countries. The way in which specialized, 
technology-dependent medicine obscures and destroys embodied connection 
is clearer in the so-called developing world. There is an implicit assumption 
in our terminology that developed is superior to developing, which may be true 
in some respects. I’m pleased that my doctor has all the medicine and equip-
ment she needs to care for me, and one should avoid unnecessarily privileging 
the primitive. But the implied trajectory of what is called development as-
sumes that Northern countries are models, goals toward which the rest of the 
world should aim. At the same time, such terminology hides the real toll that 
technology and development take on the lives of those not directly benefiting 
from them.
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I travel yearly to Honduras, where the organization I work with has a 
permanent clinic, staffed by Honduran physicians and dentists. Every project 
is decided on, planned, and carried out as a community, a cooperative effort 
of local Hondurans and visiting North Americans. When I’m there, I’m sim-
ply a doctor, not a specialist. No one asks at what age patients must be re-
ferred elsewhere; I provide medical care for all comers.
Nor can I limit my attention to things I learned in medical school. On a 
recent trip, I assisted with patient care while another university team began 
the complex task of establishing a new clinic in a mountain village. The build-
ing we met in had a wood stove and a few electric lights but no running water. 
We joined the villagers in line to use the town pump, stewarding every drop 
for our drinking, cooking, and bathing. Yet to the side of the town square 
was, of all things, an Internet café. After long hours treating intestinal para-
sites, bandaging machete wounds, or delivering babies by flashlight, we paid 
a few lempiras and left behind the distressing confines of material reality. 
Perhaps the Internet had delivered on its promise: we were instantly in touch 
with the world. Yet that was—and has always been—a con, an illusion. For 
all the excitement of e-mailing loved ones, there was, in fact, no one to touch, 
nothing present to us save a plastic box, a glowing screen.
Late one afternoon, a group of us visited a pulperia and bought choco-
bananas: chilled, chocolate-covered fruit sold on a stick for less than a quar-
ter. Kevin, one of the residents, struck up a conversation outside the shop 
with a woman holding a rather thin-looking infant. He learned that the baby 
was the woman’s nephew, the mother of whom had died soon after the baby’s 
birth. The father, we were told, was unreliable and rarely around, so the ba-
by’s aunt had taken the infant in. She had no money for formula and lived 
several hours’ walk from town. They were very poor; reliable food and water 
were hard to come by. Kevin borrowed my equipment and examined the 
baby. He had an ear infection, was mildly dehydrated, and almost certainly 
had parasites stealing whatever food he swallowed. Our makeshift pharmacy 
was just up the hill, from which we gathered medicines and rehydrating so-
lution for the baby to drink. We had very little baby formula but could get 
some from our main clinic two hour’s drive away. Kevin explained all this to 
the grateful woman, now crying as she held the baby to her chest. He ar-
ranged for her to come by the government health center the next day, where 
he would reexamine the child and have formula. We would introduce her 
then to the local health workers, who could explore other ways to support 
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her. We stayed to talk with her a while, then headed back up the hill, feeling 
less self-congratulatory that we’d done a good deed than worried we hadn’t 
done nearly enough.
Most of the human needs we encounter are beyond a doctor’s power to 
satisfy. The lasting solution to diarrhea and parasites isn’t medicine but read-
ily available clean water. Chronic malnutrition won’t be eliminated with IVs 
and high-dose multivitamins but with reliable and affordable food. Crushing 
poverty demands new ways to make a living that won’t cripple bodies or 
wound the land. We have no medicine for such things. No individual does. 
What is so patently obvious to me when in rural Honduras is that commu-
nity is vastly more important than technology.
That same evening, I joined Sarah, one of the nurses, on the tiled landing 
of the municipal building our group was using as the women’s dormitory. We 
sipped Honduran coffee and talked over the day’s events, looking down on 
the town square and up to the rugged hills surrounding us. Even in the dry 
season, the slopes are green and lush in the raking evening light. It was a per-
ceptual trick I’d learned on my first trip to Honduras: things look beautiful at 
a distance; it’s only close up that you see the suffering. Sarah pointed out the 
trash littering the town square: plastic bags, boxes, popsicle sticks, and paper 
scattered like treats for an Easter-egg hunt. The few trash cans, prominently 
labeled with slogans about keeping the village beautiful and healthy, were 
overflowing. Sarah asked what it would take to instill enough pride in the 
townspeople for them to care about appearances. I wondered, in response, 
whether the litter didn’t cast judgment as much on American culture, throw-
away items being visible markers of our economy that increasing access to 
electronic media taught the locals to emulate. In my experience, Hondurans 
aren’t necessarily inclined to conserve when consumer products make careful 
husbandry momentarily unnecessary. Given the choice, they’ll throw away 
plastic wrapping as thoughtlessly as their wealthy neighbors to the north. 
Compared to North Americans, however, they are less likely to forget the 
earth’s material limits, if only because they lack the wealth and mobility to do 
so for long. Necessity and scarcity are demanding tutors.
At the end of the brigade, on the bus ride north to the airport, we passed 
hundreds of banana trees and vast fields from which sugar cane had been 
harvested. The first time I saw this fertile valley—six years earlier—was 
shortly after the catastrophic floods accompanying Hurricane Mitch. Then, 
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the corporately owned fields lay barren while displaced locals occupied shan-
tytowns snaking along the highway median from San Pedro Sula—the busi-
ness and HIV capital of Honduras—to El Progreso, a city of uncommon 
squalor.
This time, however, the plantations were flourishing, and the once- 
displaced locals had resumed their accustomed invisibility. A copy of Berry’s 
Citizenship Papers in my hand, I was in the mood to raise irksome questions. 
Which, I wondered, was more strange: a village with no running water sport-
ing an Internet café or a country with entire valleys devoted to large-scale 
monoculture for export still struggling to feed its own people? Some 
Hondurans living in the fertile Valle de Sula were, no doubt, employed by the 
multinational corporations supplying the wealthy North with inexpensive 
fruit and sugar. Doubtless, too, Honduran government officials and private 
citizens profited from this arrangement. Still, I had difficulty understanding 
why the underfed children I treated the day before did not benefit from the 
land’s agricultural abundance. Perhaps the world economy is best served us-
ing this rich bottomland as one exploitable resource among others around the 
globe; I lack the macroeconomic language and training to refute such asser-
tions. This, however, was quite clear: one part of the world suffered harm for 
the benefit of another.
The smell of burning sugarcane hung in the air as we stepped off the bus 
at the airport. There had been more rain than anticipated in the dry season, 
and the cane fields were being torched later than usual. The result was a par-
ticulate haze dense enough to ground commercial jet traffic. The plane we 
were supposed to board never landed in San Pedro Sula, having been redi-
rected to the States. As trip leaders scrambled for alternatives, others asked 
what was going on. When I explained about the burning cane fields, one of 
our crew said, knowingly: “So we’re trapped here because of their economy.” 
A voice, sounding rather like a Kentucky farmer, spoke sharply in my head: 
“No, we’re trapped because of our economy.” No matter what my colleague 
and I had done for the people of Honduras, we were sugar consumers, and 
the land serving as factory had to be readied for next year’s production. Had 
we remained in the States, the consequences of our habits of consumption, 
now causing us momentary inconvenience, would have remained invisible. 
That these same habits might trap others in permanent misery was more than 
any of us wanted to know.
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Fixes and Diversions
In such times, a technologically dependent man like me—taught to believe 
that specialized knowledge, properly applied, will shape any reality to human 
desire—hopes that the world’s connections and limits can be either tran-
scended or ignored. Trained over many years to consume the things of this 
world with no thought to their provenance, I join my fellow Americans in 
pillaging our planet and bodies. “We will invent our way out of any self- 
created problem,” we insist—a fixed, false belief pathognomonic of the tech-
nological psychosis. A loose tethering to the realities of life on this planet is 
required for a people to pursue food and energy policies in defiance of the 
second law of thermodynamics and to offer as technological fixes—to prob-
lems largely of our own making—the still-beckoning catastrophes of bioengi-
neered monoagriculture and Yucca Mountain.
There’s no affection for created things in bending nature to our will while 
ignoring the damage done in the process. Lamentably, Christians have been 
among the worst in sheer brutality against creation, using up God’s good gifts 
with abandon. Christians should know better. They claim to follow the God 
revealed in Jesus, a God who so loved the world that he entered it in a living 
human body. In his healing ministry, Jesus touched people unclean under the 
law, cured blindness mixing dirt and saliva, visited the sick in their homes. In 
my far more humble healing art, I use my body and senses to diagnose, treat, 
and reassure. Placing the diaphragm of my stethoscope on the chest of the 
febrile child, I listen for the secrets of a heart. I touch the pads of my fingers 
to a frightened adolescent’s wrist, taking her pulse. I watch, amazed at the 
ferocity with which a hungry infant nurses at his mother’s breast. I am one 
creature working among others, and it has taken me years to understand that 
only by nurturing a real affection for other creatures can I rightly serve them, 
much less understand what it means to be healthy.
The Incarnation hallows everything that is made: the earth, our bodies, 
all living things. Precisely because of this, the long and shameful legacy of 
Christians defacing Christ-hallowed creation demands an enormous and still 
unpaid restitution. Even so, history also records that deeper tradition welling 
up like an underground spring in persons such as Francis of Assisi, who knew 
every creature, animate and inanimate, as brother or sister. Siblings in a 
healthy community don’t ask reasons why they should care for one another, 
nor do they permit anyone to abuse family members.
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We do well to acknowledge such relationships, make them explicit rather 
than obscured. Technology’s power to mask relationships is, perhaps, its least- 
appreciated attribute. I was a better doctor when I worked on the Navajo 
Reservation than I am now, and I am a better doctor in Central America than I 
am in the States. I can be better present to my patients in places where I’m stripped 
of the trappings of the medical-industrial complex and we face each other on 
something like an equal footing. It is important to admit, however, that such na-
kedness reduces my effectiveness, at least in the terms North Americans have been 
taught to measure effectiveness: convenience, longevity, material comfort.
Technology also disrupts time. Technology is usually considered progres-
sive (just as the American eugenics movement and deracinating, off-reservation 
Indian boarding schools were widely understood in their day as progressive) 
because it is future oriented. A bold new model is forever on the way and, we 
are told, will be worth the price current circumstances force us to pay. It is 
difficult, then, given the “reality-based” claims of applied science, to admit 
the obvious: the future does not exist. It can’t be touched, heard, or smelled. 
It produces nothing of use. It cannot be loved in the way any sensible thing 
can be loved. It is held before us, an inedible carrot urging the donkey on as 
he labors to pull the cart.
The future is, in short, a Gnostic diversion, segregating the dreariness of 
the material present from an ideal, if insensible, tomorrow. Humans desper-
ately want something better and put nature to the rack to eliminate human 
suffering, even if suffering is, in the developed North at least, sometimes re-
defined to include the simple frustration of desire.
Seeing Creation as a Whole
Saint Augustine, who knew a thing or two about frustrated desire, was in-
tially drawn to Manichaean Gnosticism because he believed that it could ex-
plain far better than Christianity the gulf between the world he desired and 
the world in which he lived. The Manichaean subordination of matter to 
spirit promised a way past earthly limits. Yet, in book 7 of his Confessions, 
Augustine records his late discovery of the created world’s goodness. For him, 
the evil that marred creation merely names a deprivation of the good. From 
this moment, he takes all creation seriously, no longer segregating the desired 
from the undesired: “I no longer wished for a better world, because I was 
thinking of the whole of creation.”4
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Though Augustine sometimes seems reluctant to admit as much, the 
body too is God’s good creation, joining us to the earth and to each other, all 
transformed by the Incarnation. Not that the body is good in itself, in isola-
tion. Its goodness is found in relation to created things, including the land 
that feeds it and other bodies that love and support it. Augustine, keenly 
aware of what he called the ordo amorum, “the right ordering of our loves,” 
struggled to order his many earthly loves in the light of God’s love. Some 
loves are higher than others, laying greater claim on our lives and actions. For 
Augustine, everything—including the professions—properly honors and 
serves higher things. Taking Augustine’s cue, Port William’s lawyer, Wheeler 
Catlett, advises the confused detective in “Fidelity” regarding the proper use 
of the law:
“But, my dear boy, you don’t eat or drink the law, or sit in the shade 
of it, or warm yourself by it, or wear it, or have your being in it. The law 
exists only to serve.”
“Serve what?”
“Why, all the things that are above it. Love.”5
Wheeler Catlett knows something that his interlocutor, Detective Bode, 
could not: that things are never as discrete and separable as we wish, that 
autonomy and specialization, for all their productive power, cause great harm 
apart from an embodied regard for a contextual whole. Everything is, after all, 
connected to everything else. Wheeler—who chides Bode after the detective 
angrily accuses Danny Branch of burying Burley Coulter “somewhere in these 
end-of-nowhere, godforsaken hills and hollows”—also knows something 
about finding grace and holiness even in the end-of-nowhere places of the 
created world.6 As Berry notes elsewhere:
There are no unsacred places;
there are only sacred places
and desecrated places.7
Like a broken clock, Detective Bode could not help but be right on occa-
sion. Danny did, in fact, bury Burley in the hills the old man loved. Danny, 
who understands the landscape as anything but “godforsaken,” returns after 
the burial to a Port William membership with “the aspect and the brightness 
of one who had borne the dead to the grave, and filled the grave to the brim, 
and received the dead back into life again.”8
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“Receiv[ing] the dead back into life again” seems rather much for medi-
cine to take on right now. Perhaps, however, there is something to be learned 
from a community reclaiming one of its members from a technology- 
dominated medical industry. Church communities, for example, could be-
have as a body gathered in Christ, insisting that members remain integral 
parts of a wholeness even in the alienating technological deserts of hospitals 
and nursing homes. How so? Not just by physical presence and support, but 
through liturgical reclamation, such as the anointing prescribed in James 
5:14–15. This is not a variety of faith healing used to achieve specific, indi-
vidual ends through religious ritual. Anointing reminds everyone that the 
sick person belongs to the community and, ultimately, to God, that a gath-
ered people does not cease to care when technology no longer promises a 
cure, and that, in community, no one is a burden. Such powerful actions 
testify that the good found in medical expertise remains subordinate to the 
good of the gathered body. Highly trained specialists know a great deal about 
the body as machine, but a community knows and loves its own.
Communities can teach through example the hard work of love, affec-
tion, and true intimacy. Sexual responsibility is fostered neither through dis-
tributing technological fixes with a nod and a wink nor by demanding that 
young people practice more control and show more concern for human relat-
edness than their parents do. Augustine was shaped by the philosophical ethos 
of late antiquity, which feared that sexual passion corrupts the human desire 
for the good. Today, perpetually inflamed consumer desire corrupts sexuality 
and everything else connecting us to one another. Sex is too close to the core 
of who we are as embodied persons to be a merely private matter. Churches 
will first have to learn, and then show the rest of the world, what it means to 
care for other people’s children.
Within the hospital itself, medical professionals might insist on provid-
ing patients not only with adequate rest and nutritious food but also with a 
healthy world to which the healed member may return. I need not recount 
here Berry’s many arguments in favor of a local food economy rather than the 
current system, which treats food as a technologically enhanced commodity. 
It is sufficient to note that no doctor should prescribe nor any nurse adminis-
ter a medicine without proper care and attention. Attention to such details as 
where one’s food comes from and how the land in which it grew—and the 
people who grew it—is treated is a step toward seeing health and creation as 
a whole.
48  Brian Volck
Awareness that everything affects everything else might include the rec-
ognition that seemingly innocuous shopping choices made in the United 
States compromise the health of whole communities elsewhere on the planet. 
“Thinking globally while acting locally” can quickly become a self-serving, 
though comforting, thought for those who have never seriously labored in a 
particular locality themselves. Immersion into the practices of one particular 
place is necessary for real knowledge and affection—what the philosopher of 
science Michael Polanyi calls “indwelling”—to be born.9 Only with true 
knowledge and affection for one such place can humans know what it means 
to love any place at all, just as true friendship is known only by those who 
have themselves been a friend.
Friendship, affection, love: these are the wholenesses toward which any 
healthy attempt at unspecializing medicine must gesture. When in Honduras, 
I particularly enjoy working with our interpreters, Honduran students from 
a privileged, English-speaking school who volunteer their vacation time to 
help us. One of them, a loud and funny young woman who liked to dance 
and tell jokes, was a particular favorite of mine on one trip. She was not con-
ventionally beautiful. She was too fond, I suppose, of good food to ever be-
come a surgically enhanced fashion wraith. But no one could deny that she 
was beautiful, her entire body overflowing with life, her face unable to hide 
its delight in nearly everything she saw. She and I often told stories outside 
the clinic after the last patient had been seen. We laughed nearly as often as 
we spoke. On our last day in the village, as we gathered our belongings for the 
trip home, she handed me a postcard, signed by all the interpreters but writ-
ten in her own hand, that read in part: “Thank you for loving my country and 
my people.”
I had to ponder that awhile. I thought back to my first visit to Honduras 
after Hurricane Mitch and the people I met who left me forever uncomfort-
able, no longer at ease in my old North American life. I remembered saw-
toothed horizons in the Honduran mountains, the scent of burning cane, the 
taste of mango fresh from the tree, and voices of welcome and hospitality I’d 
done nothing to deserve.
I had a fondness for all this, but did I really love them? Was love the right 
word? I’ve worked in Honduras, in a particular place and with particular 
people, long and often enough to hazard an answer. I love her country. I love 
her people.
Which brings us to a starting place.
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On particularly cold and dark mornings, as I milk our four-and-one-half-
year-old goat, I like to think I must be the only Duke University law graduate 
milking a goat this morning. It is not, of course, that I am the only Duke law 
graduate (or Duke theologian, for that matter) working at 6:00 a.m. I imag-
ine most of us are. It is just that I think that I am the only one doing such 
enjoyable work. I would take credit for the story of how a Duke law graduate 
became a farmer, but, like all good stories, mine has been gifted to me. This 
essay is written in thanksgiving for two storytellers in particular who have 
told stories that led me from the law to the farm and perhaps back to the law. 
Or, said differently, this essay seeks to discern how Christians might practice 
law by considering the work of the novelist, essayist, poet, farmer, and son of 
a country lawyer Wendell Berry, to whose work this volume is dedicated, 
alongside that of the lawyer and legal storyteller Thomas Shaffer. In his de-
scriptions of Wheeler Catlett, the lawyer for the Port William membership, 
Berry offers a vision of the good work that Christians who are lawyers might 
do, the types of communities necessary to sustain Christians in the law, and 
the limits that Christians who work as lawyers must ultimately place on the 
law. Further, his descriptions of Wheeler can be seen as an exemplification of 
the arguments made by Shaffer as to the task of Christians within the law.1
In considering the work of Wheeler Catlett, I focus on three stories in the 
Port William narrative, none of which suggests immediately that Wheeler is 
a model lawyer or legal ethicist. In the first, Wheeler fails to achieve the de-
sired disposition of his deceased client’s estate and, instead, lends money to a 
second client to achieve the goals of his dead client’s will. In the second, he 
initially refuses to draft his client’s will on the basis of his own beliefs about 
the propriety of the proposed disposition, a violation of his client’s autonomy. 
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In the third, Wheeler, along with his son Henry, aids a fugitive in evading the 
law during the ongoing commission of a “crime.” While each of these stories 
raises concerns under standard accounts of legal ethics, each is exemplary of a 
lawyer who has befriended his clients in such a manner that he might serve 
them in lieu of the law.2
Legal Friendship in Port William
The first short story, “It Wasn’t Me,” is the story of a failed will. Old Jack 
Beechum has died. Wheeler drafted his will, which included a substantial 
bequest to Old Jack’s tenants and preferred heirs, Elton and Mary Penn, who 
have farmed his place since his retirement into Port William. Old Jack’s intent 
was for the sum to be sufficient to cover half the cost of purchasing his farm; 
however, he failed to specify the price of the farm in anything other than a 
note to Wheeler, never sent, found on Old Jack’s person at his death. Old 
Jack’s daughter, Clara Pettit, who is married to a city banker, estranged from 
Old Jack and Port William almost from her birth, and likely already unhappy 
with the inclusion of Elton and Mary Penn in Old Jack’s will, insists on a 
public sale despite her father’s wishes with regard to the disposition of the 
farm.
Like most of Wheeler’s clients, Old Jack is more than a client. As Berry 
describes him: “Old Jack Beechum was Wheeler’s client, his kinsman by mar-
riage, and his friend.” Wheeler’s friendship with Old Jack is built around a 
shared life together in community, which itself is built on a shared vision of 
the good practice of farming. Thus, Wheeler is haunted not only by Old 
Jack’s unfulfilled desire for the disposition of his farm but also by his own vi-
sion of the good disposition of that land and place:
The truth is that Wheeler is a seer of visions—not the heavenly visions 
of saints and mystics, but the earthly ones of a mainly practical man who 
sees the good that has been possible in this world, and, beyond that, the 
good that is desirable in it. Wheeler has known the hundred and fifty 
acres called, until now, the Beechum Place all his life. . . . It is a place 
with good human life already begun in it, where the right sort of young 
man and woman could do well. Knowing all this, knowing the farm, 
knowing Elton and Mary Penn, Wheeler has irresistibly imagined the 
life they might live there.
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Thus, Berry suggests that Wheeler’s representation of Old Jack and his good 
ends for this young couple, for this farm, and “for the good of the world” was 
a “problem . . . that he inherited, a part of his own legacy from his deceased 
client and friend.”3
In the pursuit of this good hope, Wheeler throws his lot in with Elton and 
Mary Penn. Having vouched for them once before in recommending them to 
Old Jack as tenants, he now offers his own money to Elton in the midst of the 
auction, at which the farm sells for one and a half times the price Old Jack had 
envisioned. Elton resents Wheeler’s aid, “[having] become first the inheritor of 
a bequest that he did not ask for and did not expect, and next the beneficiary of 
an act of friendship that he did not ask for and, with part of his mind, does not 
want.” Wheeler explains that, while understanding the urge to make one’s own 
way in the world, Elton has been made a part of the story of the Port William 
membership. His choice is whether to accept that story as his own. Of most 
significance to understanding Wheeler’s legal practice, however, is Berry’s sug-
gestion that, pulled by their friendship to Old Jack, Wheeler and Elton have left 
the confines of the law: “The office has faded away around them. They might as 
well be in a barn, or in an open field. They are meeting in the world, Wheeler 
thinks, striving to determine how to continue in it. Both of them are still wear-
ing their hats and coats.”4 Wheeler begins as Old Jack’s lawyer. That legal friend-
ship, even after Old Jack’s death, is a fruitful one, expanding the Port William 
membership, and carrying Wheeler and his new client, Elton Penn, beyond the 
law to the world of farm and neighborhood.
In a second story related to wills and estates, “The Wild Birds,” Wheeler 
is a much less willing participant in the drafting of Burley Coulter’s will. 
Burley wants to bequest his farm to his illegitimate son, Danny Branch. In 
helping him do so, Wheeler must again go beyond the law to serve Burley as 
his friend and brother and act against his (Wheeler’s) own best hopes for the 
Coulter place and for the life of Burley. No construct as simple as legal agen-
cy can capture the complexity of Wheeler’s representation of Burley.
The story Burley tells Wheeler to defend giving the farm to Danny is told 
not out of legal necessity but out of friendship. Burley begins: “I’m not telling 
you what you need to know to be my lawyer. I’m telling you what you need to 
know to be my friend. If a lawyer was all I wanted, I reckon I wouldn’t have to 
hire a friend.” Friendship is Burley’s gift to Wheeler and, likewise, the cause of 
deep fear, for it demands of Wheeler a vulnerability to Burley beyond the law. 
Again, Berry suggests a receding of the legal context: “Whatever there may have 
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been of lawyer and client in this conversation is long gone now, and Wheeler 
feels and regrets that departure, for he knows that something dark and un-
wieldy has impinged upon them, that they will not get past except by going 
through.” They have entered the world of Burley’s “wayward” life, a life lived in 
the woods and in the dark that has been filled with both sin and love.5
In contrast, Wheeler has served “the human homesteads and neighbor-
hoods and the known ways that preserve them.” He has committed his life to 
an “orderly handing down” of those homesteads via the law.6 Burley now asks 
Wheeler to bless his wayward life and its good fruits in a disorderly handing 
on of the Coulter home place not to Burley’s known heir, his nephew Nathan 
Coulter, but to his unknown heir, Danny Branch, who was conceived in the 
darkness of his unspoken love for Kate Helen Branch.
As the conversation progresses, Burley asserts his authority over Wheeler. 
This authority is built not on the priority of Burley’s autonomous desires as 
Wheeler’s client but rather on Burley’s seniority over Wheeler in the Port 
William membership. Wheeler’s plans for the Coulter place must “be turned 
loose” from the orderly world of legal ownership and succession so that Burley 
can “come back into the clear and show” himself. In light of Burley’s author-
ity over him, Wheeler relents to the proposed course of action. He acknowl-
edges the provisional good to be pursued in lieu of his hope for an absolute 
good found via the rigidity of the law and a world without wayward sinners 
such as Burley. Yet relenting to draft Burley’s will is not enough. Burley has 
made clear that their relationship is not that of client and lawyer but that of 
friends and maybe even brothers. Burley demands reconciliation: “‘Wheeler, 
if we’re going to get this will made out, not to mention all else we’ve got to do 
while there’s breath in us, I think you’ve got to forgive me as if I was a broth-
er to you.’ He laughs, asserting for the last time the seniority now indisput-
ably his, and casting it aside. ‘And I reckon I’ve got to forgive you for taking 
so long to do it.’”7 Wheeler reaches out in an embrace of forgiveness. The 
story is remarkable for both the authority granted to Burley by Wheeler and 
for the hope it displays that legal relationships might be for lawyers places of 
character formation.
A Legal Ethic of Care
In looking for a context to place Berry’s unorthodox description of the good 
lawyer, those descriptions can be seen as an exemplification of the work of 
54  Richard P. Church
Thomas Shaffer on legal ethics. Shaffer’s writings are voluminous and multi-
faceted; nonetheless, his theologically grounded legal ethic centers on certain 
essential claims regarding the work of lawyers. These claims include the prior-
ity of the church in moral discernment, the priority of Christian identity to 
professional identity, and the priority of service to and engagement with the 
client. Particularly with regard to the last claim, Shaffer’s work on legal ethics 
suggests that legal relationships between lawyers and clients are always moral 
relationships. Berry displays each of these insights in his descriptions of 
Wheeler’s legal practice.
Shaffer traces three competing strands of legal ethics that are grounded in 
competing understandings of the nature of legal clients. The ethic of role sug-
gests that good lawyers do what the law requires, namely, either what their 
clients want (relying on “the system” to produce justice) or what the lawyers 
themselves believe is best (relying on an aristocratic model of lawyers as the 
guardians of society). The ethic of role, based in client autonomy, is the dom-
inant legal ethic. It suggests that lawyers are obligated to do everything with-
in the law to aid their clients regardless of the clients’ proposed ends. In either 
version, the ethic of role assumes that lawyers are nonmoral actors in their 
work. A second alternative, the ethic of isolation, acknowledges that legal 
conversations are about moral matters but assumes that lawyers and clients 
are separate moral actors making moral assertions only to be accepted or re-
jected by the other.8 In the ethic of isolation, clients reason on their own re-
garding the ends they might pursue, and lawyers see clients primarily as 
threats to their own morality.
Shaffer proposes a third ethic, an ethic of care, under which lawyers act 
as ministers to their clients in a relationship of mutuality. In other words, 
lawyers are motivated by service to others and acknowledge the interconnect-
edness of their lives and moral development with those of their clients.9 In 
this context, legal conversation is moral conversation.10 Lawyers are not mere 
agents for their clients. Rather, they act as companions to their clients in such 
a way that they discern together regarding the best ends to be pursued and the 
best means of pursuing those ends, including, but not limited to, the param-
eters set by the law.
Berry’s stories display this last type of legal relationship. In drafting and 
probating Old Jack’s will, Wheeler represents his friend in a way that exceeds 
the role of lawyers as the agents of their clients. He seeks not merely to fulfill 
Old Jack’s desires; rather, he shares Old Jack’s commitments and purposes for 
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that place. Similarly, his interaction with Burley Coulter makes clear that 
lawyers and clients are not morally isolated from one another. Burley’s de-
mands as a client are grounded in his claim on Wheeler as his friend and 
brother.
Shaffer argues along these lines, suggesting that friendship changes the 
dynamic between lawyers and their clients by establishing a depth to the rela-
tionship that enables moral claims to be made:
Integrity means that the lawyer has moral limits. There are things you 
will not ask your friend to do, and if your friend is your lawyer, there are 
things you will not ask your lawyer to do. In part—usually, I suppose—
that is because you love her, and you perceive her character, and you 
want her to be and to become a good person. But also, I think, it is be-
cause you know that it would be futile to ask her. There are some 
things—some lawful things—she would refuse to do. Part of the value 
of her moral advice is that there are things she will refuse to do. This 
refusal is part of her character. Her character is what makes her your 
friend, and you her friend, in the first place.11
Similarly, there are things you will ask your friend to do that you would not 
ask your lawyer to do. Thus, Burley makes claims on Wheeler, such as forgive-
ness, that demand that he be more than a lawyer and, in fact, more than he 
is.12 In doing so, clients can be viewed as gifts by which God intends gra-
ciously to discipline those in the law.13
A series of essential implications for a Christian construal of legal ethics 
flow from remaking legal relationships into legal friendships. First, legal friend-
ships reject what Shaffer describes as “two kingdom ethics,” particularly the 
adversarial ethic, in which the lawyer employs distinct moralities in his public 
and private lives.14 Shaffer argues that this two kingdom adversarial ethic is 
idolatrous. It is built on the assumption that the government or the legal system 
will produce justice.15 Such an assumption is self-deluded. Power does not and 
cannot consistently produce justice.16 The pursuit of justice does not inhere in 
the adversarial system itself. Procedural justice is not the justice of the cross. 
Rather, justice is a complex project in which lawyers, clients, and adversaries 
seek a common ground on which reconciliation might be found. Therefore, it 
is a gift that is given to another in contrast to either a minimalist procedural 
account of justice or the achievement of a certain distribution of resources. For 
this reason, Shaffer concludes that justice is not “something people get from the 
government” but a gift human beings offer one another.17
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A second implication of Shaffer’s ethic of care is that it necessitates that 
the lawyer develop the virtue of hope. As Shaffer describes it, lawyers as min-
isters to their clients are required to display both compassion and hope, to 
walk with those who have failed, and to restore hope to those in the midst of 
trouble.18 Lawyers must offer compassion to clients who have been less than 
they might have been; likewise, clients must offer compassion to lawyers. This 
issue is at the heart of the conversation between Burley and Wheeler, for 
Burley’s irregular ways reflect his failure to make proper his marriage in fact 
to Kate Helen Branch and legitimate his illegitimate son. Burley calls forth 
Wheeler’s compassion while simultaneously offering it to Wheeler for his fail-
ure to offer it freely to Burley.
Compassion, however, is always grounded in hope. It requires the provi-
sion of hope to clients and, as Berry describes it, the maintenance of hope in 
clients. Thus, Berry summarizes Wheeler’s legal practice in the following 
manner: “In loyalty to his clients, or to their Maker, in whose image he has 
supposed them made, he has believed in their generosity, goodness, courage, 
and intelligence. Mere fact has never been enough for him. He has pled and 
reasoned, cajoled, bullied, and preached, pushing events always toward a bet-
ter end than he knew they could reach, resisting always the disappointment 
that he knew he should expect, and when the disappointment has come, as it 
too often has, never settling for it in his own heart or looking upon it as a 
conclusion.”19 Shaffer concurs. An ethic of care entails an opening of lawyers’ 
lives to their clients such that clients are not approached as sources of moral 
corruption. The gift of forgiveness demanded by Burley is a display of the 
hope that clients might teach lawyers how to live faithfully within the law.
Ultimately, this hope requires hope in the goodness of God, which hope 
is also displayed by Wheeler. As Wheeler settles another estate, that of Nathan 
and Hannah Coulter, with no clear heir to take over the original Feltner farm, 
he arranges for his own wife to receive a monetary share of that estate while 
giving Virgil Feltner’s granddaughter, Margaret, the house and farm undi-
vided. Margaret lives in the city, but she is Wheeler’s only hope for the farm’s 
good succession. Berry describes Wheeler’s choice as follows: “Wheeler was 
not a great hand to depend on the future, but he would do it if he had to. ‘If 
you know you don’t know anything about the future,’ he would say, ‘and if 
you believe that with God all things are possible, then you have to think that 
something good may happen.’ The future would be a gamble, and Wheeler, 
having no choice, took the gamble.”20 In this regard, Wheeler acknowledges 
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the priority of hope over power in its various forms, including the power of 
the law, to achieve the good.21
A final implication of legal friendship as a model for good lawyering is 
that a variety of practices, largely at odds with the current structures of legal 
work, would become necessary. For example, legal friendship presupposes 
that lawyers have befriended their clients so as to hear the clients’ stories and 
to understand the goods of the clients’ lives. This fact requires that lawyers 
work in ongoing relationships with their clients, relationships that provide 
both lawyer and client time to know each other. Such knowledge could not 
be superficial. In fact, it requires a shared account of the good between lawyer 
and client that has developed through participation in a shared form of life. 
As noted above, Berry makes clear that this is exactly the type of relationship 
that Wheeler and Old Jack share. That relationship is premised on participa-
tion in a shared set of institutions, practices, and languages, as found in their 
common love of good farming.
In this regard, Berry’s and Shaffer’s vision of legal relationships is a chal-
lenge to some of the basic structures by which law in America is practiced. 
Firm practice in service to and defense of for-profit corporations, particularly 
large corporations with many shareholders, simply does not accommodate 
the development of relationships of shared goods. This conclusion fits with a 
basic claim present throughout Berry’s writings: good work is particular. 
Good farming or good lawyering requires attention to detail that size and 
ambition thwart.22 In contrast, for lawyers in firms, clients are always suscep-
tible to becoming abstractions, the purveyors of questions, tasks, and work 
via an assembly line of handed-down projects. For this reason, the context of 
Wheeler’s law practice as a solo practitioner or as a partner with his son is 
particularly significant. Wheeler is not yoked to the structures of modern le-
gal practice in the form of the law firm.
Could Wheeler have displayed the legal friendships evident in Berry’s 
work if he were a member of a firm? This question originally sparked the is-
sues pursued in this essay. If Shaffer is the guide to understanding the goods 
of Wheeler’s practice, the answer in most cases would appear to be no. Wheeler 
has no obligation to abstractions such as the law, which a firm is largely cre-
ated to serve. Further, he has no obligation to the abstraction profit, which is 
more than anything the ethos of the modern law firm. Yoked unequally, 
Christians in the law could rarely assert the contrary legal skills that mark 
Wheeler’s practice.23
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Furthermore, the nature of law firm clients often undercuts the basic 
hopes set forth for legal friendship. A corporate client cannot be befriended.24 
No human life can be befriended, for the client itself is an abstraction. The 
lawyer serves only a board and shareholders with a profit interest. The lawyer 
cannot counsel such an entity on the ends it might pursue, for it serves a 
single end, wealth creation.25 As Berry describes it, a corporation is, in fact, 
just a pile of money to which a group of people swear allegiance.26 Such a legal 
abstraction is incapable of love or regret unless such love or regret can be tied 
to the maintenance or creation of market share. At variance with the Gospel’s 
claim on human lives, it cannot be called to sacrifice itself.
The nature of corporations is, then, particularly worrisome for the law-
yers who would serve them. As Shaffer notes, lawyers “tend to adopt the so-
cial, political, and economic opinions of those [they] serve and associate with, 
especially the wealthy and powerful ones.” Thus, he argues that “money is the 
principal moral problem lawyers in the United States have.”27 This is true 
both because lawyers primarily serve those with wealth and because they are 
prone to becoming wealthy themselves. Wheeler has found a way to practice 
law that neither serves the rich nor has made him wealthy. This is a difficult 
accomplishment for a lawyer. Consistent, then, with Shaffer’s suggestion cited 
above that lawyers’ moral lives are at stake in their relationships with clients 
(and vice versa), lawyers who are Christians must in some instances jettison 
those clients who would lead them to be less than the Gospel would call them 
to be.28
The preceding paragraphs are not meant to suggest, however, the impos-
sibility of imagining new forms of communal legal practice that would enable 
legal friendships to flourish. In fact, one hope in clarifying the goods of legal 
practice for Christians would be to spark discernment of the structures with-
in which that practice could be pursued. Likewise, nothing here is meant to 
suggest that every law firm would prohibit activity subversive of the law or the 
production of profits. Certainly, resonances of an old professional ethic con-
tinue to be heard in many law firms today. Likewise, firms at times take ac-
tions that are, within limits, contrary to profit motives. But sporadic counter-
examples do not undercut the basic arguments made herein; the concerns set 
forth call into question the overall ethos of modern legal practice. Finally, 
while I do not want to discount the practical difficulties of maintaining the 
finances of a firm or a small legal practice built on taking the time to befriend 
one’s clients, I take such objections largely to be directed to the question of 
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the cost to Christians of faithfulness within the law. There are no theological 
grounds for ensuring that Christian legal practice is financially lucrative or, 
for that matter, even self-sustaining. The church may have to subsidize law-
yers if the tasks that Christians who would be lawyers are called to undertake 
turn out not to be profitable.
The Limits of the Lawyering in Port William
That Wheeler does not practice in the context of a law firm and does not ap-
pear to have corporate clients suggests the presence of certain limits in his 
practice of law. There are services he will not offer; there are tasks he will re-
fuse; there are goods other than the law and profits that he will serve. These 
limits are at the heart of a faithful description of the work of Christians in the 
law. Accordingly, I focus next on a final story in the Port William narrative, 
one that displays the limits of the law in Wheeler’s practice.
“Fidelity” tells the story of the death of Burley Coulter. While it is an 
important display of Berry’s ideas regarding health, it is also important for its 
description of Wheeler’s defense of the Port William membership. Burley, old 
and dying, is taken by his son, Danny Branch, and his nephew Nathan 
Coulter successively to the doctor and to the large university hospital in 
Louisville, Kentucky. Soon after doing so, Danny and Nathan realize that 
they have betrayed the trust that they owe to Burley, to allow him a death 
consistent with the life he has lived. Having realized as much, Danny awakes 
in the middle of the night, drives to Louisville, cuts Burley away from the 
tubes and machines confining him, and drives him home to Port William, 
where he cares for him in an old barn and prepares a grave for him.
Soon, the law, in the form of Detective Kyle Bode, comes to investigate 
the disappearance of Burley from the hospital. Wheeler and his son Henry, 
who is Danny’s lawyer, gather the membership of Port William in their law 
office, ostensibly to be questioned by Bode. What occurs, instead, is Burley’s 
funeral. The membership gathers and tells the story of Burley’s life with them 
as Danny buries Burley in the woods. Wheeler’s and Henry’s work in this mo-
ment is guardianship. They protect the membership from the “organized 
world” that would seek to hold Burley hostage and condemn Danny for re-
turning Burley to them.
Berry reiterates here that the fundamental relationship of the Catlett law-
yers to their clients is friendship.29 Further, he emphasizes that each of the 
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Catletts, the lawyers Wheeler and Henry and the journalist Andy (Wheeler’s 
other son), “whatever else they were, were still farmers and still of the mem-
bership.” By suggesting as much, he makes clear that their primary loyalty is 
to people and place, in lieu of the wider world and the law. This fact is stated 
starkly by Henry as Bode attempts to pressure his cooperation on the grounds 
of “his and Henry’s brotherhood in the law”:
“Can’t help you,” Henry said.
“You mean that you, a lawyer, won’t cooperate with the law of the 
state in the solution of a crime.”
“Well, you see, it’s a matter of patriotism.”
“Patriotism? You can’t mean that.”
“I mean patriotism—love for your country and your neighbors. 
There’s a difference, Mr. Bode, between the government and the coun-
try. I’m not going to cooperate with you in this case because I don’t like 
what you represent in this case.”30
In his conversation with Bode, Wheeler reiterates the limits of the law 
and, therefore, the limits of his obedience to the law:
“Well, anyway,” Detective Bode said, “all I know is that the law has 
been broken, and I am here to serve the law.”
“But, my dear boy, you don’t eat or drink the law, or sit in the shade 
of it or warm yourself by it, or wear it, or have your being in it. The law 
exists only to serve.”
“Serve what?”
“Why, all the many things that are above it. Love.”31
At the end of the story, Danny returns to the membership gathered in 
Wheeler’s office bearing no evidentiary marks of the “crime.” Bode is defeated 
in his attempt to unearth Burley’s kidnapper, having, in Berry’s words, “been 
tempted over and over again to leave, with Wheeler, the small, clear world of 
the law and its explanations and to enter the larger, darker world not ordered 
by human reasons or subject to them.”32
This final suggestion is particularly significant insofar as it was Burley 
himself who, in “The Wild Birds,” drew Wheeler beyond the law into that 
dark world that he represents in “Fidelity.” Wheeler now speaks the truth of 
that dark world to Bode, or at least defends it against the language and power 
of the ordered world. His ability to do so, however, is itself contingent on 
what he had learned from his client Burley. Thus, in closing the loop on this 
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conversation, Wheeler shows that he has had his life reshaped by the good 
clients, including Burley, whom he has served. Yet saying it this way says too 
little, for Wheeler’s own life is at stake in “The Wild Birds.” Wheeler, like 
Bode, also is tempted to remain within the law. Yet Burley demands more of 
his friend. The arguments made by Wheeler in “Fidelity” are the proof that he 
is more than a lawyer, a fact that makes those arguments the most dangerous 
to the law.
Subversive Lawyers
What Wheeler rejects in “Fidelity” is the temptation to find his identity in the 
law. Shaffer argues that Christians who would be lawyers must do likewise. 
Christians must work in that order: as Christians who might also be lawyers. 
As Shaffer suggests: “Faithfulness to the tradition of Israel and of the Cross 
means that the lawyer stands in the community of the faithful and looks from 
there at the law. Faithfulness means that a lawyer imagines that she is first of 
all a believer and is then a lawyer.”33
The law tempts lawyers to stake their identity in the title lawyer, which is 
a particularly tempting one because our culture places such esteem in the 
law.34 In rejecting this temptation, Wheeler and Henry are not lawyers. They 
are friends; they are members of Port William; they are farmers. As Berry 
describes Wheeler, he is “in a sense not so much a lawyer as a farmer who 
practices law.”35 The title lawyer is borne by Wheeler and Henry only insofar 
as the law continues to serve these higher goods, and they obey the law only 
insofar as “law expresses love of neighbor.”36 Thus, when the law comes not in 
service of their neighbors, Wheeler and Henry walk outside its confines into 
the dark world that they have been called to serve.
The implication of the limits placed on the law and the approach to legal 
ethics set forth above is that Christians cannot answer definitively whether it 
is appropriate to be a lawyer.37 Instead, Christians who work as lawyers awake 
each day and offer their work to the church and ask, Can I do this particular 
task today?38 As Shaffer frames it:
It is possible to be a Christian and a lawyer only if the question remains 
unsettled—so that the tentative nature of the answer is an admonition 
to attempt in the practice of law more than the practice itself, the con-
ventional professionalism of it, can bear. To the extent that one deter-
mines to conduct his practice as moral conversation, his advocacy as 
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moral discourse, his lawyer skill as the virtue of hope, his life as an af-
firmation that justice is a gift and not a commodity one has from the 
government, I think it is possible to be a Christian and a lawyer.39
Accordingly, he suggests that, for Christians, the law must be construed as a 
sort of Canaanite idol that the people of God must be wary of at every turn 
yet, nonetheless, take up and use.40
This means that Christian legal ethics are like all other Christian ethics. 
Those who would be disciples of Jesus Christ are called to live together in a 
manner that witnesses to the truth of his life, death, and resurrection. This 
task requires discernment regarding the shape of Christians’ life together and 
in the world. Accordingly, Christians’ lives are found in such communities of 
discernment.41 There is, then, no Christian legal ethic. Rather, a gathered 
community is gifted with a set of memories about what sorts of activities 
Christians, including those working within the law, might engage in while 
living faithfully. Likewise, the community has a process set forth in Matt. 
18:15–20 for discerning how to apply those memories to the particular con-
text in which Christians in the law currently find themselves.42
Placing limits on the narrative of the law is highly subversive, however. 
That Wheeler and Henry would, in fact, sit in the law and yet deny its su-
premacy over their loyalties is the most disturbing action that they take and 
the one that most troubles Kyle Bode. Bode assumes their common cause 
with him in affirming the status quo, which the law is largely built to serve. 
Their rejection of the law is dangerous because it subverts the claim that the 
government or the rule of law can secure peace in a world of violence. 
Rejecting the idolatrous suggestion that the law offers salvation, that is, that 
it is adequate to produce peace, Wheeler and Henry seek a more substantial 
local peace built not on procedure but on common life and loves.43
Shaffer notes that, in denying the totalizing discourse of the law, Christians 
are subversive of the rule of law.44 This fact is not surprising, for the church 
often serves as a rejection of the status quo that the law seeks to uphold. In 
other words, in its eschatological hope, the church denies that the way things 
are is the way things have to be. As John Howard Yoder notes, this claim 
makes the church inherently political and often subversive: “No ‘bridge’ or 
‘translation’ is needed to make the Bible a book about politics. The new order, 
the new humanity, does not replace or destroy the old, but that does not 
make the new order apolitical. Its very existence is subversive at the points 
where the old order is repressive, and creative where the old is without vision. 
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The transcendence of the new consists not in its escaping the realm where the 
old order rules, but in its subverting and transforming that realm. It does that 
by virtue of its being an alternative story.”45
In denying the law, Wheeler and Henry similarly subvert the dominant 
narrative of the law in a manner that suggests their hope that the world might 
be, at least in Port William, more than it is or, more particularly, that old men 
might die deaths befitting their lives among the people whom and in the 
place that they have loved. Further, Wheeler and Henry are subversive insofar 
as they use their knowledge of the law to defend the Port William member-
ship against the powers of the existing order represented by the law. As Berry 
describes it:
Wheeler started out with a clientele that he may be said to have inher-
ited—farmers mostly, friends of his father and his father-in-law, kins-
men, kinsmen’s friends, with whom he thought of himself as a lawyer as 
little as they thought of themselves as clients. Between them and himself 
the technical connection was swallowed up in friendship, in mutual re-
gard and loyalty. Such men, like as not, would not need a dime’s worth 
of assistance between the settling of their parents’ estates and the writing 
of their own wills, and not again after that. Wheeler served them as their 
defender against the law itself, before which they were ciphers, and so 
felt themselves—and he could do this only as their friend.46
In suggesting that legal friendship is the defense of the weak against the pow-
er of the law, Berry displays Shaffer’s hope that lawyers might serve as a medi-
ating force between the discourse of the wider world and smaller communi-
ties with their own language, order, and truth.47 And the eschatological life 
that the church seeks to embody is just such an alternative language, order, 
and truth.48
Shaffer notes that such mediating work between local communities and 
the wider world requires lawyers to be bilingual, not only in their speech, but 
also in their “perception of reality.” In other words, the task of mediating be-
tween the wider community and the local community requires an ability to 
understand the vision of the wider world, translate that vision into terms that 
the church might understand and discern, and then return to the wider world 
and speak back to the powers in their own language the truth that the church 
has discerned “behind the wall.”49 Such work implies that, while translation 
and communication between those worlds are not easy, they are possible some 
of the time—and some of the time through the language of law.50 Nonetheless, 
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sometimes it is not possible. When it is, the Christian who is a lawyer may be 
the vehicle of the church’s speech. When it is not, the Christian who is a law-
yer, as Wheeler, uses his knowledge of the powers to shield the church and 
“the least of these” from the wider world and the law.51 It is tricky walking 
between these worlds. It is particularly tricky, as Shaffer notes, in light of the 
power of the law itself, which so tempts those called to this task to glory in 
the law or their knowledge thereof. Nonetheless, this mediating work, em-
bedded within legal friendships, might be the good work of Christians who 
would work in the law.
Conclusion
In the novel Hannah Coulter, Berry notes that, in buying a farm, Nathan 
Coulter “had bought a lot of work.”52 This comment is important insofar as 
Berry argues throughout his writings that good work is hard to find. My own 
experience of buying a farm, largely untended for at least a decade, has been 
similar. I bought a lot of work. That good work has included feeding hogs, 
fixing fences, raising chicks, tending gardens, praying for rain, birthing kids, 
mourning the lost, blessing the dead, and tending to 6:00 a.m. milkings of 
that four-and-one-half-year-old goat. It is good work for which I am grateful. 
My work in the law has always been more worrisome as to whether I might 
call it good. Yet Berry and Shaffer offer stories of the good work that lawyers 
might do in pursuing “the good that has been possible in this world, and, 
beyond that, the good that is desirable in it.”
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The virtue of our heavenly love tempers our will and makes us want no 
more than what we have—we thirst for this alone. . . . In His will is our 
peace.
—Dante, Paradiso
He was not an ambitious farmer—he did not propose to own a large  
acreage or to become rich—but merely a good and gifted one. . . . It  
was a farm of ninety-eight acres, and Tol never longed even for the two 
more that would have made it a hundred.
—Wendell Berry, “Watch with Me”
This summer I’m approaching twenty years as the pastor of the Austin Heights 
Baptist Church, a congregation of fewer than two hundred members in East 
Texas, about half of whom might be present for worship on any given Sunday. 
At denominational meetings, and around town, I’m continually asked, “When 
are you going to a bigger church? Why do you stay?” Sometimes I give a long, 
rambling explanation, but often I respond with, “Because I read too much 
Wendell Berry.”
I’ve been reading Berry since 1980 or 1981, after I discovered his essays 
while serving a small, rural, central Texas congregation as its brand-new college 
student pastor. I commuted to the church on weekends. I had never been a pas-
tor before, and, even though I was raised in a Baptist church, it had been a 
much larger First Baptist Church out in west Texas. So I was looking for any 
insight I could get into the rural life of my congregants. At the same time, I was 
beginning to explore the issues of hunger, poverty, agriculture, and economics. 
Somewhere I found a footnote mentioning Wendell Berry. One book led me to 
another; it wasn’t long before I was reading everything I could find of his.
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I was in good company. As the veteran pastor Eugene Peterson writes: 
“Wendell Berry is a writer from whom I have learned much of my pastoral 
theology. Berry is a farmer in Kentucky. On this farm, besides plowing fields, 
planting crops, and working horses, he writes novels and poems and essays. 
The importance of place is a recurrent theme—place embraced and loved, 
understood and honored. Whenever Berry writes the word ‘farm,’ I substitute 
‘parish’: the sentence works for me every time.”1
But, if Berry is a farmer and not a pastor, how are we to read him as a 
pastoral theologian—one who has, I might add, something of an ambiguous 
relationship with the church? Berry and his wife, Tanya, usually attend the 
Port Royal Baptist Church in Port Royal, Kentucky, where she is a member 
and a deacon, and where their son and his family are members. Tanya also 
serves on the board of directors of the new Baptist Seminary of Kentucky in 
Lexington. The Berrys also occasionally attend the New Castle Baptist Church 
just a few miles down the road, where Berry was baptized as a boy, and where 
his membership still resides. The Berrys’ daughter and her family are mem-
bers there, where she is a deacon, and where one of the granddaughters is the 
youth minister. Berry says that he often sits on the same pew alongside his 
grandchildren that he sat on alongside his grandfather when he was a boy, yet 
his relationship with the church is sometimes like that of his fictional charac-
ter Jayber Crow, who attends church but sits in the back pew.
Of Berry’s poetry, his much-beloved Sabbath poems were written about 
Sundays, when he was as likely walking through fields, pastures, and woods 
as in attendance at church, which is rarely mentioned. In his fiction, the 
church exists on the periphery of his Port William fellowship and exhibits 
what Norman Wirzba calls a “disincarnate form of Christianity,” a kind of 
gnosticism, isolated and disconnected from where the people live their lives 
during the week.2 Many of us are recovering Gnostics and have served in 
those “disincarnate” churches, and reading Berry can serve as an effective an-
tidote to whatever vestiges of Gnosticism might lurk in the crevices and cor-
ners of our lives.
When I was that young pastor I mentioned above, I remember running 
up against a particularly vicious version of Gnosticism. I was newly ordained 
in a church that had never had a black person inside its walls in all its 150-
year history and whose members’ daily racial prejudice, fear, and outright 
hatred never were touched by their Sunday praying, singing, and having Jesus 
in their hearts. Sunday was about heaven, while Monday through Saturday 
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was where they lived. What shocked me even more was that they never saw 
any of it as a problem. Long before I knew the word, I was a pastor to Gnostics. 
That’s when I discovered Berry.
I engaged Berry as a guide to good pastoral ministry by starting where he 
starts: with his place. Place is a beginning from which to counter disincarnate 
forms of the Christian faith that raise the hackles of Wendell Berry and go 
against the grain of biblical faith, one that is lived out in the flesh.
Berry’s place is Port Royal, Henry County, Kentucky, where his family 
has lived and farmed since before the Civil War. He was a boy in the decade 
preceding World War II and saw the end of farming that used horses and 
mules instead of tractors. After World War II, everything rapidly moved to-
ward mechanization and an urban, industrial economy. Berry says: “I began 
my life as the old times and the last of the old-time people were dying out.”3 
But his father and grandfather taught him how to farm with horses and mules, 
and he continues the practice to this day.
After receiving his bachelor’s and master’s degrees in English from the 
University of Kentucky, he married Tanya and studied creative writing at 
Stanford University with Wallace Stegner. An aspiring writer, he traveled for 
a year in Europe, then wrote and taught in New York. Then he decided to 
return home and teach at his alma mater when he realized that what he knew 
best, and what he needed to write about, was back home in Kentucky. Most 
of his friends and colleagues thought he was crazy, but he bought a small, 
marginal farm and reclaimed it, took care of it, and farmed it using tradi-
tional farming methods.
In the more than forty years since that move, Berry has written more than 
forty books of fiction, poetry, essays, and biography. His first novel, Nathan 
Coulter (1960), was the beginning of a series set in and around his fictional 
Port William, Kentucky. It is the coming-of-age story of young Nathan in 
that farming community. A more recent work in the set is Hannah Coulter, 
who years later marries Nathan, becomes his widow, and reflects on what it 
means to be one of the members of a community of families and characters 
across time, many of whom are connected by blood, and all of whom are con-
nected by the place they share.
As Berry’s character Jayber Crow says: “To feel at home in a place, you 
have to have some prospect of staying there.”4 Just as Berry committed to 
staying on the farm, somewhere along the way I decided that I needed to do 
the same—commit to a particular congregation of people over the long haul. 
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I want to pastor like Berry farms. We live in what Berry calls the culture of 
“the one-night stand,”5 and we clergy are often little different from the folks 
to whom we minister. I’m among the first to say that God sometimes calls us 
to move to another congregation and that sometimes, by circumstances be-
yond our control (economic pressures or denominational policies), we have 
to move. Many of us will admit that, occasionally, we move because we’re 
climbing the denominational success ladder. But faithful staying and com-
mitting to one congregation, one community, in the world of one-night 
stands is a witness to the gospel of “the Word that was made flesh and dwelt 
among us” (John 1:14). Besides all that, good ministry takes a while.
Years ago Berry wrote: “During the last seventeen years, for example, I 
have been working at the restoration of a once exhausted hillside. Its scars 
are now healed over, though still visible, and this year it has provided abun-
dant pasture, more than in any year since we have owned it. But to make it 
as good as it is now has taken seventeen years. If I had been a millionaire or 
if my family had been starving, it would still have taken seventeen years. It 
can be better than it is now, but that will take longer. For it to live fully in 
its own responsibility, as it did before bad use ran it down, may take hun-
dreds of years.”6
All pastors have church members whose lives are deeply scarred by bitter-
ness, anger, hurt, abuse, disease, and death, not to mention the deep scarring 
caused by war, consumer capitalism, nationalism, and racism. These folks are 
scarred, in short, by sin. For the Gospel of Jesus Christ to grow and heal such 
worn-out, eroded lives takes patient, long-suffering, detailed work. It takes 
time to cultivate the habits of peacemaking, forgiveness, reconciliation, and 
love where violence, mistrust, and fear have long been the norms. It takes 
time to grow Christians.
A woman stood in my study doorway unleashing her anger on me for the 
umpteenth time in the seven years I had been her pastor. And I wasn’t the 
only one who was the target of her angry outbursts, but church members as 
well, many of whom had known her for twenty years. Previous pastors had 
had the same challenge with her that I had. Over those seven years I had tried 
reason, confrontation, and avoidance. Nothing seemed to work. But, on that 
particular day, something clicked with her when, in the middle of her spew-
ing forth, I calmly asked her why she was so angry. She stopped in midsen-
tence, looked at me, and then, with a deep sigh, began to recount a childhood 
of abuse and anger. It was the conversation that turned the corner in her rela-
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tionship with me as well as with the members of the congregation. She began 
to be more careful with what she said and how she said it, began to demon-
strate the first vestiges of healing. It took seven years to get to that day, and it 
has taken many more years of patient, listening work for more healing to take 
place.
But that’s not all; we pastors need more. We also need “correct discipline” 
along with “enough time” to farm and to pastor properly. Propriety is an im-
portant word to Berry. “Its value,” he says, “is in its reference to the fact that 
we are not alone. The idea of propriety makes an issue of the fittingness of our 
conduct to our place or circumstances, even to our hopes. . . . We are being 
measured, in other words, by a standard that we did not make and cannot 
destroy.”7 Proper work is the practice of submitting our lives to this call and 
to these people in this place. It includes the pastoral practices of preaching 
and teaching and leading the liturgy but also the detailed, painstaking, mun-
dane care of nurturing the people and paying attention to God working in 
them. Proper work is work that fits with the purpose of God in this particular 
place.
I recommend the following passage to every pastor-to-be:
When one buys the farm and moves there to live, something different 
begins. Thoughts begin to be translated into acts. . . . It invariably turns 
out, I think, that one’s first vision of one’s place was to some extent an 
imposition on it. But if one’s sight is clear and one stays on and works 
well, one’s love gradually responds to the place as it really is, and one’s 
visions gradually image possibilities that are really in it. . . . Two human 
possibilities of the highest order thus come within reach: what one wants 
can become the same as what one has, and one’s knowledge can cause 
respect for what one knows.
. . . The good worker will not suppose that good work can be made 
properly answerable to haste, urgency, or even emergency. . . . Seen in 
this way, questions about farming become inseparable from questions 
about propriety of scale. A farm can be too big for a farmer to husband 
properly or pay proper attention to. Distraction is inimical to correct 
discipline, and enough time is beyond reach of anyone who has too 
much to do. But we must go farther and see that propriety of scale is 
invariably associated with propriety of another kind: an understanding 
and acceptance of the human place in the order of Creation—a proper 
humility. . . . It is the properly humbled mind in its proper place that 
sees truly, because—to give only one reason—it sees details.”8
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Berry is describing a farmer who is considering the purchase of a piece of land. 
(He sounds like a pastor looking over a new church assignment or call.)
Instead of designing a blueprint for how the farm ought to be and then 
reworking the farm to fit the design, Berry pays attention to the particularities 
of the land itself and listens to others who might have wisdom about what has 
worked well on this place and what has not. He works patiently and humbly 
and lovingly. There is a kind of “hermeneutics of farming” similar to the late 
Mennonite theologian John Howard Yoder’s “hermeneutics of peoplehood,” 
in which one patiently and humbly listens to the sense of the congregation 
and the Bible and the Spirit in a particular context. For Yoder, the Bible has 
no isolated meaning “apart from the people reading it and the questions that 
they need to answer.” He goes on to say that to isolate the Bible from context 
and the people in that context “is to do violence to the very purpose for which 
we have been given the Holy Scriptures.”9
To do proper work we must acknowledge that some of what we bring to 
a new ministry with a congregation is an imposition on it. It can be a kind of 
violence. It might be the violence of forcing a particular biblical interpreta-
tion on a congregation, or the church marketing strategy that we picked up 
in seminary, or maybe an issue of social justice about which we are particu-
larly impassioned. Sometimes we react to our previous congregation as we 
serve our present one or bring our ideal church vision and impose it on a new 
parish.
In my first congregation, I decided within the first few weeks that I need-
ed to confront racism. I went at it with a hard-charging “thus sayeth the 
Lord.” But, after lots of conflict and threats and near brawls with a few people 
and good counsel from some wise ones, I began to pay attention to my con-
gregation and to what God was saying through them as well as to them.
I started learning how to do a kind of hermeneutics of peoplehood, sit-
ting on front porches, and working gardens with the people, and drinking 
iced tea afterward while listening to their stories, including their stories of 
race and fear. As a result, my preaching and teaching changed. I still talked 
about race, but how I talked about it was different. My sermons began to 
grow out of the conversation between the people and the Bible and the place 
where we lived. I learned to listen throughout the week in order to speak for 
twenty minutes on Sunday morning.
The old Baptist prophet Carlyle Marney said that one time he had a 
couple of preacher-boys in his study telling him all the plans they had for 
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ministry in their first congregations. “These fellows were going to bring in the 
kingdom with bulldozers,” Marney said.
The Kingdom of God is not brought in with bulldozers. It cannot be 
imposed and still be the Kingdom of God, the Way of Jesus Christ. The 
means God uses to bring about his reign must fit with the purpose of his reign 
of justice, peace, harmony, and reconciliation—with God, with humanity, 
and with all creation. It cannot be coerced with bulldozers, tanks, or guns or 
with prayers ordered by the state, laws passed by Congress, or manipulations 
engineered by Madison Avenue. God calls us to do the work of ministry that 
fits with the life of the Prince of Peace, the Suffering Servant, Jesus.
Unlike the work of bulldozers, which Berry calls “a powerful generalizer” 
that works against the impulse “to take care of things, to pay attention to the 
details,”10 “good work is always modestly scaled, for it cannot ignore either 
the nature of individual places or the differences between places, and it always 
involves a sort of religious humility, for not everything is known. Good work 
can only be defined in particularity, for it must be defined a little differently 
for every one of the places on earth.”11
Berry’s essays are peppered with biblical references and quotes, and his 
stories are drenched with the Bible, especially stories of paying attention to 
details; his knowledge of Scripture and the profound influence of the Christian 
tradition on literature makes his work an invaluable preaching resource. 
Perhaps no scriptural image is used more in his work than Jesus’ parables of 
the lost sheep and the lost son found in Luke 15, and there is often the sense 
that these two parables provide a lens through which he defines and sees what 
community, friendship, and extended family look like. In “Making It Home,” 
a “lost” son who has been away at war and journeys back home to his family 
and farm is met out in the middle of a plowed field by his father, who turns 
to his little brother and says: “Honey, run yonder to the house. Tell your 
granny to set on another plate. For we have our own that was gone and has 
come again.”12
“Watch with Me” is an extended meditation on a community watching 
out for a lost member who has had a “spell” come over him. They watch him 
and try to keep him safe until he is himself again. “Thicker Than Liquor” is 
about a nephew seeking the one lost, drunk uncle and bringing him home. In 
“Are You All Right?” neighbors check on a household that is cut off from ev-
eryone else owing to rising flood waters. And the short novel Remembering, 
with its allusions to Milton and Dante, tells of a young farmer who has been 
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“dismembered” by a farm machinery accident and a loss of a sense of self, 
only to be “re-membered” back into family and farm and community.13 For 
Berry, the good shepherd pays attention to the details of even one lost sheep 
and goes looking for it until he finds it.
A veteran pastor told me “that there never has been a pastor fired for 
visiting too much.” I spend an enormous amount of time paying attention to 
the details of members’ lives. To put it in the language of the parable of the 
shepherd and the lost sheep, I’m checking on my flock. In the afternoons, I 
am usually out visiting with folks, for I have found that most of the good, 
deep-down work of cultivating disciples happens out where they live and 
work and spend their time, and much less often in my study, and even less in 
the crisis times. It is during the crisis times that people reap from what was 
planted and nurtured earlier during their day-to-day living.
One day I was drinking coffee with a church member when he asked if 
I’d go with him to look at bass fishing boats. The last thing I wanted to do was 
look at fishing boats, and I certainly did not have the time to spend the after-
noon looking at them. Nevertheless, that’s what I did. After two hours of 
going to various boat dealers, talking about boats and fishing, and making 
other small talk, he suddenly asked me how to pray. He said that he had 
never learned to pray, didn’t know how to start, and was afraid of praying 
incorrectly. So we talked about prayer and then ended the afternoon by pray-
ing together. It had taken him more than two hours to get up the courage to 
ask me about prayer. In a normal pastoral visit in my study, we would never 
have gotten to it because the session would have ended after an hour. Since 
that afternoon, we now talk about prayer as comfortably as we talk about bass 
boats, and I’m aware that he’s practicing prayer daily. Someday, when the 
crisis comes, he’ll know how to pray.
Of course, it is a rare day that only one sheep is missing or in trouble. 
Most of the time there are eight or ten missing or sick, on top of the others 
I’m trying to nourish and teach and encourage. Some sheep find ways to get 
lost over again and over again. All of us who are decent shepherds know not 
only that we need some help but also that good New Testament ecclesiology 
says that it is the whole flock that is to take care of its members.
In Berry’s stories, it is the members of the community—those who live 
and work and share lives—who look out for one another. As a pastor, I keep 
asking, “How did they get like that? From whom did they learn to share a 
common life, including taking care of one another in crisis?” Berry says that 
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they learned it from a tradition, a living community-across-time. Extended 
families passed it along to mothers and fathers, who passed it along to their 
children. “Human continuity is virtually synonymous with good farming and 
good farming must outlast the life of any good farmer. For it to do this . . . we 
must have community.”14
But communities of people who share life in this way are rare, and the 
sense of tradition is practically extinct. Here is where we have to move beyond 
Berry. In his stories, the church exists on the edge of the common life of the 
people as only a fading, pale reflection of the larger community. We need 
churches that are, instead, the very ground of community, that define, build, 
and embody a common life that can move beyond the walls of the church and 
demonstrate common living in and to the wider society. In other words, we 
are to do the proper work of helping congregations know that we are the body 
of Christ. So every Sunday in worship the scattered members of the congrega-
tion are regathered and re-membered in Christ as one body. We hear and re-
hear the stories of our people across time through the reading of Scripture 
and participating in practices of worship spanning centuries. This work, our 
liturgy, then extends beyond Sunday through the rest of the week in practices 
of ministry and service. At the same time, this mundane, practical common 
life during the week helps keep our Sunday work from becoming Gnostic.
Berry provides images and stories for congregations that have little con-
cept of what this practical common life looks like, so I encourage my congre-
gation to read his work. His characters work together and eat together; I want 
the members of my congregation to eat together as often as possible. On most 
any weeknight, adults and families are on their way home from work, going 
by the grocery store to pick up something quick for supper, or stopping 
through a drive-through for the evening meal, and going to their individual 
homes for supper—even though many drive by the church on their way. We 
encourage people to come to the church to share their mealtime.
Beyond the good work of projects like Habitat for Humanity, I’m always 
on the lookout for other ways that the people of the congregation can share 
work. Most of them do yard and garden work, so we’ve decided that those 
who own lawnmowers and garden tillers will share them with those who need 
them. We also share children, children’s clothes, and child care. If someone is 
visiting the elderly, he or she encourages others to go along, including young 
people who can learn how to visit and pray with others. We urge veteran 
Christians to develop meaningful friendships with young people and chil-
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dren. Even a church finance committee meeting is a place for young people 
to learn—not only about money matters, but also about how mature Christian 
people deal with such matters.
My proper work as pastor is to nourish and encourage the common life 
of my congregation. It’s hard, sometimes tedious work and often overlooked 
by others. Yet it is also good and satisfying work; there can be pleasure in it. I 
work hard but am learning to recognize my limits and trust God for the rest. 
I spend more time working in the yard and garden, more time with my girls 
and my wife, and more time on my porch. Berry concludes the poem “The 
Amish Economy” with the lines:
But now, in summer dusk, a man
Whose hair and beard curl like spring ferns
Sits under the yard trees, at rest,
His smallest daughter on his lap.
This is because he rose at dawn,
Cared for his own, helped his neighbors,
Worked much, spent little, kept his peace.15
That is the kind of pastor I want to be.
Like Berry, and like the Amish about whom he writes, this sense of plea-
sure and satisfaction is connected with the commitment to stay with this 
land, paying attention to the details of these people, coming to terms and 
humbly accepting our proper place with them, and learning to live within the 
limits of creaturely life. Berry’s testimony is that love can grow from submit-
ting to our place; gratitude springs from the grace of no longer trying to “be 
somebody,” as he so often says, or trying to make the land into something it 
is not. Instead: “One’s love gradually responds to the place as it really is. . . . 
What one wants can become the same as what one has.”16
In a world where metaphors like rat race, climbing the ladder, and dog-eat-
dog are prevalent even among ministers, loving what you do, knowing satis-
faction in it, and being at peace with who you are are not small things. Indeed, 
it is the grace of God and a witness to the peaceable kingdom to embody such 
a life. Dante’s Paradiso points to this when the poet encounters Piccarda 
Donatti in one of the lower circles of heaven. He says to her: “But tell me: all 
you souls so happy here, do you yearn for a higher post in Heaven, to see 
more, to become more loved by Him?” She smiles as she answers him, 
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“Brother, the virtue of our heavenly love tempers our will and makes us want 
no more than what we have—we thirst for this alone. . . . In His will is our 
peace.”17
Tol Proudfoot, Berry’s fictional gentle giant, good man, and fine farmer, 
embodies this same sense of satisfaction and peace when Berry says of him: 
“He was not an ambitious farmer—he did not propose to own a large acreage 
or to become rich—but merely a good and gifted one. . . . It was a farm of 
ninety-eight acres, and Tol never longed even for the two more that would 
have made it a hundred.”18
Over the past forty years, Berry and his family have neither owned a large 
acreage nor become rich, but he has become a good and gifted farmer and has 
learned to live a good and gifted life as a witness to God’s peaceable kingdom.
One last story: Berry tells of a cold December day when his five-year-old 
granddaughter, Katie, spent the day with him while he hauled a wagon load 
of dirt for the barn floor, unloaded it, smoothed it over, and wetted it down. 
For the first time, Katie drove the team. She was proud of herself, and Berry 
says that he was proud of her and told her so: “By the time we started back up 
the creek road the sun had gone over the hill and the air had turned bitter. 
Katie sat close to me in the wagon, and we did not say anything for a long 
time. I did not say anything because I was afraid that Katie was not saying 
anything because she was cold and tired and miserable and perhaps homesick; 
it was impossible to hurry much, and I was unsure how I would comfort her. 
But then, after a while, she said, ‘Wendell, isn’t it fun?’”19
May our work, at least from time to time, be full of such simple joy and 
satisfaction.
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Part 2
Holy Living

I am convinced . . . that no satisfactory solution can come from consider-
ing marriage alone or agriculture alone. These are our basic connections to 
each other and to the earth, and they tend to relate analogically and to be 
reciprocally defining: our demands upon the earth are determined by our 
ways of living with one another; our regard for one another is brought to 
light in our ways of using the earth.
—Wendell Berry, “The Body and the Earth”
I started taking the pill two months after our first son was born. It was a 
safety measure. After all, he was conceived while my husband and I were (in-
correctly) using the natural method. I was only halfway through my master’s 
degree program. How could I possibly graduate if I got pregnant again? So I 
started taking the “mini-pill” or progesterone-only-pill, which allowed me to 
continue breast-feeding.
I took the pill for a year and a half and didn’t get pregnant, which was a 
relief. But, I wondered, should I be doing this? It made practical sense—I 
needed to finish my degree. As my husband, Fred, often reminds me, we 
moved to the Piedmont of North Carolina so that I could go to school, a 
decision that he supported but, as a native of Montana, was not entirely 
thrilled about. We are Christians, members of a community that has long had 
serious moral concerns about birth control—although our denomination 
does not have much to say about the matter. While the Catholic Church has 
an official statement against it (most notably articulated in the 1968 papal 
encyclical Humanae vitae), Protestant Christianity, at least in practice, has 
unofficially embraced the use of birth control. At the 1930 Lambeth 
Conference, the Anglican Church passed a resolution allowing the “restrict-
ed” use of birth control. The Anglican Church shared some of the Catholic 
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concerns about birth control, such as the likelihood that it would encourage 
promiscuity, but maintained the value of sex apart from procreation, asserting 
that “motive, not method, is what made birth control good or bad.”1 The 
conference agreed that, “in those cases where there is such a clearly felt moral 
obligation to limit or avoid parenthood, and where there is a morally sound 
reason for avoiding complete abstinence,” contraceptives “may be used . . . 
provided that this is done in the light of the same Christian principles.”2 
Where the health of the mother or the family’s financial situation was press-
ing, contraceptives were deemed morally acceptable. However, the use of 
birth control was not an option if it was merely a question of convenience, 
selfishness, or luxury. After 1930, most other Protestant churches followed 
the Anglican lead.
Yet, in the largely acculturated Protestant church in America, the ques-
tion of motive has become an ambiguous one. Indeed, it seems that mainline 
Protestants today are motivated more by the prospect of convenience than by 
that of welcoming the stranger or the unplanned child. How can we challenge 
one another’s motives for using birth control when we are not held account-
able for career choices or home size? At the church I attend, birth control of 
any kind is rarely discussed and never challenged. We are an unusually young 
congregation, many of whom are graduate students. On average, there are 
about thirty people in attendance every week, most of whom are married. 
There are only two children.
Farmers and Fertility
Fred and I are organic farmers. One day, we got into an argument about birth 
control—specifically, whether I should be taking the pill. I had been reading 
up on the Catholic position and was staunchly defending it. Fred was on full 
attack against. Suddenly I blurted, “What if it’s like putting chemicals on our 
garden?” That stopped him in his tracks. “You’re right,” he said, after thinking 
a moment. “I guess it’s kind of a ‘quick-fix’ to control fertility, like the ‘quick-
fix’ fertilizers we don’t use to control the fertility of our land.” The argument 
ended there, but I couldn’t get away from the thought. How could we be pas-
sionate about organic, sustainable agriculture and use hormonal birth con-
trol? If we refuse to boost our fertility in the garden using chemical fertilizers 
or to reduce the numbers of bugs and weeds with pesticides and herbicides, 
how could we justify using a chemical to control our own fertility?
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While there are a lot of good arguments against using birth control, this 
one had a strong hold on me. I was curious: Are other female farmers asking 
the same question? What I found was fascinating. None of the women farm-
ers I asked used hormonal birth control. Many of them had tried it at some 
point but were unhappy with the way it made them feel. Others refused to 
take it at all. And one friend, who had been taking the pill for years, just re-
cently quit because she has been raising sheep for the last year. Now that she 
is in touch with nature’s seasons and cycles of fertility, she can’t justify taking 
a pill that tricks her body into thinking she’s pregnant. I suggested to my 
sister, who is an organic vegetable farmer, that women who farm are more in 
touch with nature, including their own bodies. Perhaps that is why they com-
plain about the side effects of the hormones. She laughed and said, “Well, I 
guess I am in touch with the cycles of the moon.” This is because she plants 
by the moon. Her own cycles are connected to the lunar cycles through the 
soil she touches every day. It is no coincidence that these women refuse to use 
hormonal birth control. In every case, it was something inherent in each 
woman’s agrarian way of life that informed her decision.
In his essay “The Body and the Earth,” Wendell Berry—perhaps the pre-
eminent agrarian thinker in America—makes a connection between human 
fertility and the fertility of the earth. He writes: “There is an uncanny resem-
blance between our behavior toward each other and our behavior toward the 
earth. Between our relation to our own sexuality and our relation to the re-
productivity of the earth, for instance, the resemblance is plain and strong 
and apparently inescapable.”3 In this essay, I try to show how Berry makes 
that connection. I focus specifically on “The Body and the Earth” as it pulls 
together many strands of his thought and articulates well an agrarian vision 
of the world. Then I try to show how that vision is particularly biblical and 
important for the church to take seriously. Finally, I propose an agrarian per-
spective on birth control that might help frame the way Christians engage in 
this debate.
The Agrarian Vision
In “The Body and the Earth,” Berry offers a sharp critique of our attitude 
toward the body in modern industrial society. The chief problem, as he sees 
it, is that we have forgotten the proper place of human beings within the or-
der of creation. In contrast to preindustrial societies, where art and literature 
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reveal an innate sense that humans are one small part of a much larger cre-
ation, Berry observes that, with the rise of industry, “we became less and less 
capable of sensing ourselves as small within Creation, partly because we 
thought we could comprehend it statistically, but also because we were be-
coming creators, ourselves, of a mechanical creation by which we felt our-
selves greatly magnified” (100). Effectively thinking ourselves gods, we have 
created works that cut us off from the wilderness, forgetting that we are a 
small part of creation and dependent on the whole of creation to survive.
This forgetfulness leads to isolation because it allows us to live under the 
illusion that we are independent, disconnected beings who can and should 
pursue our individual self-interests at all costs. Thus, our relationships are 
increasingly determined by competition, and this isolates us—from the earth 
and from one another. It is this isolation, Berry argues, that is the source of 
the disintegration of modern society. But, for Berry, the most fundamental 
and damaging isolation is that of the body. Not only have we divided our-
selves from others, but we are also divided within the self: “At some point we 
began to assume that the life of the body would be the business of grocers and 
medical doctors, who need take no interest in the spirit, whereas the life of 
the spirit would be the business of churches, which would have at best a 
negative interest in the body” (104). Just as modernity sets one body against 
another, so it sets the body against the soul. The isolated body is, thus, set 
against the world, pursuing its satisfaction at the expense of other bodies, of 
the earth, and even of its own soul. Whether we set the soul against the body 
or indulge the body at the expense of the soul, we are destroying both.
These divisions between body and soul and world are destructive because, 
Berry argues, despite our efforts to deny it, everything is connected. We are 
dependent creatures. Our lives and all life, human and nonhuman, are caught 
up in a complex system of interdependence that constitutes the whole. Berry 
writes: “These things that appear to be distinct are nevertheless caught in a 
network of mutual dependence and influence that is the substantiation of 
their unity. Body, soul (or mind or spirit), community, and world are all sus-
ceptible to each other’s influence, and they are all conductors of each other’s 
influence” (110). Trying to divide what is inherently connected threatens the 
health of the whole. It is like severing the veins of a circulatory system. We are 
endangering our own lives by living in denial of our connections, to others 
and to the earth.
As Berry sees it, this begets the disintegration of modern culture, a pat-
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tern that is at once cultural and agricultural. Culture and agriculture are dis-
integrating precisely because we have divided them. We have forgotten that 
souls cannot thrive apart from healthy bodies, that bodies cannot thrive with-
out healthy food, and that culture cannot thrive without healthy agriculture. 
Berry argues that healing is possible only by the restoration of these long- 
ignored connections. Body, soul, community, and world must be reconnected 
because the health of each is essential for the health of the whole. In a nut-
shell, this is the agrarian vision of the world. It is a vision in which humans 
are returned to the status of creature and, thus, reconnected to everything in 
creation. It is a vision in which care for the earth, care for bodies, and care for 
souls are all bound up in each other.
From this framework, Berry considers how we might reconnect, find 
healing and wholeness, and overcome division. He begins by considering two 
core divisions in need of healing. He writes: “The divisions issuing from the 
division of body and soul are first sexual and then ecological. Many other 
divisions branch out from those, but those are the most important because 
they have to do with the fundamental relationships—with each other and 
with the earth—that we all have in common” (113). Berry brings these two 
relationships together in his concept of household. Far from our modern no-
tions of home, the notion household suggests something more like a preindus-
trial family farm or a cottage industry. It is built on the practical bond of 
mutual dependence and work. It is the place where a husband and wife are 
joined in lifework together, where they learn to enact their marriage and prac-
tice their love in the midst of being bound together by necessity, not simply 
to each other, but also to other, similar households. But the household has 
been dismembered, and what was once a sexual difference—differences in 
particular tasks that were of equal importance for sustaining the household—
became a sexual division. Just as body and soul have been divided, so have 
women and men, even husband and wife. Berry’s critique, in this case, is a bit 
outdated but useful nonetheless. At the time of writing “The Body and the 
Earth” (the mid-1970s), he argued that, in modern industrial society, men 
have been cut off from their nurturing role, sent away from the home to the 
specialized work that is the lifeblood of the market economy, while a woman’s 
nurture is regarded as being of little use economically. Woman is valued more 
for her potential buying power than for the complex discipline of housewif-
ery. Berry writes: “In modern marriage, then, what was once a difference of 
work became a division of work. And in this division the household was de-
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stroyed as a practical bond between husband and wife. . . . It was no longer a 
circumstance that required, dignified, and rewarded the enactment of mutual 
dependence, but the site of mutual estrangement” (115). It could be argued 
that, in the twenty-first century, both husband and wife have been sent away 
from home, either to work as highly specialized, well-paid professionals or to 
be underpaid housekeepers and landscapers in the employ of those same pro-
fessionals. Either way, households have been dismembered.
It is to the household that Berry says we must return in order to heal 
these divisions between men, women, and the earth. Here, he makes a vital 
connection. In the household, there is no sexual or ecological division. In the 
household, a husband and wife’s work is bound to the cycles of fertility and 
the seasons that make human life possible: “The motive power of sexual love 
is thus joined directly to constructive work and is given communal and eco-
logical value” (132). Household sex, then, is tied to the constructive work of 
making and sustaining one another, which is entirely dependent on the fertil-
ity of the earth. Thus, the household is the link “between human sexuality 
and its sources in the sexuality of Creation” (124). Our sexual relationship 
binds us together in the household; our household binds us to the earth. The 
way we treat one will invariably affect the other. This is how Berry is able to 
say that there is a strange “resemblance” between our relation to our sexuality 
and to the soil we live on.
It is at this point in his essay that Berry makes the connection between 
the way we treat our own fertility and the way we treat that of the earth. 
However, before we get into that particular discussion, we must first ask how 
this vision has any bearing for the church. Does Wendell Berry have anything 
relevant to say to Christians on this matter? In the next section of this essay, I 
try to show that he is not far from a biblical vision of the world. Many of the 
connections he makes are congruous with what the Bible tells us about hu-
mankind’s relationship with soil. His critique of modern industrial capitalism 
is a prophetic call to righteousness—that is, right relationships with God, 
neighbor, and the earth.
In the Garden
We must begin with the creation account, for that is the story that tells us 
who we are and who God is. One of the primary functions of the creation 
story is to put us in our proper place in the order of creation. Central to the 
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biblical vision is the notion that we are creatures and God alone is Creator. 
That essential truth should dispel any illusion we might have about ourselves 
as godlike. When we acknowledge ourselves as creatures, we discover our-
selves connected to everything else in creation. The Old Testament scholar 
Ellen Davis writes: “The biblical writers . . . help us see the degree to which 
our relationship with God is bound up in our relationships with the other 
creatures whom God has made.”4 This complex relationship between God, 
humans, and the earth is established at the very beginning.
The two creation stories in Genesis, seen together, make clear that, while 
we have a share in divinity on one side, we are also connected to the fertile soil 
on the other. In the first creation story, humans are made in the image of God 
(Gen. 1:26–27). In the second, humans are made from humus; the Potter 
forms a human body out of clay and breathes life into it (Gen. 2:7). Thus, 
while humans are to rule the earth as God would (Gen. 1:26–30), represent-
ing God’s interest in the world, they are also of the earth and dependent on it 
for life. God and the soil are the sources of human life—both at the begin-
ning and for the rest of the story. Indeed, while humankind, as God’s image 
on earth, has a unique place in the order of creation, the second creation 
story is a sober reminder of the claim that the soil finally has on us. After the 
disobedience in the garden, God said: “By the sweat of your face you shall eat 
bread until you return to the ground, for out of it you were taken; you are 
dust, and to dust you shall return” (Gen. 3:19 [NRSV]). In the biblical vi-
sion, Berry’s dyad—body and earth—becomes a triad. God, humankind, and 
the soil are in relationship and—as we shall see—connected in a way that is 
very close to Berry’s agrarian vision.
Davis argues that, while we are used to the idea that the Bible calls us to 
love God and neighbor, we may be surprised to discover that the Old Testa-
ment is especially interested in our relationship with soil. That relationship is 
first established in Eden. In the second creation story, God set the first hu-
mans in the garden to “watch and work” the land. Davis points out that these 
Hebrew words (‘avad and shamar) are not common agricultural terms but are 
used more often to describe human activity toward God. When directed to-
ward God, ‘avad means “worship” and shamar means “‘to watch,’ or ‘watch 
over,’ ‘observe,’ ‘keep’ or ‘preserve.’” Humans are, thus, called into a particular 
kind of relationship with the soil that goes beyond “till and keep.” Humans 
are called to serve the land, to be subservient to that on which we and all 
creatures depend for life. We are also called to observe the land as we would 
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God’s commands, learning from it as well as protecting it from harm. Davis 
writes: “Together, these two verbs outline humanity’s complex relationship 
with the fertile soil, a relationship that is meant to be deferential, observant, 
and protective. We must serve (‘avad ) the land, not worshipping it but show-
ing it reverence as God’s own creation, respecting it as one whose needs take 
priority over our immediate desires. We must watch it and watch over it 
(shamar) as one who has something to teach us and yet at the same time needs 
our vigilant care.”5 Thus, in the biblical vision, humans are members of a 
complex network of relationships, and the call to righteousness entails main-
taining the integrity of all those relationships—to God, neighbors, and 
earth.
The interweaving of these relationships appears again and again through-
out the Bible but is particularly vivid in the Song of Songs. In her commen-
tary on the Song of Songs, Davis argues that, most centrally, “the Song is 
about repairing the damage done by the first disobedience in Eden, what 
Christian tradition calls ‘the Fall.’” Adam and Eve’s disobedience to God had 
the disastrous result of division: division between man and woman, human-
ity and nature, and humanity and God. The Song, through which we experi-
ence healing on all three levels, represents “the reversal of that primordial exile 
from Eden.” This healing is a love story with two primary characters, a man 
and a woman, who speak passionately of their mutual desire. The Song shows 
us what pure love looks like, love as it once was in the garden. Yet the lan-
guage of love that dominates the Song not only speaks of two lovers in the 
heat of passion but is also about the love between God and humanity (Israel 
in particular). Moreover, some of the most striking imagery in the Song refers 
to the land, which not only is the setting for the lovers’ encounter but “also 
becomes an object of love, especially as the perfumed mountains and lush 
fields of Israel are at times identified with the lovely ‘topography’ of the wom-
an’s body.”6 In fact, the image of the woman we get in the Song looks much 
more like the land of Israel than a female form. This is revealing. It suggests 
that God loves the beautiful earth and calls us into that same kind of relation-
ship with creation. Indeed, it calls us back into the garden to reclaim inti-
macy that once existed: intimacy between God and humanity, between man 
and woman, and between humans and the earth.
As we have seen, the church has something to learn from the agrarian 
vision. The Bible makes clear that we are in relationships in which the health 
of each affects the health of the whole. The biblical vision is like a three-sided 
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prism through which all those relationships are displayed in myriad colors. 
God, humanity, and the earth are in relationship, and that relationship was 
once defined by pure love. Yet those relationships have been disordered since 
the Fall. Division has ensued. But the reality of the Fall does not mean that 
the connections among God and creatures no longer exist. Indeed, God, hu-
mans, and the earth are so deeply connected that disorder in one area causes 
disorder in another, and these relationships, using Berry’s language, are still 
“reciprocally defining” (131). The way we treat the earth is reflective of our 
relationship with God, which is reflected back into our relationships with our 
neighbor or spouse; it is all deeply interwoven.
Sex and Soil
To return to my original question regarding birth control: Does the way we 
treat our own fertility relate to the way we treat the earth’s fertility? In Berry’s 
account in “The Body and the Earth,” the disintegration of the household has 
resulted in the division of sexuality from fertility. That division, of course, is 
made possible by the advent of hormonal birth control. Whereas natural forms 
of birth control certainly existed in preindustrial societies, they were deter-
mined by what Berry calls “a cultural response to an understood practical 
limit.” Knowing that the land can produce only so much food, most agrarian 
and hunter-gatherer people used some form of birth control, but it was inti-
macy with the land that informed their sexual practice. Modern industrial 
societies, however, have severed the connections between sexuality and fertility. 
We have also, Berry observes, done the same with the earth’s fertility. We have 
handed it over to the “farming experts” or agribusinessmen. We have allowed 
the “specialists” to take over our fertility, entrusting “the immense questions 
that surround the coming of life into the world” (133) to those who, in return, 
hand us the chemicals and devices to use without restraint. We are now “free 
from fertility”—both our own and that of the earth—which, Berry writes, “is 
to short-circuit human culture at its source. It is, in effect, to remove from 
consciousness the two fundamental issues of human life. It permits two great 
powers to be regarded and used as if they were unimportant” (134).
There is danger in this “freedom,” as Berry warns. As laid out in Genesis, 
there is a divinely ordained relationship between humans and the land that is 
marked by servanthood, observance, and protection. That is a stark contrast 
to the agricultural practices we find today on corporate farms across the world. 
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Rather than “watching” the land and working within its natural limits, “the 
dominant practices of modern industrial agriculture are based on the idea 
that technology has given us the power to reinvent our human relationship to 
the soil.”7 As we dump massive quantities of pesticides and herbicides on our 
genetically modified corn and soybeans, as we pump stockyards of beef and 
cooped-up chickens full of growth hormones, as we watch soil erode and 
wash into the rivers along with thousands of gallons of animal waste, we are 
practicing agriculture in a way that threatens the health of our relationship to 
God and to all our neighbors with whom we share this earth. Can the same 
be said about the way we treat our own fertility? That we pump our own bod-
ies full of hormones to prevent pregnancy—thus dividing sex from fertility—
is a technological achievement that skews our very sexuality.
Wendell Berry published “The Body and the Earth” when pharmaceuti-
cal contraceptives were a relatively new phenomenon. He warned that our 
full embrace of something about which we knew so little, and that affected so 
significant a part of our lives, could have dire consequences—as the technol-
ogy of land use already has. It could be said that his view about our treatment 
of fertility was prophetic. Last summer I was in England visiting my relatives. 
My cousin is a geneticist, and I asked him about his latest research. He was 
studying the negative effects of estrogen on fish in rivers in the United 
Kingdom. “How does estrogen get into the water?” I asked. “The pill,” he 
replied. Berry was right. There is, in fact, a connection between the way we 
treat our bodies and the way we treat the earth, and scientists are just now 
stumbling on this.
It is now generally accepted in the scientific community that there is a 
worldwide decline in amphibian populations.8 There have been a number of 
reasons suggested for this: habitat depletion, infectious diseases, and environ-
mental pollution. Recent research suggests that estrogen in the water supply 
is affecting the reproductive systems of amphibians. There are two forms of 
estrogen found in amphibian habitats, natural and synthetic. These come 
from human waste (hormonal birth control, hormone replacement therapy, 
etc.) and certain types of plants. There are also estrogen mimics that have a 
different chemical structure but the same effects as estrogens. These come 
from man-made chemicals that are used for pesticides, such as DDT, and the 
production of plastic. All these estrogens or estrogen mimics seem to affect 
amphibian reproductive systems in similar ways, which suggests that this 
could be one cause of population decline. It is important to note here that 
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“amphibian populations are excellent indicators of the general health of the 
environment because of their position near the top of the food chain and 
their significant biomass in many ecosystems” and the permeability of their 
skin, which allows them to be more sensitive to pollutants.9 Indeed, there is a 
connection between our attitudes toward our own fertility and that of the 
earth, and it is found in the creeks and streams that surround us. Our attempt 
to control fertility threatens the fragile ecosystems in which we live.
Over the course of writing this essay, I stopped taking the pill. I had not 
worked out all the reasons yet, but it seemed the right thing to do (it also 
saved us thirty dollars a month). One direct result has been an actual change 
in my own makeup. Quite literally, I find myself a happier person. I had been 
taking the progesterone-only pill. Progesterone is the hormone that domi-
nates a woman’s cycle after she has ovulated, approximately fourteen days 
prior to menstruation. As progesterone levels rise, a woman often feels slight-
ly depressed, tired, bloated—all symptoms of PMS. By ingesting progester-
one, I was daily forcing PMS down my throat. Now, as my body is returning 
to its natural rhythm, I find that my mood has changed, and I follow its 
changes throughout my monthly cycles. Estrogen, the hormone that domi-
nates the first part of the cycle, lifts my mood. I generally feel happy, ener-
getic, confident. After I ovulate, I can feel myself slide downward until I 
menstruate. The beauty for me (and for my family) is that I understand these 
feelings. Instead of getting frustrated or blaming myself for mood swings, I 
can see that my own body often determines how I feel. It also helps in my 
relationship to my husband. I can warn him, “I may be more sensitive this 
week.” Or I can apologize, “I’m sorry I reacted that way; I think I know why 
I was more defensive than usual.”
Early in the process of writing this essay, I contacted Norman Wirzba, 
then a philosophy professor at Georgetown College who is also an agrarian, a 
husband, and a father of four. I thought that he might have some insights on 
the subject of birth control and asked him to discuss my questions with his 
wife, Gretchen Ziegenhals—specifically, the parallels between chemicals put 
on a garden and chemicals put into our bodies. He replied: “My wife is con-
cerned that women’s bodies not be understood in a passive way, something 
like a garden upon which men can exact their wishes.”10 I agree. It is not 
women’s bodies that we should think of as a garden. Both women and men 
have fertile bodies, and, when they become one flesh, their fertility is joined. 
It is not a singular but a plural concept—our fertility. But I think that the 
96  Elizabeth Bahnson
garden metaphor is still helpful here. Fred and I work the garden together. It 
is a mutual effort that requires both of us—he usually does the digging and 
planting, while I do the weeding and harvesting. We both do the cooking. 
But all that labor requires working together and working with nature. We 
have to plant cabbage and broccoli early in the spring—otherwise worms will 
eat it. We have to plant sweet potatoes in the heat of summer so that we can 
eat them over the winter. We compost our weeds and scraps and plant cover 
crops on our garden beds so that we will have good fertility next year. We are 
learning to “watch and work” the land on which God has placed us. All this 
helps us reimagine how we think about our own fertility. And we are learning 
to “watch and work” our bodies so that we do not divorce sexuality from 
fertility and, as Berry says in “The Body and the Earth,” “pleasure from re-
sponsibility” (135).
As Christians, we are called to a particular kind of relationship with na-
ture—the nature of the earth and that of our bodies. We are called to treat it 
respectfully, with holy reverence, as God’s own creation. We are called to learn 
from it, to be amazed by it, and to work with it. And we are also called to 
protect it and keep it from harm. In treating the earth this way, in treating our 
own bodies that way, we will treat other bodies that way. This begins to ap-
proach the shalom, the peace and wholeness that God desires. Even so, we 
cannot plan for everything. God sends us surprises. After putting compost on 
my flower bed this year, a tomato plant sprouted. Instead of pulling it up, I 
let it grow in the middle of my perennials. To our surprise, that plant pro-
duced the first tomato of the year.
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Farming is an altar on which only the bread and wine of truth can be 
placed.
—Catherine de Hueck Doherty, Apostolic Farming
In these days of war, my thoughts return to Italo Calvino’s Invisible Cities, a 
fantastical novel in which Marco Polo and Kublai Khan meet nightly in the 
Khan’s palace garden for a series of fevered conversations. Marco Polo tells the 
Khan of all the exotic, mysterious cities within the empire. Night after night 
he describes each city until finally the Khan realizes that the young Venetian 
traveler is really speaking again and again of the same place. But these tales 
can only distract; the Great Khan knows that his empire is crumbling, that he 
himself is dying. One evening Kublai Khan confesses to Marco Polo that his 
empire is “rotting like a corpse in a swamp.” Here is Marco Polo’s response: 
“Yes, the empire is sick, and, what is worse, it is trying to become accustomed 
to its sores. This is the aim of my explorations: examining the traces of happi-
ness still to be glimpsed, I gauge its short supply. If you want to know how 
much darkness there is around you, you must sharpen your eyes, peering at 
the faint lights in the distance.”1
Though the rulers of the American Empire share much with Kublai 
Khan—for example, the desire to control the known world—they lack his 
wisdom in one crucial area: the ability to see that the empire is rotting. Lying, 
torture, preemptive war, using God as a political tool, privileging corporate 
welfare over the welfare of communities, mandating the pursuit of unlimited 
economic growth on a planet with finite resources—how long can it really 
last? These things can’t be reduced to certain policy choices or the work of a 
few bad apples, as if missing weapons of mass destruction and Abu Ghraib are 
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mere speed bumps on the road to freedom. This is simply how the empire 
does business, and ours is perhaps the first generation in this country’s history 
to be able to look past the facade and see the monster behind the mask.
The empire is sick, and what is worse, it is trying to become accustomed 
to its sores.
Where will be found the faint lights in the distance?
Hope Grows in a Field
Adela and I are hauling water. Five-gallon buckets in each hand, we make 
forays down to the creek, where we dip our buckets, haul them back up the 
hill, then hand them off to another crew. A group of us is watering peas, po-
tatoes, spinach, and lettuce—our first spring crops.
It’s a dry March here in North Carolina’s Piedmont, a tough spring to 
start a community garden. La Niña is upon us—which foretells a summer of 
drought. We don’t have a well yet. I worry that we won’t be able to keep haul-
ing water through the hot summer.
Adela doesn’t seem to have these concerns, and when she walks up, sets 
down her buckets, and smiles, my own fears vanish. We fall to talking, Adela 
in rapid Mexican Spanish, me in halting Gringo Spanglish. We talk about the 
work, the planting and watering and weeding that will need to happen before 
we harvest. I ask her about the years she worked in North Carolina’s tobacco 
fields. We rest. Then we go back to work.
Though I began with the backdrop of empire, my real subject here is a 
garden, specifically, a community garden. I wish to articulate why the church 
needs community gardens, why such gardening is an act of resistance to the 
powers that be, and why growing food is a small but necessary witness to the 
Kingdom of God.
The place Adela and I watered peas is called Anathoth Community 
Garden. My thoughts have been shaped by this place, and it’s largely the 
story of this particular garden and its people that I want to tell.
A year ago, when Anathoth was only an idea, I tried to write a theology 
of gardening. I thought that would help me voice to others why Anathoth 
was important and necessary. I failed. The idea was doomed before I wrote 
the first word because I had approached it abstractly. The story of Anathoth 
Community Garden had yet to begin; therefore, any theologizing prior to the 
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story itself would fail precisely because it was prior. Theology cannot be im-
posed on particular stories; it can only arise out of them. This doesn’t just 
happen magically. Theology, like gardening, requires cultivation.
Anathoth Community Garden is now a reality. The story has a begin-
ning. I can now attempt to answer the question I’m still asked a year after 
the garden has begun producing food: Why should a church involve itself in 
agriculture?
Here’s how our community garden works. When Adela became one of 
the founding members of Anathoth, she paid her five dollars for the entire 
year, she agreed to donate two hours of her time a week (she really works three 
or four), and she agreed to be put to work at whatever needs doing that day. 
In turn, Adela and other members receive a share of the weekly harvest—ev-
erything from arugula to Zapotec tomatoes—from April through November. 
Though we seek out migrant and low-income families to become members, 
anyone can join.
The food is grown without harmful fertilizers or chemicals. We do the 
work by hand, thus reclaiming the God-bestowed dignity of manual labor. 
Initially, the ground was plowed with a neighbor’s tractor. But the permanent 
raised beds were built by hand, and we now do nearly all ongoing tasks—cart-
ing manure, weeding, planting—by hand as well. This privileging of hand 
tools over machines affords the dual pleasure of decreasing our dependence 
on the oil economy and providing exercise for our bodies. We prefer the 
scythe to the weed-whacker.2 Energy taken from the soil in the form of veg-
etables is returned as compost, thus keeping the soil, in Sir Albert Howard’s 
words, “in good heart.”3 Our goal is to make Anathoth Community Garden 
sustainable in the most basic sense: it will operate almost entirely on sunlight 
and the work of human hands.
These are the nuts and bolts of our community garden, or, rather, the 
roots and branches. But the invisible work, the movement of God’s Spirit, 
that holy sap rising unseen to give life to trunk and limb—this I find harder 
to describe or explain.
The story of Anathoth Community Garden really begins with a murder. 
On a June afternoon in 2004, Bill King was closing up his shop on the corner 
of Mill Creek and Carr Store Road when someone walked through the door 
and shot him in the back of the head. Before Bill and his wife, Emma, bought 
the place, the little bait and tackle grocery was a haven for local crack dealers. 
The first thing Bill and Emma did when they arrived was to ask the dealers to 
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leave. Parents began bringing their children to the store for ice cream; neigh-
borhood kids rode their bikes down for a soda. When people couldn’t pay, 
Bill would let them take food on credit. Whatever sense of safety this little 
farming community of Cedar Grove had enjoyed before that afternoon in 
June, one trigger pull had ended. A once-quiet way of life was shattered. 
People here were angry and afraid.
Valee Taylor, a friend of Bill’s, was just plain angry. Several weeks after 
the murder, Valee visited Grace Hackney, the pastor of the Cedar Grove 
United Methodist Church (UMC), to talk about what the community 
should do. It’s not often that a black man will set foot in a white church in 
Cedar Grove, but Valee and Grace had become friends after meeting one day 
at the post office. Valee wanted to put out a reward. Grace had another 
idea—a prayer vigil. Valee was persuaded. The following week, people from 
the community gathered in the parking lot of Bill’s store, and they prayed for 
peace. Grace later told me that the motivation behind the vigil was to make 
“a statement against the domination of fear. As people of faith we are called 
to stand up against violence, against separation according to class, race, and 
other societal divisions.”
Hearing Valee tell it, that afternoon was a sort of mystical experience. 
“The sunlight was shining down on us,” he said, “the air was crisp, there was 
a light breeze. Here were blacks and whites together praying for peace in the 
community. Until Grace talked about it that day, I had never understood the 
concept of the Kingdom of God. And looking out across the parking lot—I’d 
say that was it.”
The town of Cedar Grove is no bigger than a church, a post office, and a 
stoplight, yet more than one hundred people attended Bill’s vigil. One of 
those in attendance was Valee’s mother, Mrs. Scenobia Taylor, a fifth-genera-
tion descendant of African American sharecroppers and daughter of Doc 
Corbett, who was once the largest landowner in Orange County. Mrs. Taylor 
was moved by something she witnessed at the vigil. After the murder, as she 
tells it, God told her in a dream to give five acres of her land to the commu-
nity. She felt that somehow this land would help heal the community’s 
wounds. But to whom would she give it?
In the spring of 2005, Grace initiated a series of community conversa-
tions about faith and land, calling them “Food-Faith-Farm.” People came 
from Cedar Grove UMC as well as from the wider Cedar Grove communi-
ty—farmers, retirees, even the local librarian. We began by looking at some 
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troubling realities: Why was it that many of us had land, yet within five miles 
of the church there were people who didn’t get enough to eat? The “rich food” 
of which Isaiah spoke was available only to those “with money and with price” 
(Isa. 55:1f [NRSV]). Couldn’t some of the arable land, much of it former 
tobacco land that since the federal buyouts was now lying fallow, be used to 
grow food for people who needed it? Other questions followed: If the church’s 
mission is to practice reconciliation, doesn’t that include mending our rela-
tionship with the land, perhaps restoring some of the fertility lost from years 
of soil erosion? How can the ‘adam (human) care for the ’adamah (humus); 
how can we “till and keep” the fertile soil to which our lives are inextricably 
bound (Gen. 2:7, 15)? In the midst of these questions, the idea for a com-
munity garden arose.
When Mrs. Taylor learned about the community garden idea, she knew 
that her dream had been prophetic. She donated the five acres to Cedar Grove 
UMC to act as trustee, and Anathoth Community Garden was born.
Grace invited me to get involved when the first conversations began. I 
live near Cedar Grove on a small subsistence farm that my wife and I work 
together. In May 2005, I quit my job as a writing tutor at the Duke University 
Divinity School, wrote grants over the summer, and by August was hired as 
the garden manager. I work full-time, my salary paid by donations and grants 
from Duke Endowment and the Valparaiso Project for Christian Practices. A 
continuing series of grants from the coffers of James B. Duke are funding the 
first three years of the garden’s life.
One way to describe Anathoth is that it’s a place where the fortunes of a 
robber baron now feed illegal immigrants and crack addicts.
The Vocation of Farming
Managing these two arable acres, which are beginning to seem more like a 
small farm than a garden, is the hardest job I’ve ever had. Nothing in my 
formal education prepared me for this; nor is it the livelihood I ever imagined 
myself making. But as tobacco–cum–turf farmer Dwight Compton once told 
me, you don’t choose to farm—you’re chosen. Farming or gardening is not just 
a job; it’s a calling. A vocation.
I’m often asked why a well-educated thirty-four-year-old would take a 
job as the manager of a community garden. Implicit in the question are sev-
eral unspoken assumptions: it’s a downward move; it’s a waste of a master’s-
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level education; farming is better left to blue collars and migrants; and so on. 
My answer often begins as a counterquestion: “Have you ever read Wendell 
Berry?” Though I’m reluctant to speak of conversion experiences, I find my-
self reaching for that language when I describe the influence Berry’s writings 
have had on my life. I first read Berry while at Duke Divinity School, in a 
Christian ethics class taught by Joel Shuman, one of the editors of this vol-
ume. In Berry’s novels, essays, and poems, I saw emerging a way of life that 
made sense. Berry’s agrarian world jumped off the page fully clothed and alive. 
Here was an antidote to the shallow consumerism in which I was mired; here 
was a holistic, practical vision of how to live rightly both with the land and 
with others. I had found a way of life I wanted to claim as my own.
In a letter to Berry (his former student), Wallace Stegner sums up my 
own reaction on discovering Berry’s work: “Those who read you devoutly—
and this letter is an indication that I am one of them—find something else in 
you that their world too much lacks: the value, the real physical and spiritual 
satisfaction, of hard human work. We respond to your pages as victims of 
pellagra or scurvy respond to vitamins. . . . You are a hero among those who 
have been wounded and offended by industrial living and yearn for a simpler 
and more natural and more feeling relation to the natural world.”4
I was one of those “wounded and offended by industrial living.” I grew 
up in southwestern Montana, a place of such beauty it makes your teeth ache. 
My father taught me as a boy how to visit wild places around our home in 
Gallatin Valley and how to leave them undisturbed by our passing. My foot-
print on the world then was small. But, when I moved east to attend Duke in 
my late twenties, I saw a larger footprint, one I had made by participating in 
our culture’s running roughshod over creation, all in desperate hunger for 
more. Berry’s agrarianism offered a way out. And so I joined that group of 
those Stegner mentioned, those who respond to Berry’s books “as lost dogs in 
hope of rescue turn toward some friendly stranger.”5
For some time afterward, my conversion remained incomplete. It was 
impotent because it was a conversion only from the neck up. I had no atten-
dant practices to get my hands and feet involved. In May 2000, I graduated 
from Duke fully convinced that agrarianism would save us from the greed, 
violence, and sheer idiocy of capitalism (the idea that you can have unlimited 
economic growth, e.g., on a planet of finite resources), yet I hadn’t the slight-
est knowledge of how that way of salvation was worked out. Even that idea—
agrarianism will save us—was murky and abstract. I hadn’t yet learned how 
104  Fred Bahnson
one did the work necessary to sustain an agrarian way of life. I needed to see 
Berry’s vision lived out in a particular community.
In the spring of 2002, I went to Chiapas as a “peaceworker.” I lived among 
a group of indigenous coffee farmers whose families had been attacked by 
government-sponsored paramilitaries in the low-intensity war of the 1990s. 
This was Graham Greene country, a land where groves of crosses stood on 
forlorn hillsides “like trees that had been left to seed,”6 where the Mexican 
government was still killing Christians, only this time under the banner of 
counterinsurgency instead of fascism.
Young and naive, I did little to ameliorate the situation. My “peacemaking” 
consisted of me spending several nights in these people’s homes, eating their 
tortillas, drinking their sweet, weak coffee, and trying to learn to speak Tzotzil. 
I received far more than I gave, and what they gave me more than anything was 
the desire to live as they did, at least insofar as I could in my own country. 
Among these lovely people—Catholic pacifists who had renounced the armed 
path of the Zapatistas, farmers of the kind we’d call organic—I saw embodied 
the agrarian practices I now wanted to claim as my own. I returned from 
Chiapas determined to farm. I wrote to Berry asking if I could apprentice with 
him at Lane’s Landing, sending along with my request some poems I’d written. 
Though I don’t think he saw much in my poetry—“you have much to learn 
about making poems”—he did encourage my farming interests. He wasn’t 
farming much now, “just some slaughter lambs,” and wouldn’t be able to take 
on an apprentice, but recommended that I should seek out a farm near where I 
lived in North Carolina, offering to help me locate one.
I soon found a job as a farm apprentice at Harvey Harman’s place, a per-
maculture farm in nearby Chatham County, North Carolina. What I learned 
from Harvey gave me enough confidence to try my own hand at farming, if 
only at the subsistence level. Now, as the manager of Anathoth Community 
Garden, my education continues. From the vantage the garden affords, I can 
see the trajectory my life has taken. Its arc traces a consistency only a hand 
larger than mine could have writ. I guess that’s what Dwight Compton meant 
about being chosen.
Gardening for Exiles
The year of Bill King’s murder, 2004, was the year Jeremiah came up in the 
lectionary. It was also the year American forces tried to mop up the after- 
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effects of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Jeremiah knew something about 
invasions. At the time he was writing, the Babylonians had just sacked 
Jerusalem in a “shock and awe” campaign and carted off the first wave of cap-
tives. Jeremiah’s people were dragged from their homes and forced to live in a 
strange land where they had no power and no job opportunities and didn’t 
speak the language. Nevertheless, during the Babylonian siege, God told 
Jeremiah to buy a field at Anathoth. The known world was crumbling. Yet 
this little chunk of real estate became a symbol that God would restore Israel, 
that “houses and fields and vineyards shall again be bought in this land” (Jer. 
32:15). Anathoth became a sign of hope in a war-torn world, a continuation 
of God’s earlier message to the exiles already living in Babylon: “Plant gardens 
and eat what they produce. . . . Seek the shalom of the city where I have sent 
you into exile, and pray to the Lord on its behalf, for in its shalom you will 
find your shalom” (Jer. 29:5, 7). Shalom is not just the absence of violence; it 
is a state of well-being, of living in harmony with one’s community and with 
the land.
Jeremiah made clear that planting gardens and seeking peace were sym-
biotic practices—like sowing beans with your corn or marigolds with your 
tomatoes—and exactly the kind of companion planting the church should be 
doing. How curious that Jeremiah doesn’t tell the Jews to escape, or seize the 
reins of power, or advance the Jewish cause by getting legislation passed in 
Babylon’s halls of power. Instead, he tells them to build houses and inhabit 
them, to plant gardens and eat what they produce. Marry and multiply. In 
other words, settle down and flourish. Live as if you were perfectly at home. 
Home is no longer a territory to be defended. Home is now whichever 
Babylon God happens to send you. Shalom doesn’t begin once every last 
Babylonian is convinced they need to get on board. It begins with a few 
people planting gardens in a land at war. It begins with a field.
When we read ourselves into Jeremiah’s story, we come up short. In many 
ways, those of us who are white, middle-class Christians aren’t the exiles; we 
are Babylon. Real exiles—the rural poor, migrant workers, crack addicts—live 
all around us. How can we ourselves live in shalom when, within a five-mile 
radius of Cedar Grove, there are at least twenty families who live without 
indoor plumbing? North Carolina has one of the fastest-growing Latino mi-
grant worker populations in the country. Many of these people are driven 
from their farms owing to the pressures of falling corn and coffee prices, 
thanks in large part to neoliberal economic trade policies like the North 
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American Free Trade Agreement that are created and enforced by our own 
government. Welcoming these landless exiles to grow food at Anathoth seems 
one way the church can seek the shalom of our community.
In November 2005, we broke ground, built two beds, and planted an 
unlikely pair of fall crops: garlic and blueberries. In spring 2006, we built 
more beds and planted corn, potatoes, peas, peppers, and tomatoes. The fol-
lowing year, we added a passive-solar greenhouse to extend the growing sea-
son, built a Celtic cross garden, and built a deck on the barn. The garden is 
now the host site for Volunteers for Youth, a nonprofit agency that takes 
young people with community service hours to fulfill and places them at 
work sites. On an average week, we’ll host ten to fifteen of these young people 
on our Saturday workdays. We now have a rotating student internship pro-
gram in which future pastors from Duke Divinity School serve their field 
placements with us, as well as a summer apprenticeship program in which 
young people learn how to start and manage a community garden. For the 
most part, the work has gone smoothly.
But not everyone is supportive. The land on which the garden sits is a 
mere quarter mile down Mill Creek Road from where Bill King was mur-
dered. Further down the road from Anathoth are several known crack houses. 
Bill King’s murderer, never apprehended, may well have set foot on Anathoth 
Community Garden. Why build a garden down there where the crack dealers 
live? people ask us. What if people steal your vegetables?
One day I called up a local chicken farmer, whom I’ll call Vic, to see 
whether I could buy chicken manure to spread on our garden. I had never 
met Vic but knew that he was a former member of Cedar Grove UMC. Vic 
told me that they used all their manure on their tobacco fields. I thanked him 
anyway and was about to hang up when he said, “But even if I did have some, 
I wouldn’t sell you any.” I was blindsided by what followed. Vic proceeded to 
berate me, an outsider, for coming into his community “where my family has 
been since 1783” and “messing everything up.” He said that he thought the 
community garden was a bad idea, that “outsiders” had taken over Cedar 
Grove UMC, and that, as long as “you outsiders” were doing things like start-
ing community gardens, he’d never set foot in that church. I asked whether 
we could talk about this in person. Why was the community garden such a 
bad idea? But he only laughed bitterly and hung up.
I was tempted to laugh myself and would have had not Vic been so in-
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censed. Against the idea of a community garden? That’s like being against 
school lunch programs or improved health care. I had the same flummoxed 
reaction as I’d had when the other naysayers had argued that we shouldn’t 
build a garden “down there.” But then I began to wonder whether Vic’s vit-
riol over what seems like a fairly innocuous thing means that maybe it’s not 
so innocuous after all. Maybe a community garden is actually a threat to life 
as we know it. To acknowledge that there are people who go hungry in this 
community is to put some hard questions before those of us who possess the 
land and the means to address that hunger.
Of course, what Vic and others like him don’t know yet (it’s with hope, 
not optimism, that I add yet) is that the result of this barrier breaking isn’t 
anarchy or bedlam. When strangers grow and share food together, they cease 
to be threatening to each other. The ones who were once abstract catego-
ries—the poor folks, the rich folks, the black folks, the white folks, the illegal 
aliens—cease to be categories and become instead the people they’ve always 
been: Larry, James, Adela, Cynthia, Vic.
The Art of Opting Out
Jeremiah teaches us that the way to get along in this world is to skirt Babylon 
altogether. Don’t waste time fighting the empire or trying to make it a little 
less evil; opt out. Step around it, and go about your business. Grow your own 
food, for instance.
One reason you plant gardens and eat what they produce, from Jeremiah’s 
time until now, is that you can’t trust Babylon with the food supply. Since the 
end of World War I and the ensuing proliferation of cheap petrochemicals, 
we’ve entrusted our eating to the Babylon of the American industrial food 
system. This particular Babylon, like all Babylons, claimed a salvific status not 
granted by God. With the so-called green revolution, scientists and politicos 
claimed, America would be able to feed—that is, save—the entire world. But, 
in the words of James Howard Kunstler, though the green revolution boosted 
crop yields, it “was minimally about scientific innovation in crop genetics and 
mostly about dumping massive amounts of fertilizers and pesticides made out 
of fossil fuels onto crops, as well as employing irrigation at a fantastic scale 
made possible by abundant oil and gas.”7 This project has resulted in one of 
the most unsustainable food systems in the world, where a head of lettuce 
108  Fred Bahnson
grown in the Salinas Valley in California and shipped to Washington, DC, 
consumes thirty-six times the fossil fuel energy in transport as it gives back in 
food energy.8 But what happens when the oil runs out?
When you let Babylon grow the food you eat, you remain in its clutches. 
Industrialized agriculture has contributed to this country becoming one of 
the most obese in the world. A friend of mine in Bolivia calls the United 
States “the Great Northern Feedlot”: we don’t much care how our food is 
grown as long as a steady, cheap supply comes rolling down the trough.
One need not travel far into the Berry corpus to see how detrimental this 
industrial-eating mentality and its outworkings have been. Industrial agricul-
ture eschews ecological knowledge in favor of what Sir Albert Howard called 
“the NPK mentality.” At the end of the so-called Great War, the munitions 
factories stopped fixing atmospheric nitrogen to make bombs and began to 
make fertilizers. Scientists had learned that plants could be grown with only 
nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P), and potassium (K). The NPK mentality is a 
kind of reductionistic faith in these chemicals to supply everything the plant 
needs. But as Howard foresaw in 1943: “These chemicals and machines can 
do nothing to keep the soil in good heart. By their use the processes of growth 
can never be balanced by the processes of decay. All that they can accomplish 
is the transfer of the soil’s capital to current account.”9 Our current food chain 
depends from start to finish on fossil fuels. The fertile soil in this system is no 
longer a living entity but rather an inert mix of sand, silt, and clay—a conve-
nient place to prop up your crop while you feed it NPK. The results are ruin-
ous and myriad: the dead zone in the Gulf of Mexico; topsoil disappearing 
faster than the earth can make it; poisoned aquifers. “Mother earth [thus] 
deprived of her manurial rights,” Howard says, “is in revolt; the land is going 
on strike; the fertility of the soil is declining.”10
We could return to the earth its “manurial rights” if we stopped relying 
on oil and hubris and relied instead on sunlight and local knowledge. It’s how 
all food was grown before the advent of petrochemicals; it is how food will 
continue to be grown when the oil runs out. Depending on which expert is 
doing the predicting, that will be sometime in the next twenty to fifty years.
Another way to get around this Babylon is to buy as much of our food as 
we can from local farmers and to get to know their names. “Don’t you find it 
odd,” the farmer Joel Salatin asked the journalist Michael Pollan, “that people 
will put more work into choosing their mechanic or house contractor than 
they will into choosing the person who grows their food?”11
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But perhaps the best way to opt out of industrial eating is one Jeremiah 
recommends, that is, trying your hand at small-scale food production. Though 
most of us are two or three generations removed from the land, I have a 
hunch that we all harbor a deep yearning to participate in the necessities of 
procuring food and shelter. Consider the following from Gene Logsdon, an 
agrarian-curmudgeon extraordinaire:
It seems to me that the garden is the only practical way for urban socie-
ties to come in close contact with the basic realities of life, and if that 
contact is not close, it is not meaningful at all. To feel the searing heat as 
well as the comforting warmth of the sun, or to endure the dry wind as 
well as the soothing breeze; to pray for rain but not too much rain; . . . 
to know that life depends on eating and being eaten; to accept the decay 
of death as the only way to achieve the resurrection of life; . . . to grow 
in personal simplicity while appreciating biological complexity, so that 
in the garden there is time to sit and think, to produce good food for the 
mind—these are all part of an education that the industrial world hun-
gers for but cannot name.12
Community gardens like Anathoth can provide such close contact. There 
people can learn the lost art of canning or rediscover the joy of sliding their 
hands into garden beds the consistency of chocolate sponge cake. As Logsdon 
reminds us, these things are an education that the industrial world cannot 
provide.
I’ve come to exult in the resistance inherent in the act of growing food. 
In his book Defiant Gardens, Kenneth Helphand describes gardens created 
under the duress of war. Helphand’s book contains amazing pictures of such 
defiant gardens: World War I soldiers on Vimy Ridge growing celery along 
the bottom of a communications trench; Jews growing cabbage in the Lodz 
ghetto; a hillside of “bonsaied” desert sage in front of the Minidoka intern-
ment camp for Japanese Americans.13 I think of Anathoth as a garden created 
during a war and, thus, a defiant garden. The violence isn’t only in Iraq; it’s 
right down the street at Bill King’s store. It’s inside us. Hauling water with 
Adela, planting a row of sweet potatoes with young people from Volunteers 
for Youth—these are small acts of protest, not just against the Great Northern 
Feedlot of Babylon, but also against the Babylon within our soul, the violent 
desire we each harbor to lord it over others.
Growing even a small portion of our own food trains us to see that food 
is a gift, not a commodity. “The way we eat,” says Michael Pollan in The 
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Omnivore’s Dilemma, “represents our most profound engagement with the 
natural world. Daily, our eating turns nature into culture, transforming the 
body of the world into our bodies and minds.”14 For Christians, the way we 
eat also represents—through the sharing of Christ’s body and blood—our 
most profound engagement with each other. By sharing the Lord’s Supper, we 
learn not just how to eat but how to share and how to receive, how to live and 
how to die. The orthodox theologian Alexander Schmemann puts it this way: 
“Centuries of secularism have failed to transform eating into something 
strictly utilitarian. Food is still treated with reverence. A meal is still a rite—
the last ‘natural sacrament’ of family and friendship, of life that is more than 
‘eating’ and ‘drinking.’ To eat is still something more than to maintain bodily 
functions. People may not understand what that ‘something more’ is, but 
they nonetheless desire to celebrate it. They are still hungry and thirsty for 
sacramental life.”15
Anathoth Community Garden is, as an extension of the church, a place 
where those who still hunger and thirst for sacramental life can be fed. In that 
way, it is a school for reverence. The garden teaches us that the way we eat, 
what we eat, and whom we eat it with matter. Eating a meal of Yukon Gold 
potatoes and Swiss chard that you’ve grown with your neighbor follows or-
ganically from sharing the Lord’s Supper. To think of food sacramentally is 
something “the industrial world hungers for but cannot name.” It’s up to the 
church to do the naming. We can renarrate for the world not only what it 
means to eat but also what it means to eat well. People desire to be fed; a 
church’s community garden becomes the place to fulfill such desires even as it 
transforms them.
Stanley Hauerwas, a professor of theology and ethics at Duke Divinity 
School, recently visited Anathoth Community Garden and afterward preached 
at Cedar Grove UMC. In his sermon, he said of Anathoth: “A community 
garden—what a useless gesture.” I took that as a compliment to our work, or 
at least an honest appraisal. Gardening will by no means change the world. 
Though we hope it will have some effect, that’s not really why we do it; we’re 
just trying to be faithful. A community garden won’t stop the nations from 
wreaking havoc. It won’t feed the world. How silly to waste one’s time grow-
ing food when a supermarket is filled to the brim just down the road. “A 
garden,” Berry says in his essay “The Reactor and the Garden,” “is not always 
as comfortable as Kroger’s.” Yet it’s exactly in the uselessness of the gesture, 
the smallness of it, the discomfort it causes from doing work that is physi-
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cally demanding, that the garden finds its strength.16 “It is in the willingness 
to accept this discomfort that we strike the most telling blow against the 
power plants [or Babylons] and what they represent,” continues Berry. “We 
cannot hope to recover our freedom from such perils without discomfort.”17
Gardening, useless though it may appear, finds a certain strength in weak-
ness. Gardening is a “complete action,” Berry says, because it’s an action that 
is more than symbolic. It is a protest, but it goes beyond protest and proposes 
an answer. Community gardening can be seen as a piece of what Berry calls 
“the work of local culture.” In an essay by that title he says: “The only true and 
effective ‘operator’s manual for spaceship earth’ is not a book that any human 
will ever write; it is hundreds of thousands of local cultures.”18 There will be 
no one, overriding answer, only hundreds of thousands of answers, all worked 
out locally. The work of local culture is but a different twist on the same an-
swer Jeremiah had for the Jews living in Babylon. Live locally, eat locally, “do 
not go cheap for power,”19 serve God by seeking the peace of your neighbor. 
This is no earth-shattering revelation about how to achieve world peace or 
end poverty; rather, it’s a matter of witness, a way of living in a place that, if 
practiced, might begin to resemble the Kingdom of God.
Lights in the Distance
I’m still haunted by Marco Polo’s words. Where do we look for the faint lights 
in the distance? The lights leading us forward won’t be found in the marble 
halls of commerce, the government, the university, or any institution, though 
each of those institutions may contribute. So long as the church mirrors such 
institutions, the lights won’t be found there either. Berry’s critique of the 
church’s complicity in the violence of our national economy is no less incisive 
today than it was in 1992 when he wrote the essay “Christianity and the 
Survival of Creation.” Now, as then, the church has become “willy-nilly the 
religion of the state and the economic status quo. . . . It has flown the flag and 
chanted the slogans of empire.”20
Where I do see light, and where I do stake my claim, is in the defiant 
church, the one that prizes fealty to the Slaughtered Lamb over the gods of 
America, Mammon, and technological triumphalism. Defiant churches with 
their defiant community gardens assume a special role. They become refuges 
within Babylon’s widening gyre, serving as both metaphor and locale for how 
the church lives out its mission. The answer to those who ask, Why should 
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churches be involved in agriculture? is this: it’s one way of seeking the salvation, 
the shalom, the welfare of the place to which it has been sent, which is noth-
ing less than seeking the Kingdom of God.
Toward the end of Invisible Cities, Marco Polo says: “At times I feel your 
voice is reaching me from far away, while I am prisoner of a gaudy and unliv-
able present, where all forms of human society have reached an extreme of 
their cycle and there is no imagining what new forms they may assume. And 
I hear, from your voice, the invisible reasons which make cities live, through 
which perhaps, once dead, they will come to life again.”21
The church is our Marco Polo, our guide describing myriad cities that are 
really one city. The voice reaching us from far away is the same one that says, I 
was hungry and you gave me something to eat; love your enemies and pray for those 
who persecute you; feed my sheep. In these words, we can hear the visible and 
invisible reasons that make dead cities live, that give life and breath to our 
abandoned rural areas. It is the Word that pierces and illumines the darkness.
We know that the empire is sick and, what is worse, that it is trying to 
become accustomed to its sores. This is the aim of the church’s explorations: 
examining the traces of shalom still to be glimpsed, we gauge its short supply. 
To know how much darkness there is around us, we must sharpen our eyes, 
peering at the faint lights in the distance, the lights of the New Jerusalem of 
which we have already been given a glimpse.
Planting gardens and eating what they produce, seeking the shalom of the 
city—this isn’t looking back to Eden; it’s looking ahead to the day when “the 
first things have passed away” (Rev. 21:4), when the Lamb that was slaugh-
tered will invite us all to join in that great messianic feast.
Coda
It’s July now. We finally got a well, one that pumps a whopping sixty-two gal-
lons a minute—more than enough to irrigate our two-acre garden even in 
severe drought. Still, I miss carrying buckets of water from the creek. There 
was something elemental about irrigating by hand. For one thing, it con-
nected us to those farmers around the world who don’t have electricity, who 
have watered their crops by hand for centuries. And the work of hauling itself, 
hard though it was, gave me a certain feeling of wholeness that’s missing when 
I turn on the hydrant. Like the myriad other daily tasks here at Anathoth 
Community Garden, it reminded me of the simple joy of manual labor.
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I remember something Adela said that day we hauled water together. On 
our umpteenth trip back up the hill, when my sore back muscles were crying 
uncle, I put down my buckets and watched Adela come toward me up the 
hill. I was ready to quit and said as much to her. But there were more beds to 
water. She wanted to keep going.
“El trabajo es bien duro, no?” I asked. “It’s hard work, isn’t it?”
“Si pero el trabajo es bonito.” “Yes,” she said, her grin pure silver, “but the 
work is beautiful.”
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A Personal Preface
I am an Old Testament scholar and a native Californian—and those two as-
pects of my identity probably contribute in equal measure to the fact that the 
ecological crisis has become increasingly important as a focus of my thinking, 
teaching, and writing. In recent years, I have come to believe that anyone who 
wishes to understand the Old Testament deeply would do well to learn more 
about the ecological crisis—and especially about its agricultural dimensions. 
Conversely, Christians and Jews who wish to understand the depth dimen-
sion of the crisis would do well to ponder it in light of the Old Testament (for 
Jews, “the Bible”). The mutually informative relation between ecological 
awareness and biblical study rests on two factors. First, the ecological crisis is 
at root a theological crisis, a crisis in our relationship with the God who made 
the heavens and the earth, and the Old Testament/Hebrew Scripture is for 
both Jews and Christians an indispensable and authoritative witness to the 
nature of that relationship. Second, the Old Testament is pervasively land 
centered in its theological perspective. Rarely does one read through two or 
three successive chapters without seeing some reference to the land or to Zion, 
the city that is, ideologically speaking, its center, whose holiness is, in good 
times, the source of its fertility. There is no extensive exploration of the rela-
tionship between God and humanity (or God and the people Israel) that does 
not factor the land, the fertile soil, into that relationship. Overall, from an 
Old Testament perspective, the fertility of the land of Israel—or even of the 
whole earth1—is the best index of the health or unhealth of the covenant re-
lationship. When humanity or Israel is disobedient, rain is withheld, thorns 
and briars abound, the land languishes and mourns. Conversely, “truth [or: 
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faithfulness] springs up from the ground” (Ps. 85:12). It is no coincidence 
that the most extravagant poetic images of loveliness—in the Prophets, the 
Psalms, and the Song of Songs—all show a land lush with growth as well as a 
people living in (or restored to) righteousness and full intimacy with God.
Moreover, the Old Testament is particular in its land centeredness. To 
paraphrase the contemporary agrarians, this literature is “placed”; the Scrip-
tures of ancient Israel know where they come from. They reflect the narrow 
and precariously balanced ecological niche that is the hill country of ancient 
Judah and Samaria—“a strip of land between two seas,” as they say, with wa-
ter to the west and desert to the east. The Israelite farmers knew that they 
survived in that steep and semiarid land by the grace of God and their own 
wise practices. And it was no small part of Israelite wisdom to recognize that, 
unlike their neighbors—the Philistines on the fertile plain of Sharon, the 
Egyptians and Babylonians ranged along the banks and canals of their great 
rivers—they had only the slightest margin for negligence, ignorance, or error. 
The Bible as we have it could not have been written beside the irrigation ca-
nals of Babylon or the perennially flooding Nile, any more than it could have 
emerged from the vast fertile plains on the North American continent. For 
revelation addresses the necessities of a place as well as a people. Therefore, 
ancient Israel’s Scripture bespeaks throughout an awareness of belonging to a 
place that is at once extremely fragile and infinitely precious. Fragility belongs 
essentially to the character of the land and may even contribute to its value. 
Seasonal aridity and periodic drought, a thin layer of topsoil, susceptibility to 
erosion—these mark the land of Canaan as a place under the immediate, 
particular care of God. That fragility may be a distinctive spiritual asset, rath-
er than a liability, is implied in God’s instruction to the Israelites in the wil-
derness: “For the land into which you are entering to take possession of it—it 
is not like the land of Egypt from which you have come out, where you could 
sow your seed and water with your foot, like a vegetable garden. The land to 
which you are passing over [the Jordan] to take possession is a land of moun-
tains and valleys. By the measure of the rain from the heavens it will drink 
water [or: you will drink water]. It is a land which YHWH your God looks 
after; always the eyes of YHWH your God are on it, from the beginning of 
the year to the end of the year” (Deut. 11:10–12).2
All this is to say that as an Old Testament scholar I come naturally by my 
respect for land and my concern that it be “kindly used” so that it may con-
tinue to be used from generation to generation.3 And that respect and con-
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cern are compounded by the fact that I am a Californian by birth and up-
bringing. That is to say, I grew up in a lovely place—and, what is more, I grew 
up attuned to its loveliness. Many of my most valued and memorable hours 
were spent outside and barefoot. We were only a few miles as the seagull flies 
from “the City”—San Francisco. However, we (the children at least) were 
oriented to our own small island town, the water around it, and the nearby 
hills, where we lived and played freely like no city child can. We found fasci-
nation in snails and slugs and tadpoles and the sea anemones that grew on the 
side of the docks. In summer, we ate what we could hold of the wild plums 
and blackberries, and the surplus melted into the soft asphalt; our feet carried 
the purple-black stain into the fall. The roads were too narrow and the curves 
too blind to give cars much freedom, so we had them mostly to ourselves, as 
giant chalkboards and hopscotch grids. Thus an intense, even bodily delight 
in place shaped me, and it informs the way I continue to think and feel, just 
as reading the Bible slowly and carefully has shaped the way I think and feel.
Having watched drastic change take place in my native state over the five 
decades of my own active observance, I am saddened. Highways run where 
farms used to be. Rural areas and small towns have become suburbanized, 
exurbanized, exclusivized by and for the wealthy, colonized by weekenders. 
Real estate prices jump, not year by year, but month by month. Blue-collar 
workers live in urban ghettos or trailer parks far from their jobs. Children 
grow up and routinely move to another state where they can afford to live. As 
a biblical scholar, with some awareness of how events and life patterns un-
folded in a different part of the world over centuries and millennia, I am 
anxious. In the ancient Near East, “development” occurred, as did social in-
equities and environmental degradation, yet life on the land continued with 
considerable continuity for most people, generation to generation. I am no 
expert about land use. But as I compare the extent of environmental and so-
cial change in the premodern Middle East (in most places, up to the second 
half of the twentieth century) to what I have personally witnessed in California 
I would judge that the effect of our current patterns is catastrophic. In my 
home state, increasingly on our continent as a whole, and around the globe, 
we are on a short-term trajectory whose long-term consequences are surely 
dire.
It is just because I am anxious that I read the modern agrarians: Wendell 
Berry, Wes Jackson, Norman Wirzba, and others. They don’t make me feel 
better about our situation, but they help me make sense of it, for myself and 
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for my students. Their perspective seems to me deeply sane, and sane compan-
ionship is, as the sages of Proverbs knew, essential for living well—with faith 
and hope, if not with optimism. Reading the agrarians has changed my profes-
sional work of reading the Old Testament. I dare to think it has made my 
readings sharper and more concrete. If that is so, it is because the modern 
agrarians have helped me begin to cultivate sensibilities that were second na-
ture to the biblical writers themselves, as members of a society that was not just 
agricultural but agrarian minded. In this essay, I highlight several aspects of 
agrarian thinking that intersect with and illumine the thought of the Bible.
Agrarian Mindedness: Value beyond Price
About fifteen years ago, early in my attempts to teach on the subject of bibli-
cal theology and land use, I was reading the shelves in the soil science section 
of Yale’s undergraduate library—figuring that that would give me a broad and 
manageably (for me) shallow overview of how scientists think about land and 
its fertility. One title in particular caught my eye: Meeting the Expectations of 
the Land. The thought formed in my mind: “Whoever came up with that title 
understands how the Bible thinks about land.” So I pulled it off the shelf. 
That collection of essays, edited by Wes Jackson, Wendell Berry, and Bruce 
Colman, was my first introduction to a different way of thinking about land 
in contemporary settings.
Two things impressed me immediately about the book. First, these au-
thors had a sense of history. On the very first page, Jackson refers to “a sys-
temic problem whose roots are in the roots of agriculture, at least as far back 
as the time thousands of years ago when patches became fields.” As a biblical 
scholar, I tend to think that a problem that does not have a millennia-long 
time frame to it is not yet a serious problem. Second, in this book I heard for 
the first time my living contemporaries articulating a way of viewing and 
valuing land radically different from the “real estate mentality” that domi-
nates virtually all public discussion and action in California: “Land cannot be 
possessed for very long, let alone commercialized. It will eventually claim 
us.”4 If I could immediately recognize Jackson’s categorical statement as true, 
that is because it has deep resonance with the thought of the Old Testament, 
namely, with the central biblical conviction that the people Israel belong to 
their land more than the land belongs to the people. For “legally” speak-
“And the Land I Will Remember”  119
ing—that is, speaking on the basis of Torah—the arable land in Israel above 
all other places belongs to God, and the people Israel, who are themselves 
God’s “particular possession” (segullah; Exod. 19:5), hold it in trust for God. 
Therefore, the priestly law of Leviticus, one of the most land-sensitive books 
of the Bible, sets severe limits on land sales: “And the land will not be sold in 
perpetuity, for the land is mine; yes, you [Israelites] are resident aliens with 
me!” (Lev. 25:23).
Agricultural land is, from a biblical perspective, literally invaluable. There 
is no record, biblical or inscriptional, of an Israelite voluntarily selling land on 
the open market5 because—in contrast to their neighbors in Egypt and 
Mesopotamia—Israelites seem to have had no concept of arable land (’ad-
amah) as a commodity, to be bought and sold freely. While Leviticus allows 
for the sale of houses within the city wall (these would have been essentially 
landless houses, jammed one against the other), the fertile soil cannot be 
handled thus, as “private property” in the modern sense. Rather, the cultural 
institution by which farmland is transmitted is called nahalah, “hereditary 
portion.” A piece of land is the God-given possession of a family, to be held 
as a trust and transmitted from generation to generation. Although the rights 
to land use may be sold to pay off debts, the land reverts to the original fam-
ily unit every fiftieth year, the “Jubilee” (Lev. 25:30–31).
As I have already indicated, any understanding of how the ancient 
Israelites thought about land must begin with the recognition that they had 
little enough of it and most of what they had was only marginally arable. 
They managed to establish themselves in the steep, rocky hill country because 
it was the only part of the land of Canaan that nobody else wanted. They 
survived as farmers by becoming intimate with their land, by learning to meet 
its expectations and its needs, by passing on their knowledge, each generation 
serving as the human “seed stock” indispensable for the well-being of the 
next. With that small, fragile area as their population center, the early Israelites 
became a special breed of farmer; they became true agrarians, who practice 
and value “the complex accomplishment of knowledge, cultural memory, 
skill, self-mastery, good sense, and fundamental decency—the high and in-
dispensable art—for which we probably can find no better name than ‘good 
farming.’”6
Wendell Berry’s observation about how agrarians value a little land cap-
tures the biblical mind-set exactly:
.
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Agrarians value land because somewhere back in the history of their 
consciousness is the memory of being landless. . . . If you have no land, 
you have nothing: no food, no shelter, no warmth, no freedom, no life. 
If we remember this, we know that all economies begin to lie as soon as 
they assign a fixed value to land. People who have been landless know 
that the land is invaluable; it is worth everything. . . . Whatever the 
market may say, the worth of the land is what it always was: It is worth 
what food, clothing, shelter, and freedom are worth; it is worth what life 
is worth.7
Of course, the memory of being landless is central to the biblical story. Land 
deprivation is not just something that happened to somebody else, long ago. 
It is the essence of the “personal history” that each Israelite farmer is to recite 
“before YHWH”: “My father was a stray Aramaean, and he went down to 
Egypt and sojourned there . . . , and the Egyptians treated us badly . . . , and 
we cried out to YHWH, . . . and he brought us to this place, . . . a land gush-
ing with milk and honey. And now, look, I have brought the first-fruit of the 
fertile soil (’adamah) that you gave to me, YHWH . . .” (Deut. 26:5–10). The 
voices we hear in the Old Testament bespeak throughout an agrarian mind-
fulness that land—this particular land, my land, our land—is inseparable 
from self “before God.” Land is the earnest of the covenant, the tangible sign 
and consequence of God’s commitment to the people Israel.
“Property is a point of honor.”8 It is part of the agrarian project to rede-
fine the notion of property, connecting it with notions of propriety: what is 
proper, honorable, fitting.9 It is highly apt to that project, then, to observe 
that the Old Testament writers place the land within a network of relation-
ships that are constituted and maintained through acts of mutual acknowl-
edgment, respect, honoring; all that is implied in the Hebrew verb zakhar, 
“remember.” It is what Israel “remembers” that determines whether it remains 
faithful to the covenant. The Mosaic commandment that stands over the 
Passover celebration is “Zakhor, Remember this day when you have come out 
from Egypt, from a house of slaves” (Exod. 13:3). So anyone with ears to hear 
knows that it is a very bad sign when, in the wilderness, the Israelites and the 
“riffraff in their midst” say, “We remember the fish that we ate in Egypt, for 
free . . . !” (Num. 11:5).
But surely the most redemptive act of remembering in the Bible is God’s, 
as recorded by that green book, Leviticus, looking toward the time when the 
Israelites will be cast out for their rebelliousness, “into the land of their 
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[Babylonian] enemies.” Yet even then God will honor them—not for their 
own sakes, but for the sake of something more enormous even than their sin: 
“And I will remember my covenant with Jacob, and yes, my covenant with 
Isaac, and yes, my covenant with Abraham I will remember—and the land I 
will remember” (Lev. 26:41–42). It is a remarkable statement. Can it be that 
God is agrarian minded, too?
In his indispensable study of Israel’s land theology, Christopher Wright 
suggests that the covenant is properly conceived as a triangulated relationship 
among Israel, the land, and YHWH, “all three having the family as the basic 
focal point at which the conjunction of the three issued in ethical responsi-
bilities and imperatives.”10 That sentence could almost come out of one of 
Berry’s essays in which the claims of family, land, and human decency are 
shown finally to be inseparable from the claim of God on our lives. Without 
some comprehension of that indissoluble web of relationships, even an im-
perative as familiar as the Fifth Commandment is enigmatic precisely in its 
specificity: “Honor your father and your mother, so that your days may be long 
on the fertile soil [’adamah] that YHWH your God is giving you” (Exod. 
20:12; cf. Deut. 5:16). Wright observes: “Because of its explicit links with the 
land traditions, the relationship between God and Israel was thoroughly 
‘earthed’ in the socio-economic facts of life—shaping and being shaped by 
them, and at times threatened by developments in that realm.”11 He is speak-
ing of the Iron Age, of course. But Berry and the other new agrarians might 
well say that the manifold crises of contemporary agriculture and industrial 
culture realize those threats in our own socioeconomic situation. Indeed, 
those crises show us what the unraveling of the web of covenant relationships 
looks like “on the ground.”
The Primacy of the Land
A second aspect of agrarian thinking that has informed my reading of the 
Bible is the principle that “the land comes first,” in a sense that is more than 
geologic.12 The primacy of the land sets the standard for all human actions; 
“meeting the expectations of the land” is our first and nonnegotiable obliga-
tion. At the outset, the Bible uses poetic language to express the primacy of 
the land. The so-called primeval history (Gen. 1–11) gives the fundaments of 
a biblical anthropology, and one of those is that humans are created by God, 
’adam from ’adamah (Gen. 2:7). Although the wordplay is captured surpris-
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ingly well by the English pun “human from humus,” the Hebrew more ef-
fectively evokes a relationship that might be viewed as both genealogical and 
vocational. Both words are related to the word for “red” (’edom); in that re-
gion, red is the skin tone of both the people and the earth. Terra rossa, “red 
earth,” is the geologic term for the thin but rich loam covering the hill coun-
try where the early Israelites settled. ’Adam from ’adamah thus evokes the 
specific relationship between a particular people and a particular place.
To my mind, the most suggestive expression of the primacy of the earth 
appears a few verses after that pun, in what is arguably the first statement 
about human vocation: “And YHWH God set the human being in the garden 
to ‘avad it and to shamar it” (Gen. 2:15). I leave those words untranslated for 
the moment because any translation dissolves the meaningful ambiguity in 
both verb phrases. A common translation is “to till it and to tend it,” but that 
implies that the terms are horticultural and agricultural, and they are not. 
Rather, ‘avad is the ordinary verb equivalent to the English work, and it nor-
mally means to work for someone, as a servant or slave. Often, the grammatical 
object of the verb is a deity, YHWH or “the other gods”; it also designates 
service to a human master (e.g., Pharaoh). Much less frequently, ‘avad denotes 
work done on or with some material, and, in all cases but one, that material is 
soil (e.g., Gen. 2:5, 3:23, 4:2). In view of those nearby references to working 
the soil, one may certainly translate here “to work it.”13 But the wider usage of 
the verb suggests further that the human task is to work for the garden soil, to 
serve its needs. As all readers of Hebrew know, ‘avad is often translated “wor-
ship.” While biblical religion clearly forbids divinization of the earth, one 
might recall that the English word worship originally meant to “acknowledge 
worth.” In that sense, the Hebrew pun translates well into English.
But since the first verb can be applied to working the soil one might well 
overlook its inherent ambiguity, were it not for the second verb, shamar, 
which does not elsewhere refer to land care.14 An all-purpose translation is 
“keep”—a flock, say, or a city; frequently the inference is “preserve, observe.” 
Most often in the Bible, the verb is used with reference to keeping the ordi-
nances of God: “Yes, my Sabbaths you shall keep!” (Exod. 31:13). Something 
that does not originate with us, something of inestimable value, is to be re-
spected and preserved. Keeping the ordinances of God proves to be the sole 
condition on which Israel may retain its hold on the God-given—or, better, 
God-entrusted—land of Canaan. Thus Moses instructs the Israelites just on 
“And the Land I Will Remember”  123
the eve of their entry into the land: “And you shall keep [v eshamarta] his stat-
utes and his commandments which I am commanding you this day, so it may 
be good for you and for your children after you, in order that you may live a 
long time on the fertile soil [’adamah] that YHWH your God is giving to 
you, for all time” (Deut. 4:40). This instruction to “keep” the garden could 
well be seen as pointing toward the obligation to keep torah, the totality of 
divine “teaching” that directs Israel’s life in the land and with God.
So, even while the human being is still in Eden, there are limits to be 
observed, standards by which the legitimacy of human actions may be judged: 
“The land expects something from us. The line of succession, the true line, is 
the membership of people who know it does.”15 That knowledge and the 
willingness to live by it constitute for Berry and his fellow agrarians the qual-
ity that the biblical writers most often call righteousness. Their ability to sense 
the mute expectation of the God-watched earth illumines my own under-
standing of this first explicit biblical statement regarding human work: “And 
YHWH God set the human being in the garden to serve it and to preserve it.” 
“The expectations of the land” proves to be an exegetically fruitful concept, 
even if not conceived with the Bible in mind.16
As I read it, then, both verbs, ‘avad and shamar, imply the primacy and 
the preciousness of the land. At the same time, there is a suggestion of its 
vulnerability; anything that humans are charged to preserve they are also ca-
pable of neglecting or violating. So the two elements of the stated divine in-
tention stand in some tension as well as in complementary relation. In order 
to live, we must “work” the land, manage it, take from it. In order to “live a 
long time” on it, we must limit our take; we must submit our minds, our 
skills, and our strength to serving its needs. Of the tension inherent in the 
biblical statement, Evan Eisenberg observes:
There is no escaping the need to manage nature. The best we can do is 
observe the following rule: So manage nature as to minimize the need to 
manage nature. . . . We are destined to work our way across the globe, 
turning Eden into something else. And we are destined—in our better 
moments—to protect Eden against our own work. The command to 
protect puts upper limits on the scope of our work and lower limits on 
its quality. In other words, we must not try to manage too much of the 
world, but what we do manage—our cities, our factories, our farms—
we must manage well.17
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Working in that way requires of us humility—literally, the quality of being 
thoroughly “grounded,” connected in mind as well as body to the humus 
from which human life is drawn. That fundamental recognition of the land’s 
primacy is the motivating force and point of orientation for Wes Jackson’s 
natural systems agriculture, which looks to “nature as measure,” taking its 
working ideas from observation of nature’s economic practices, allowing 
imagination and action to be limited and guided by the way the world itself 
works.18 From an agrarian perspective, humility might be defined as letting 
our minds be disciplined by observation of the way the earth works—and has 
worked well in most places for time out of mind—and, further, disciplined 
by observance of its limits. That means recognizing that, along with needs 
and expectations, the land also has something to teach.
As a theological educator, I find one of the most appealing aspects of 
agrarianism to be its cheerful embrace of ignorance: “Since we’re billions of 
times more ignorant than knowledgeable, why not go with our strong suit 
and have an ignorance-based worldview?”19 Wes Jackson has long asserted 
that the ecological crisis is the result of “a knowledge-based worldview found-
ed on the assumption that we can accumulate enough knowledge to bend 
nature pliantly and to run the world.” The alternative that he and his col-
leagues propose is the recognition of “informed ignorance as an apt descrip-
tion of the human condition and the appropriate result of a good educa-
tion.”20 Starting our work by recognizing our ignorance—that is an idea that 
echoes the thought of the biblical sages: “Rely on YHWH with your whole 
heart / and do not lean on your own understanding” (Prov. 3:5). As with the 
agrarians, the biblical writers’ willingness to highlight our ignorance rests not 
on laziness or despair but on the confidence that there is a wisdom worked 
into the very fabric of things:
YHWH by wisdom founded the earth;
he established the heavens with understanding.
By his knowledge the deeps were cleaved,
and the clouds dripped dew.
My child, do not let these depart from your eyes;
hold onto discernment and astuteness,
and they will be life to your soul
and grace to your neck.
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Then you will walk safely on your way,
And your foot will not stumble. (Prov. 3:19–23)
If we can look beyond our selves to see God’s wise foundational work shaping 
our world, then we are ready to dispense with false distinctions between prac-
tical work, on the one hand, and spiritual work or religious service, on the 
other. For it is evident that all our activity, mental and physical, must be di-
rected toward shaping our lives, our culture, and, indeed, the earth we man-
age in order to survive, in accordance with the divine wisdom manifested in 
natural systems. With perfect concision, Wendell Berry expresses in a few 
lines both an awareness of the aim and end proper for human life and the 
humble embrace of ignorance:
. . . I am slowly falling
into the fund of things. And yet to serve the earth,
not knowing what I serve, gives a wideness
and a delight to the air, and my days
do not wholly pass. It is the mind’s service. . . .21
A Humble Materialism
A third point of connection between biblical thinking and modern agrarian-
ism is so pervasive and fundamental to both that it seems at first hardly neces-
sary to mention, namely, their exacting concern with the materiality of hu-
man existence. The agrarians pose the question overtly: how can we meet our 
material needs, in the present and for the indefinite future, without inflicting 
damage? Less obviously, but with equal urgency and concreteness, the biblical 
writers are concerned with ordering material existence in ways that are conso-
nant with God’s will and the design of the world. (If this characteristic of 
biblical literature is not obvious to Christians, that is because the books that 
attend most carefully to the question of ordering material existence are the 
ones Christians are least inclined to read. Along with Proverbs, those are the 
second half of Exodus, Leviticus, and Deuteronomy.) So the biblical writers 
and the new agrarians are, in a real sense, materialists; they prefer to write in 
concrete and specific terms rather than in abstractions. And they are material-
ists of a humble sort. They do not claim that what we humans can (or, theo-
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retically, ever could) see or touch or work on or make is exhaustive of what is, 
nor even that it constitutes the larger or more important part of what is. They 
simply insist, and model by example, that we “owe a certain courtesy to 
Reality, and that this courtesy can be enacted only by humility, reverence, 
propriety of scale, and good workmanship.”22
Yet, if it sounds odd to call them materialists at all, that is because our 
society is characterized by materialism of a very different sort. In the first in-
stance, of course, we are addicted to the acquisition and eventual disposal of 
vast quantities of unnecessary stuff. But we are materialistic in a second sense 
as well. A generation ago, E. F. Schumacher spoke of industrial society’s un-
questioning acceptance of the presuppositions and illusions of “materialistic 
scientism.” Among the most powerful and probably the most dangerous of its 
illusions is the idea “that science can solve all problems”—although it is com-
mon experience that the efficient solution of an individual problem generates 
a host of new ones.23 That sort of trust in the omnipotence of science is, of 
course, a kind of faith stance, albeit a wobbly one.24 If it were held by a pre-
modern society, we would unhesitatingly label as magical a kind of thinking 
that presumes to guarantee certain physical results yet bears such a tenuous 
relation to empirical reality. For, despite its ostensible grounding in science, 
this form of materialism is strangely oblivious to what may be the most read-
ily observable and nonnegotiable characteristic of our material world: fini-
tude. Those who work consciously and intelligently within material reality (as 
though we could work elsewhere!) are continually confronted with limits of 
time, space, matter, and energy. Writing some thirty years after Schumacher, 
Barbara Kingsolver gives an updated report on the status of the illusion: 
“Most of our populace and all of our leaders are participating in a mass hal-
lucinatory fantasy in which the megatons of waste we dump in our rivers and 
bays are not poisoning the water, the hydrocarbons we pump into the air are 
not changing the climate, over-fishing is not depleting the oceans, fossil fuels 
will never run out, wars that kill masses of civilians are an appropriate way to 
keep our hands on what’s left, we are not desperately overdrawn at the envi-
ronmental bank, and really, the kids are all right.”25
Within the first few pages of the Bible, we find a mocking exposé of an 
attitude very similar to our scientific materialism: the ambition and perverse 
confidence that led the people “on the plain of Shinar” (central Mesopotamia) 
to “build a tower with its head in the sky.” “Let’s make a name for ourselves, 
so we won’t be scattered over the face of the earth!” (Gen. 11:4). City builders 
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all clumped together, resisting dispersion, with their inflated imaginations in 
the clouds—this is a caricature of what the Israelites saw in the technologi-
cally dominant culture of their age, the great riparian civilization to the east. 
Beginning already in the fourth millennium b.c.e., aggressive channeling of 
the Tigris and the Euphrates produced an agricultural system of unprecedent-
ed productivity, which, in turn, produced a burst of population. The surplus 
of food and labor enabled the construction of immense walled cities—most 
notably, in biblical times, Nineveh and Babylon—each with a ziggurat domi-
nating the skyline. Yet centuries of heavy irrigation exacted their environmen-
tal price, in the form of a rising water table, salinization of the soil, erosion, 
and silting. The Israelite caricature perhaps reflects the historical fact that, 
over the millennia, the cities in the lower part of the plain suffered eclipse. 
Gradually, and repeatedly, as the “breadbasket” for each city became unpro-
ductive, the center of power moved upstream to a less damaged region.26 A 
large section of the once–Fertile Crescent remains salt fields to this day.
The Israelites, in contrast to their materially more fortunate neighbors, 
never had enough water or arable land to waste. Probably that is why they 
developed agrarian eyes and, therefore, they could see that the Babel-onians’ 
folly lay in taking their minds off the ground, which is, for us humans, the 
chief and proper sphere of material concern: “The heavens are heavens for 
YHWH, but the earth he gave to human beings” (Ps. 115:16). The Tower of 
Babel story captures what may be the essence of all technologically induced 
disaster: the illusion that our cleverness will somehow deliver us from the 
need to observe the normative form of materialism that sustains life, the am-
bition to be exceptional—“Let’s make a name for ourselves”—by pursuing an 
alternative “lifestyle” disconnected from the soil. In the story, God shatters 
that illusion with one quick divine visitation; but, in real time, it may take 
generations, centuries, even millennia, for the disaster to complete itself. By 
the grace of God, however, the biblical story may enable us to recognize our-
selves in that tragic historical process somewhere short of the end. Thus, it 
gives us a reason and a chance to restore a humble and healthy materialism to 
our lives and even to our culture.
In a 1992 lecture at the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Berry 
observed: “Our predicament now, I believe, requires us to learn to read and 
understand the Bible in the light of the present fact of creation. This would 
seem to be a requirement both for Christians and for everyone concerned, 
but it entails a long work of true criticism—that is, of careful and judicious 
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study.”27 As someone who engages full-time in critical biblical study, I am 
surprised to discover that, over the last decade, it is the agrarians who have 
most profoundly influenced and changed the way I read. Reading the Bible 
through agrarian eyes is a self-confirming activity. The more I do it, the more 
I see—but the singular subject is misleading, for I find that I can do this kind 
of reading only with my students, many of whom know more about farming 
and land care than I do. So they see things I do not see; thus, they deepen my 
insight, specifically, my exegetical insight. For what emerges from our reading 
is more than a general spiritual awareness of our connection with the land. 
Rather, we learn to read more concretely and more accurately, supporting our 
interpretations on the basis of what we know about ancient Israel’s social 
structure, its geographic, topographical, and historical situation, and its theo-
logical understandings.
“Hafokh bah vahafokh bah, hakkol bah. Turn it over and over; everything 
is in it—and in it you will see [something].”28 So the ancient rabbis spoke of 
the endlessly fruitful work of reading Scripture. “Hafokh bah, turn it over”—is 
it coincidence that the image is agricultural, or at least horticultural? The verb 
is elsewhere used for turning compost, soil in the making. Deliberate or not, 
the association is meaningful, for Scripture is in significant ways like the soil. 
Each is a rich deposit, to which time and many lives have contributed. Indeed, 
each is itself a living thing—a community, as the seminal ecological thinker 
Aldo Leopold taught us to view the soil—over which the Spirit of God hov-
ers.29 Each, if we attend to it with proper care, yields to us the daily bread on 
which all human life depends. That is why, as a Christian biblical scholar and 
someone who eats, I am learning to remember the land as I read.
Notes
The title of this essay is drawn from Lev. 26:42. All translations of biblical passages 
are my own. The essay previously appeared in Ellen Davis, Scripture, Culture, and 
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A Body and a Place
As best I can remember, I was seven or maybe eight years old the first time I 
was there, probably accompanying my grandfather on his weekly walk to 
count and salt the cattle and make sure the fences were still up. For a boy that 
age, it was a hard-earned prize, a walk of an hour or more that demanded the 
negotiation of steep hills, blackberry brambles, rhododendron thickets, and a 
half dozen or so barbed-wire fences that seemed to have a persistent knack for 
tearing my clothes and leaving bloody marks on my body. My parents and 
grandparents called it the Old Home Place. It was the original parcel of my 
mother’s family’s farm, the narrow hollow and surrounding steep hills where 
my mother and her father and grandfather had been born and raised in a 
rambling old house that had been turned to salvage when I was still in dia-
pers. It is the place where my ancestors are buried. It is the place I most 
clearly recall in connection to learning who I was, where I had come from, 
and what kind of things ought really to matter.
As I grew older, I often walked to the Old Place on my own, the terrain 
of the hike becoming as familiar to me as my own body. Sometimes I went 
hunting squirrels, sometimes picking berries, sometimes just for the sake of 
the walk, but always covering the same well-known ground. Leaving the 
house, I would walk northeast up the red dirt of Upper Mill Creek Road, 
cross the creek into the Taylor hollow, and eventually climb up the hill, past 
the pond at the head of the hollow where I sometimes fished for bass and 
bluegill. From the pasture at the top of the hill, overlooking the Elk River to 
the northwest, I would turn east and walk through a dense forest of beech, 
oak, hickory, and maple, around the southern side of a high knob, emerging 
from the woods on the spur ridge overlooking the original home site. Even 
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now, from hundreds of miles away, I can see and feel the land’s contours. I can 
hear its sounds and smell its smells: the mud and cattail around the pond and 
below the cisterns, the rotting leaves slowly turning to humus in the dense 
hardwood forests, the Hereford cattle grazing on the steep hillside pastures. I 
can taste the teaberry and mint leaves my grandfather gave me to chew and 
the pawpaws and blackberries he picked for me to eat. I can see the family 
cemetery on the point of the ridge, overlooking the hollow below. It is shaded 
by a massive old oak tree beneath which I used to sit quietly, half expecting 
those buried there to speak to me, telling me stories about their lives and the 
place we shared. I can count the graves, those of my great-great-grandparents 
and all the generations since, and I can almost hear their voices, carried on the 
wind.
All these memories and experiences are a part of me in a way that exceeds 
my affection for them. They have inexplicably marked my body and shaped 
my identity. They are the cornerstone of the history of my life and have helped 
make me the person I am. They have given me a sense of what it means to live 
well—to be healthy—as a human being. In so doing, they have shaped my 
entire life, including my work, first as a boy working on his grandparents’ 
farm, then as a physical therapist, and now as a theologian, interested in each 
case in the human body—not just in how the body works, but also in what it 
is for.
Of Bodies and Bioethics
Personal reminiscing notwithstanding, this is not an essay about me. I want, 
rather, for it to be an essay in conversation—with the work of Wendell Berry 
and with the relatively young, distinctly modern discipline most usually called 
bioethics. That means that it is in some sense an essay about human bodies 
and the health of those bodies. As I have already suggested, there are signifi-
cant connections between my story and questions about bodies and their 
health, but I suspect that these connections are far from self-evidently relevant 
to most of the people who “do” bioethics. In the current scientific and politi-
cal climate, in fact, explicitly normative questions about the body and its 
goods are commonly regarded as matters of speculation or even superstition. 
Yet, as I hope to show presently, all questions in bioethics are ultimately, by 
inclusion or by exclusion, questions about the nature, destiny, and goods of 
the human body. I take Berry to be challenging us in this direction when he 
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says: “The question of human limits, of the proper definition and place of 
human beings within the order of Creation, finally rests upon our attitude 
toward our biological existence, the life of the body in the world.”1 This is to 
say, quite simply, that bioethics is in the final analysis about what bodies are, 
and what they are for.
This means, as Berry goes on to acknowledge, that we cannot speak at 
length about the body without speaking as well about the many things our 
bodies do, matters as far-ranging as religion and agriculture. Indeed, he says: 
“While we live our bodies are moving particles of the earth, joined inextrica-
bly both to the soil and to the bodies of other living creatures. It is hardly 
surprising, then, that there should be some profound resemblances between 
our treatment of our bodies and our treatment of the earth.” Our bodies are 
not simply contiguous but also continuous with other bodies and their places 
on the earth, and this means that nothing less is at stake (in understanding 
how properly to relate our bodies to the earth and to other creatures) than our 
health: “By understanding accurately his proper place in Creation, a man may 
be made whole.”2
If bioethicists have succeeded in evading direct engagement with these 
questions, it is due in part to the problematic way the modern moral imagina-
tion has conceived the human body. Many standard approaches to bioethics 
take for granted what most of modern medicine seems to have assumed, 
which is that it is possible to make a distinction between the body and the 
person associated with it, that the body is in some way inhabited by that per-
son, and that it is the private property of that person, who is free to dispose 
of it as he or she chooses. Philosophers know this account of the body more 
or less as Cartesian, after the seventeenth-century French philosopher and 
mathematician René Descartes.3 Descartes sought to develop a philosophical 
method built on a foundation of absolute certainty. Consistent with the skep-
ticism that was fashionable at the time, he engaged in a thought experiment 
wherein he systematically doubted everything that could to him conceivably 
be false. In the end, he believed, he could accept as indisputable only one 
thing, which was that he, as an individual person, existed as an essentially 
immaterial thinking thing, a res cogitans. His fundamental dictum is well-
known today, even to nonphilosophers: Cogito ergo sum, “I think, therefore I 
am.”
But, if the human subject is an immaterial thinking thing, then what is 
the human body? Obviously, believed Descartes, the body was something 
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other than the active thinking subject—there was, in other words, an essential 
dualism of person and body. Descartes ultimately said that the body was a 
quasi-artificial, passive extension of the person, a res extensa that existed to be 
manipulated at will by the person inhabiting it. The body was, he suggested, 
not unlike a machine.4
Although Cartesian dualism has as a philosophical position died the 
death of a thousand qualifications, the metaphor of the body as machine and 
its associated dualism has persisted and has probably become one of the most 
common ways modern people think of themselves and their bodies. Intuitively, 
the Cartesian model has great explanatory power, and it is especially conge-
nial to the body’s rendering as an object of scientific investigation.5 Perhaps 
most important, the machine metaphor is friendly to the modern sociopo-
litical consciousness, which purports simultaneously to privilege the autono-
mous will of the individual while conditionally allowing that autonomy to be 
restrained in the name of certain kinds of social utility.
But Are We Machines?
The machine metaphor is helpful just to the extent that it is true. In some 
ways, and to some extent, the human body is like a machine, and that meta-
phor has contributed a good deal toward an improved understanding of the 
human body. This improved understanding, in turn, has produced many 
medical achievements that are indisputably salutary. Yet metaphors have lim-
its, and a failure to recognize those limits distorts our knowledge of the things 
to which our metaphors refer, which, in turn, distorts the ways we live in the 
world.6 This is, I contend, much the case with contemporary medicine—and, 
thus, with contemporary bioethics. As a branch (or at least an epiphenome-
non) of modern medicine, bioethics has often failed critically to account for 
the limits of the biomedical view of the body, which is decidedly mechanistic. 
And this failure has meant that bioethics has been unable to say very much 
about the ways in which modern medicine has, because of the limits inherent 
in the way it imagines the body, failed or been unable to contribute as fully as 
it otherwise might to genuine human flourishing.
No one has spoken as clearly and persuasively about the limits of the 
body-as-machine metaphor as Wendell Berry, who maintains that the ma-
chine metaphor is in many respects unnatural: “Of course, the body in most 
ways is not at all like a machine. Like all living creatures and unlike a ma-
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chine, the body is not formally self-contained; its boundaries and outlines are 
not so exactly fixed. The body alone is not, properly speaking, a body. Divided 
from its sources of air, food, drink, clothing, shelter, and companionship, a 
body is, properly speaking, a cadaver, whereas a machine by itself, shut down 
or out of fuel, is still a machine.” Yet we live as if these things are not the case, 
and our lives, including the ways we practice healing and caring for the sick, 
have become distorted.7 As participants in a culture of radical individualism, 
we think of and treat our bodies as solitary and individual, like machines, and 
pay relatively little attention to the thousands of ways in which they are con-
nected to other bodies and to our particular places in the world. We forget, 
ignore, or treat as irrelevant their surroundings, from which we draw life. We 
discount the idea that they might have purposes beyond those we individu-
ally will for them, purposes, for example, that are based on relations to bodies 
or landscapes that we have not chosen or perhaps even inherent in the limits 
imposed on us by their fragility and finitude.8 Because of this discounting, we 
find ourselves immersed in a kind of ongoing and increasingly unrestricted 
war against limits of all kinds. Because of our ignorance of the interdepen-
dences that are fundamental to our lives as creatures, that war expands into a 
war against each other, against the earth, and, ultimately, against ourselves 
and our health.9
Ideally, we should be mindful of the lessons that Berry has tried to teach 
us, for example, that “to speak of the health of an isolated individual is a con-
tradiction in terms” and that “the grace that is the health of creatures can only 
be held in common.”10 But, because our perception of what constitutes our 
health is partial and distorted, we fail to attend properly to the ways in which 
we are increasingly unhealthy members of an increasingly unhealthy creation. 
Medical expenditures on technologically sophisticated therapies that will 
benefit mainly the rich climb precipitously even as we neglect the welfare of 
the poor, of children, and of the earth we inhabit.11 We spend obscene 
amounts of money preserving the illusion of youth or mechanically staving 
off the deaths of the well insured for just a few more days while infant mortal-
ity from entirely preventable causes climbs among our poorest neighbors. 
Our automobiles, power plants, and manufacturing facilities spew pollutants 
while we destroy our watersheds by lopping off the tops of mountains and 
dumping the remnants into adjacent valleys so that we can more cheaply get 
at the coal beneath the surface. We eat without thinking about what we eat or 
where it comes from even as we flush the poisoned topsoil on which we de-
136  Joel James Shuman
pend for food down rivers and into oceans that literally are being poisoned to 
death. It is a way of life that is good for none of us, ultimately not even for the 
agribusinesses and chemical companies that profit from it.
Even though we have managed largely to ignore it, the problem created 
by our way of life is vast.12 The difficulties associated with trying to overcome 
it are bound to be legion. Yet we will not get anywhere close to a satisfying 
solution if we attempt to mend things quickly through massive, top-down 
shifts in social or economic policy. Given that the problems are so deeply 
entrenched as to be part of us, chances are we would simply replicate them in 
different ways.13 Perhaps what we need is to change ourselves, to learn to live 
in the earth, to see it, and even to speak differently about it and all its inhab-
itants. Such an approach could begin in any number of places. But here I am 
interested in only one. I propose that we learn to live, see, and speak differ-
ently about our bodies. Insofar as our speech is dependent on metaphor, we 
need to learn to use more faithful metaphors for the human body.
Changing our speech and adopting new metaphors is no small matter, 
for the way we live is a function of the world we see, which is, in turn, related 
to the way we have been trained to speak. The philosopher Iris Murdoch has 
said: “I can only choose from the world I can see, in the moral sense of ‘see’ 
that implies that clear vision is a result of moral imagination and moral ef-
fort.”14 Murdoch understood, says Heather Widdows, that the “metaphors 
and pictures we use to describe the world demarcate the limits and possibili-
ties within which we can be active in the world.”15 Moral imagination, or vi-
sion, develops only as we learn to speak in particular ways about the world; 
our ways of life are inseparable from our narrations of what is going on in the 
world.16 We learn such narrations as members of tradition-bearing communi-
ties, which teach us to live and speak in one way rather than another.17 Given 
the immensely artificial world of superhighways, supercomputers, and super-
markets in which most of us presently live, our gravitation toward the ma-
chine metaphor and its attendant dualism is not surprising. Yet there remains 
reason to hope that things can be different, for there continue to be among us 
women and men whose imaginations are fueled by what Berry says is another 
“expansive metaphor of farming and marriage and worship”:
All the essential relationships are comprehended in this metaphor. A 
farmer’s relation to his land is the basic and central connection in the 
relation of humanity to the creation; the agricultural relation stands for 
the larger relation. Similarly, marriage is the basic and central commu-
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nity tie; it begins and stands for the relation we have to family and to the 
larger circles of human association. And these relationships to the cre-
ation and to the human community are in turn basic to, and may stand 
for, our relationship to God—or to the sustaining mysteries and powers 
of the creation.18
As pregnant a claim as this one is suggests that there are other, complemen-
tary metaphors for our bodies that might help us live more faithfully. It is to 
the unearthing of one such metaphor that I turn next.
Searching for Metaphors: The Body as Landscape
Our search might begin quite simply by considering the ways we learn about 
bodies in everyday practice. We do not learn about them simply by dispas-
sionately accumulating information about them. Rather, our learning is sen-
sual—and sensually complex. We learn about bodies to a great extent using 
our own bodies, and, because of this, our learning is by nature intersubjective, 
meaning that the bodies we learn about have significant effects on us as learn-
ers.19 We learn about bodies in much the same way we learn about landscapes, 
the particular places on earth we inhabit, which is to say we learn as bodies, 
by touch, taste, smell, and varieties of manipulations and tactile and motor 
observations that mark and shape both the learning body and the body 
learned about.
Lovers learn bodies this way, through the accumulated familiarity that 
comes with the recurrent intertwining of limbs and a thousand mindless ca-
resses. Parents and children learn bodies this way as well, through myriad 
playful and affectionate gestures, certainly, but also through what Kathleen 
Norris calls the quotidian mysteries of everyday tasks like feeding, bathing, and 
dressing.20 Athletes, whose undertakings require extraordinary levels of em-
bodied self-knowledge, develop their skills by testing their bodies against 
those of their teammates and competitors, acquiring strength and flexibility, 
and learning to use their bodies by exploring and expanding their limits, day 
after day. And, lest I be accused of waxing sentimental, let me point out that 
students of anatomy—physicians, nurses, and physical therapists, among 
others—also come to learn about the body first of all by handling bodies, not 
just those of cadavers, but one another’s as well. It is worth noting that such 
learning begins and always refers back to what anatomists call landmarks, the 
body’s particular, readily locatable points of reference from which other fea-
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tures may be located and learned. Seemingly, the body is, much more than it 
is a machine, a landscape, a particular, complex place that is part of and inter-
dependent with its immediate surroundings and, ultimately, all creation.
Landscapes are, first of all, particular places. Although the general laws of 
the physical and natural sciences are applicable to every landscape, those laws 
can never approach, let alone exhaust, all there is to be known about any 
given landscape. Landscapes are particular to themselves and their surround-
ings and the history of their uses, and they can be known only as they are 
respectfully explored and inhabited. The boundaries and contours of land-
scapes are not drawn arbitrarily according to the machinations of political 
power or economic self-interest, as on a map; rather, they emerge, often tran-
siently, through the stories told by those who inhabit and use them.21
Landscapes are also, therefore, properly beloved. Knowledge of a land-
scape is never separable from its habitation and use. A place may be known 
intimately only as it is lived on and used, yet it can be inhabited and used well 
only to the extent that it is loved. To love a particular place is to use it suitably 
and with the acknowledgment that it has an integrity and a life quite apart 
from what can be taken from it; to love it is, in other words, to care for it. 
“Land,” says Berry, “cannot be properly cared for by people who do not know 
it intimately, who do not know how to care for it, who are not strongly mo-
tivated to care for it, and who cannot afford to care for it.”22 This means that 
the question of a land’s proper use and its integrity is fundamentally histori-
cal, in the sense that such questions always appeal to the more basic question 
of the identity of the people who have long-standing connections to and af-
fection for the land. To have such affection is to desire above all else the land’s 
flourishing, its health. One cannot truly love someone or something one does 
not know, and such knowledge is by nature historical.23 The misuse of land by 
absentee coal and timber companies, who possess nothing in the way of affec-
tion for or historical knowledge of the land and its inhabitants, bears abun-
dant witness to this, as anyone who has lived in or traveled through rural re-
gions like my native West Virginia or my current home in the Anthracite 
country of northeastern Pennsylvania can attest.
To love a landscape means, finally, to understand that it is a member of 
creation, a part of something greater than itself. Its character and proper uses 
are shaped by its relation to adjacent landscapes, in the sense that landscapes 
are never discrete and the boundaries and transitions between them may be 
determined only roughly and in part. The health of upland forests and farms, 
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for example, affects the health of local watersheds, which, in turn, affects the 
health of rivers and oceans and those who depend on them to live, which is 
to say all of us. The acknowledgment that a landscape is a member of creation 
is essentially a claim about how properly to relate to that landscape. Such an 
acknowledgment is an admission that the place in question is part of some-
thing that exists by the grace of divine agency, that it is from God and a reflec-
tion of God’s being that ultimately belongs to and is destined to return to 
God. “The land,” God reminded the Israelites, “is mine; with me you are but 
aliens and tenants. Throughout the land that you hold, you shall provide for 
the redemption of the land” (Lev. 25:23–24 [NRSV]).
The person who realizes that her beloved landscape exists as a member of 
the entire creation therefore understands that her place, no matter how exten-
sive the history of its belovedness, belongs not to her but to God. She is its 
steward, charged for a time with its care. Berry says that this care is best un-
derstood as usufruct, the right of temporary possession that carries with it the 
assumption that whatever use is made of a place by its steward will cause it no 
irreparable damage.24 One who understands her relationship to her place in 
this way understands that the “destruction of nature is not just bad steward-
ship, or stupid economics, or a betrayal of family responsibility; it is the most 
horrid blasphemy.”25 Love of God and love of creature are, thus, inseparable, 
as the writings of both Old and New Testaments consistently remind us.
Testing the Metaphor: Landscapes of Flesh
Human bodies are, as I have already said, fundamentally connected to and 
dependent on the earth. Beyond and because of that connectedness, more-
over, bodies themselves, in their particularity, their belovedness, and their 
membership within creation, are metaphoric landscapes of flesh. In spite of 
their considerable similarities to one another, bodies are radically particular. 
Of course, it would be silly, much less unhelpful, to discount the value of 
statistically normative accounts of the body such as are gained from blood 
chemistry profiles, pediatric growth charts, and the like. Yet each body has its 
own particular history, and only as that history is understood and appreciated 
in its particularity can a given body be known and cared for properly.26 Berry 
is clearly right when he explains: “The question that must be addressed . . . is 
not how to care for the planet, but how to care for each of the planet’s millions 
of human and natural neighborhoods, each of its millions of small pieces and 
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parcels of land, each of which is in some precious way different from all the 
others.”27 These human and natural neighborhoods are constituted by human 
bodies connected to one another and to their places, whose well-being de-
pends on their being cared for in light of their precious differences.
To care for bodies in a way that accounts for their differences requires 
that those bodies are beloved. The one caring must desire the wholeness of the 
body cared for, not simply in the sense of returning that body to some ab-
stract standard of health as represented by comparison to biostatistical norms, 
but in the sense of making possible the progress of its purposeful life in com-
munion with particular other lives.28 For, as Berry reminds, “no loved one is 
standardized”: “A body, love insists, is neither a spirit nor a machine; it is not 
a picture, a diagram, a chart, a graph, an anatomy; it is not an explanation; it 
is not a law. It is precisely and uniquely what it is. It belongs to the world of 
love, which is a world of living creatures, natural orders and cycles, many 
small fragile lights in the dark.”29
Bodies are loved properly in their particularity, certainly, but only as the 
love extended toward them accounts for their existence as creatures who 
flourish as dependent and interdependent members of God’s creation. A body 
may be loved well only as it is loved within the creaturely boundaries of its 
fragility and finitude. To love it without respect to these limits is not to love 
it at all but to covet it for one’s own purposes. The twentieth-century Protestant 
theologian Karl Barth maintained that human life was properly understood 
as a gift and a loan from God. To understand life in this way is first of all to 
understand its origin and continued existence as coming ultimately from 
God, not from itself or those who may have a stake in its continuation.30
And this means that a body can be properly beloved only in light of its 
mortality. In this respect, health is to be understood, says Karl Barth, “like life 
in general [as] a temporal and therefore a limited possession.”31 Illness is prop-
erly to be resisted, but also to be understood as a harbinger of mortality, 
which, ultimately, cannot be overcome but can be exceeded—but only by 
God, and only through death and resurrection (1 Cor. 15:54–57). Acknowl-
edging this as a guiding principle is not fatalism but, as Berry says, “an indis-
pensable form of cultural generosity. It is the one effective way a person has 
of acknowledging and acting upon the fact of mortality: he will die, others 
will live after him.”32 Love, Berry explains, “must confront death, and accept 
it, and learn from it. Only in confronting death can earthly love learn its true 
extent, its immortality. Any definition of health that is not silly must include 
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death. The world of love includes death, suffers it, and triumphs over it. The 
world of efficiency is defeated by death; as death, all its instruments and 
procedures stop. The world of love continues, and of this grief is the 
proof.”33
Modern Medicine and Landscapes of Flesh
The question of whether it is helpful to think of the body as a landscape of 
flesh rests on whether such thinking can foster better care of bodies, espe-
cially by those whose work is the enterprise we call medicine. One way the 
landscape metaphor might help those who care for bodies is by encouraging 
a sense of humility, a mindfulness of the limits of their discipline. Caring for 
landscapes requires a patient, intimate attention to detail for which expertise, 
no matter how substantial, is not a substitute. To the extent that a body is like 
a particular place on earth, the medical professional who seeks to care for it 
must understand that she is—forgive the oxymoron—a sort of invited tres-
passer. If she does not attend adequately to the sympathetic knowledge of 
those who best know and love that body, she brings to it the capacity to do 
considerable harm in the name of good. In a short aphoristic essay entitled 
“Damage,” Berry tells a story that nicely illustrates this point.
The story begins with Berry’s unambiguous desire to do (what he re-
garded as) good: “I have a steep wooded hillside that I wanted to be able to 
pasture occasionally, but it had no permanent water supply.” He goes on to 
tell how he sought to improve his farm by hiring someone to dig a small pond 
into the hillside. Almost immediately the pond began to fill, and soon enough 
it was large enough to provide water for a small number of livestock. Yet, for 
all Berry’s good intentions, not to mention his considerable knowledge of and 
affection for his farm, things did not unfold exactly as he had planned: “We 
had an extremely wet fall and winter, with the usual freezing and thawing. 
The ground grew heavy with water, and soft. The earthwork slumped; a large 
slice of the woods floor on the upper side slipped down into the pond.” In 
reflecting on this damage, which he acknowledges having caused, Berry con-
siders how things might have been different. “I was careful,” he says, “to get 
expert advice”: “But this only exemplifies what I already knew. No expert 
knows everything about every place, not even everything about any place. If 
one’s knowledge of one’s whereabouts is insufficient, if one’s judgment is un-
sound, then expert advice is of little use.”34
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The medical stranger who comes to a body wishing to do it good—to 
improve it—is an expert whose knowledge and skills rightfully garner signifi-
cant power and esteem. Yet, if she is truly to do it good, she must begin by 
acknowledging the limits of her understanding of the particular body she 
encounters. She must try to know it not simply as one instantiation of a body 
but as the particular, beloved body that it is. To do this, she must learn some-
thing of its aspirations and affections, its present and past connections to 
other bodies, and the ways in which it was, is, or has failed to be a beloved 
body. Most of all, she must respect its sanctity, remembering that its presence 
to her and, indeed, to the entire world is as a gift and loan from its creator. 
Only by treading lightly over the holy ground that is a landscape of flesh can 
she hope to count her work on its behalf as genuinely good.35
Treading Lightly over Landscapes of Flesh
The fact that the medical industry, like so many facets of modern North 
Atlantic culture, is fraught with problems does not mean that physicians and 
nurses no longer do the good work of caring properly for bodies. During the 
summer of 2002, my father’s health began to fail. He was diagnosed with 
heart failure stemming from an aortic valve insufficiency and coronary artery 
disease. It soon became apparent to those of us who cared for him—my 
mother and my brothers and sister and me—that, unless he heeded his physi-
cians’ counsel and underwent surgery, he was not going to live long. In 
October of that year, he underwent a nine-hour surgical procedure during 
which his aortic valve was replaced and he was given five coronary artery by-
passes. In spite of his weakened state and the significant damage his heart had 
already suffered, he recovered and after a few weeks was able to return home. 
For nearly a year and a half we continued to enjoy his familiar presence in our 
lives.
Toward the end of 2003, he began again to experience the symptoms of 
serious heart failure. His physicians adjusted his medications, and his symp-
toms grew less severe for a while, yet, over time, it became apparent to me that 
he was in end-stage heart failure and his best days were now behind him. One 
night in January 2004, I was awakened by a late telephone call from my 
mother. My father had gotten out of bed to go to the bathroom and had 
fallen, breaking his femur, the large bone in his upper leg. He had been trans-
ported by ambulance to the local hospital and then to the nearest major med-
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ical center in Charleston, some sixty miles away. Early the next morning I left 
to make the eight-hour drive to be with him and my family.
When I arrived in Charleston, I learned that he had, indeed, sustained a 
serious fracture but that his heart failure was too advanced to do the surgery 
necessary to repair his injury. He was being cared for in the coronary intensive 
care unit, and, by treating him aggressively with medications and a Swan 
catheter, they had made a little headway in reversing his heart failure and re-
lieving his leg pain. But he was frail and confused and disoriented, almost to 
the point of psychosis, and all of us were frightened and hurt by the suffering 
we saw him experiencing. We took turns sitting with him, wiping his fore-
head, feeding him the little bit he cared to eat, talking with him when he was 
lucid, doing whatever we could to make him comfortable. I recall sitting at 
his bedside late one night as he slept restlessly, running my hand over the 
deformity in his thigh, and wondering how this man, on whom I had been so 
dependent for so long, had himself become so helplessly dependent.
His physicians were obviously deeply concerned with his condition—
they kept using the word fragile—and it soon became apparent (to me, at 
least) that they wanted but were reluctant to tell us that he was not going to 
get better. In the midst of all this, they and the nurses who were caring for my 
father were amazingly kind, sympathetic, and accommodating. When we 
asked as a family to meet with the physicians, to give them permission, so to 
speak, to tell us what needed saying, they were quietly and compassionately 
honest about his prospects, and, when we asked that they stop treating him 
aggressively and move him from intensive care to a private room, they were 
remarkably responsive. The young intensive care physician who was the lead-
er of this medical team was grateful for our proactive involvement. “In my 
position,” he explained, “there’s always something else to do. The problem is 
with knowing what not to do. For that, I need help, like you’re giving me 
here.”
Within minutes of being moved to a private room, my father’s confusion 
disappeared, and he was alert and communicative. My mother asked for some 
time alone with him, to explain that his death was imminent, and shortly 
thereafter he called all six of us children into the room. In the midst of our 
various gestures of affection and grief, he spoke to us eloquently, almost as if 
he had been rehearsing for years what he was going to say. He told us of his 
love for us and his hopes for our future, and he admonished us as well. “The 
love your mother and I have given to you,” he said, “has been a gift. It has 
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been given freely, and there has been a lot of it. There’s a lot of love in this 
room, and I want you all always to remember that it has been given, not to be 
hoarded, but to be spent.” Soon thereafter he went to sleep, and within a few 
hours he was dead.
My father is dead, but he remains a significant part of the landscapes that 
make up my life. Recently, while I was visiting my mother, I took time to go 
back to the Old Place, going this time not to look about cattle or check 
fences or hunt squirrels but to pay my respects to my father’s grave at the fam-
ily cemetery. I climbed the hill and walked out the ridge until I arrived at the 
cemetery. I entered the gate and passed again over the familiar ground of the 
old graves of past generations until I came to a newer one where my father’s 
body lay, having become yet another beloved feature of the landscape that has 
shaped my life. A headstone had been placed since my last visit, and I read 
with tearful approval the inscription beneath my father’s name: “He leaves 
behind a legacy of love.”
I am genuinely grateful for the technical expertise of the physicians and 
surgeons who cared for my father over the final years of his life. But I am even 
more grateful that, when the time came, they had the wisdom to recognize 
the limits of their expertise and to yield it to a higher expertise, that of love, 
of which their yielding was itself a form. For it is love, human and divine, that 
teaches us the limits that make sense of all our knowledge and skill. It is 
through love that we live joyfully and purposefully, even in the midst of grief, 
for it is love, finally, that offers the only real hope of overcoming death.
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[God] is at a total remove from every condition, movement, life,  
imagination, conjecture, name, discourse, thought, conception, being, 
rest, dwelling, unity, limit, infinity, the totality of existence. And yet,  
since it is the underpinning of goodness, and by merely being there is 
the cause of everything, to praise this divinely beneficent Providence  
you must turn to all of creation. It is there at the center of everything  
and everything has it for a destiny.
—Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names
We are all praising, praying to
The light we are, but cannot know.
—Wendell Berry, Sabbaths
In “The Long-Legged House” (1969), Wendell Berry wrote that as a writer 
his struggle has not been to find a subject but rather to know what to do with 
the subject he has been entrusted with from the beginning. The subject he 
was referring to was Henry County, Kentucky, the region of his birth: “I was 
so intricately dependent on this place that I did not begin in any meaningful 
sense to be a writer until I began to see the place clearly and for what it was.” 
Seeing a place clearly, Berry notes, is “an enormous labor,” one that begins 
with the realization that we belong to a place rather than the other way 
around. To know that we are not the owners or possessors of the world 
amounts to a “startling reversal of our ordinary sense of things” and culmi-
nates, at least for Berry, in what became his governing ambition: “to be alto-
gether at home here.” The ambition to allow oneself to be entirely governed 
by a place, by one’s belonging to thrushes and herons—this aspiration being 
the briefest and clearest characterization of “agrarianism”—is “a spiritual am-
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bition, like goodness.” While other creatures instinctually live in place, hu-
man beings must make the choice—informed by intelligence, propriety, and 
virtue—to be in place: “It is an ambition I cannot hope to succeed in wholly, 
but I have come to believe that it is the most worthy of all.”1
It is unlikely that many would call Berry’s ambition mystical, particularly 
if we go by popular characterizations of the term restricting it to obscure and 
esoteric teachings or exceptional, ecstatic experiences providing direct access 
to and awareness of the sacred. According to this common view, a mystic is 
someone who has extraordinary states of consciousness in which unity with 
the divine is achieved. As William James famously put it, a mystic has a spe-
cial faculty, much like the musician has a special ear, that is open to particu-
larly intense states of feeling reaching into depths of truth “unplumbed by the 
discursive intellect” and beyond the reach of institutional religious authority.2 
Mystics, in other words, are people possessed by special powers that take 
them out of the realm of the ordinary, out of the places of daily life and 
struggle, and into the holy realm of an ineffable God.
Defining Mysticism
For a number of reasons, this characterization of mysticism, though having 
historical precedent, needs to be challenged and corrected, particularly in a 
self-absorbed time like our own when creation itself is threatened by neglect, 
abuse, or outright destruction.3 Rather than being a peculiar type of experi-
ence or paranormal state of consciousness, mysticism is better understood as a 
practical process and a way of life that is, in principle, available to everyone. 
Though his or her goal is an encounter with God, a mystic is someone who is 
particularly open and attentive to the presence of God in this life and world. 
What the presence of God means, or who the God is whom we surrender our-
selves to, is, of course, not something that can be determined beforehand. 
Indeed, and as the witness of many mystics confirms, the God we meet on a 
mystical path is most often quite unlike what we expect, imagine, hope, or 
fear. This is why mystics speak so often of a “God beyond God.”4 In fact, given 
our propensity to worship the gods of our own devising or comprehension, the 
gods who will best sanction and further self-promoting agendas, Meister 
Eckhart advises the following prayer: “I pray God to rid me of God.”5
Coming into the presence of God is always mediated by traditions, cul-
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tures, sacred scriptures, institutions, practices, and (personal and social) expe-
riences that may or may not adequately prepare us for the task. We always 
start our journeys from the perspective of some place as it has been shaped by 
time and memory, even if the course of our journey reveals the deficiency, 
even falsity—because either unjust, naive, sentimental, dishonest, or unlov-
ing—of the received understanding or naming of that place. In other words, 
a mystical path is something like a trial in which we submit our assumptions 
and desires, as well as the inflated egos and the false gods of our world, to 
rigorous testing and questioning to determine whether we have been faithful 
and true to the life we have been given. Few people have the patience or depth 
for this testing or the courage to face up to our various forms of idolatry. This 
is why named mystics are relatively few in number.
The narrowing of our mystical sensitivities is also attributable to the fact 
that, whether we care to admit it or not, we are still too much under the 
modern deistic assumption that God is far removed from our world and that 
gaining access to this God requires some supernatural, perhaps paranormal, 
effort that would make us unscientific or plainly kooky. We do not see God, 
as the Psalmist plainly does (of the many Psalms, see esp. 65 and 104), as in-
timately involved in the minute and mundane movements of our being as the 
one who gives us life and sustains us in it. And so we go in search of a god 
beyond this life and this world, all the while forgetting God as the Creator 
underpinning the goodness in all that is. What we need to learn is that the 
place of God is not “somewhere else,” sequestered to some special place or 
realm of our experience. As we develop a contemplative and mystical way of 
living, we will discover that God is at the center of our being, at the heart of 
the whole of creation as its animating, pulsating life.
It is important to be clear that mystical traditions as a whole would not 
be in agreement with this point. One can find in mystical writings (often in-
fluenced by Gnosticism or informed by Christian Platonism) strands of anti-
materialism and otherworldliness, strands that see little or no value in being 
at home in our created place. In the name of detachment, for instance, we are 
told to be “receptive of nothing but God” (Eckhart) or to become forgetful of 
everything beneath us and concern ourselves with “no creature whether mate-
rial or spiritual nor with their situation and doings whether good or ill.”6 But 
what detachment means and what it practically entails is a complex, not uni-
versally agreed on matter. It need not simply mean the denial or denigration 
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of material creatures. It can be developed in terms of the denial of certain 
kinds of attachments that esteem self and creation falsely and do not give suf-
ficient glory and honor to God. Think here of Thomas Merton’s precise for-
mulation: “We do not detach ourselves from things in order to attach our-
selves to God, but rather we become detached from ourselves in order to see 
and use all things in and for God. . . . There is no evil in anything created by 
God, nor can anything of His become an obstacle to our union with Him. 
The obstacle is in our ‘self,’ that is to say in the tenacious need to maintain our 
separate, external, egotistic will.”7 On this view, a view that I will here develop 
in an agrarian way, the goal is not to become free of creation itself but instead 
to be freed of certain ways of being within creation, ways of perceiving, think-
ing, and acting that inhibit or prevent a deep encounter with creation and 
God.
Learning the art of detachment is not easy, especially in our time, when 
we have grown accustomed to the myths of self-creation and self-regulation. 
We find it difficult to fully appreciate that we live through our dependence on 
others—most directly and evidently through bodily acts of touching, eating, 
drinking, and breathing—and, ultimately, God. This is why we need to re-
cover an understanding of Christian practice and discipleship as a “schooling 
in the ways of creatureliness,” in which we learn “that courtesy to creatures in 
which reverence for the Creator finds expression.”8 To understand God as our 
Creator, as the maker of everything, is to see everything (ourselves included) 
in terms of their relationships to each other and in God. We become courte-
ous because we fully acknowledge that who we are, even that we are, is a fea-
ture of our having received the gifts that others are to us. Pseudo-Dionysius, 
speaking of the beauty and goodness of God, put it this way: “Beauty is the 
cause of harmony, of sympathy, of community. Beauty unites all things and is 
the source of all things. . . . From it derives the existence of everything as be-
ings, what they have in common and what differentiates them, their identi-
calness and differences, their similarities and dissimilarities, their sharing of 
opposites. . . . Hence, the harmony and the love which are formed between 
them but which do not obliterate identity. Hence, the innate togetherness of 
everything. Hence, too, the intermingling of everything, the persistence of 
things, the unceasing emergence of things.”9 There is, in other words, a cor-
respondence among creatures, a mutual and created harmony and sympathy, 
that finds its unity and wholeness in God. If we are to come into the presence 
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of God, we must learn to find our place in this created correspondence and 
live responsibly and charitably within it.
This point is of tremendous significance because it means that mystical 
practice requires of us that we learn to become appropriately and fully present 
in the places in which we move and live and that we take up our proper place 
as creatures within the orders of creation: “Contemplation, then, cannot 
properly be a prostration before a power outside us; it is a being present to 
ourselves in our world with acceptance and trust. Hence . . . the importance 
of attention to the praying body; the contemplative significance of taking time 
to sense ourselves in prayer, to perceive patiently what and where we materi-
ally are.”10 Indeed, because God, however mysteriously, is made manifest 
through the work of creation, we can make no claim to being present to God 
except insofar as we tune our living so as to be in harmony with God’s life-
giving presence among us. If to be alive is to be created, then to live well is to 
live in such a way that our own creative gestures—as witnessed in our eating, 
teaching, building, parenting, playing, and loving—increasingly bear witness 
to and honor the continuing creativity of God: “If the ‘mystical’ ultimately 
means the reception of a particular pattern of divine action (creative love, self-
emptying incarnation), its test will be the presence or absence of something 
like that pattern in a human life seen as a whole, not the presence or absence 
of this or that phenomenon in the consciousness.”11
This characterization of mysticism as a journey into the presence of God 
rather than the undergoing of exceptional states of consciousness opens new 
possibilities for a dialogue between Berry’s ambition to be in place and the 
mystic’s commitment to be present to creation. As I will argue, agrarian prac-
tices and sensitivities can, because of their focus on the health and vitality of 
embodied memberships, play a vital role in the reformulation of a contempo-
rary mysticism that, while not in complete agreement with some traditional 
emphases, is firmly rooted in creation yet tuned to the life of God. As we 
proceed, however, we will need to be particularly mindful of the strategies 
that human beings have used for being in place, for what is clear is that we 
can be more or less successful in this effort.12 That we can fail terribly is evi-
dent in our time as we now contemplate, for the first time in history, the near 
annihilation of creation’s processes, memberships, and habitats. Not only are 
the divinely created harmony and sympathy the early church fathers talked 
about coming apart through our own hands, but their current dissolution 
also threatens to put an end to our memberships altogether.
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Becoming Creatures
The sense that our destructive waywardness is attributable to a denial of our 
creatureliness is well understood by Berry. In “A Native Hill” (1968), he 
wrote: “There appears to be a law that when creatures have reached the level 
of consciousness, as men have, they must become conscious of the creation; 
they must learn how they fit into it and what its needs are and what it requires 
of them, or else pay a terrible penalty: the spirit of the creation will go out of 
them, and they will become destructive; the very earth will depart from them 
and go where they cannot follow.”13 It is when we make ourselves the goal of 
the world, as when we manipulate or redesign the earth and its creatures to 
satisfy self-chosen and self-enhancing aims, that the memberships of creation 
begin to unravel. We stifle creation by making personal pride and greed “the 
standard of our behavior toward the world.” By failing to live patiently and 
with a measure of propriety, attentive and attuned to our fittedness within 
multiple webs of interdependence and responsibility, the beauty and good-
ness of creation is destroyed:
The world is lost in loss
Of patience; the old curse
Returns, and is made worse
As newly justified.
In hopeless fret and fuss,
In rage at worldly plight
Creation is defied,
All order is unpropped,
All light and singing stopped.14
In short, we are impatient and unskilled at being creatures. Our impatience is 
most magnified in our desire to stand alone, unencumbered by the demands 
and responsibilities, the limits and the possibilities that come from living 
within and being constituted by the many memberships of creation. On an 
agrarian, but also mystical, view, there is no self-standing I. What we call I is 
always already communal and relational, a creature formed and sustained 
through the dynamisms of soil and soul.
Understanding, let alone practicing, a patient and attentive regard for 
creation is anything but easy, particularly in a time of mass urbanization and 
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readily available technology when our connections to the memberships of 
creation are so thin and superficial. Ours is a culture beset by biological and 
ecological amnesia, the mass forgetting that we are bound through our bodies 
to the microbial life in soils and the photosynthetic activity of plants. In the 
course of his writing career, Berry has spoken clearly about some of the strat-
egies and practices we need to reconnect to our biological and cultural 
homes—ranging from staying in one region (saying no to upward mobility 
and social dislocation) and committing to a community to growing a garden 
and investing in a household and a local economy. What I want to do here, 
however, is develop the transformation of mind-set and habit that must occur 
if we are to fully be in the places that we are and, thus, be “altogether at 
home.” As will become clear, what Berry has in mind is a spiritual transforma-
tion that links up in multiple ways with a mystical form of life.
Like the great spiritual masters who speak of a need for a perpetual meta-
noia, a continuous turning round of the mind and heart, in order for us to 
enter into communion with each other and with God, so too Berry observes 
that we have been infected with, and, thus, must continually treat, our devel-
oped “habit of contention—against the world, against each other, against our-
selves.” The breaking of this habit, this “intransigent destructiveness in us,” 
will require a drastic change in the assumptions by which we live our lives: “It 
is not from ourselves that we will learn to be better than we are.”15 To correct 
our intransigence, we will need to become “apprentices” to creation, by learn-
ing to know the world as best we can and then cooperate in its processes.16
An apprenticeship is the long labor by which workers slowly and care-
fully learn to yield themselves to the excellences of a craft. They do not simply 
impose their ambitions on the work but rather let the materials (their avail-
ability and quantity), the needs of the community in which the work is per-
formed, and the possibilities of good, safe, beautiful, and useful design deter-
mine the character and extent of the work. They must leave behind visions of 
profit and glory so that a genuine understanding of and appreciation for the 
work and the product can be achieved. The measure of the quality of our 
work, in other words, is not derived from what we might gain for ourselves 
but rather indicated in the durability and beauty of the thing made, in the 
health and happiness of the community in which the work is performed and 
the product is used, and in the long-term viability of the work itself (the work 
does not presuppose the degradation or destruction of the resources or work-
ers that feed into the work). Good work—work that reflects a successful ap-
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prenticeship—will, therefore, result in healthy, flourishing habitats and dy-
namic, convivial communities. It does this because the workers have learned 
to detach from their ambition, replacing it with attachments that reflect a 
more sympathetic and harmonious (though not always easy) attunement to 
the grace at work in the world.
When we become apprentices of creation, we let the health of the land 
serve as the measure of the quality of our overall work. In a very real and 
practical sense, we submit ourselves to the creation and, thus, fully accept our 
divinely appointed vocation to “till and keep” the garden (Gen. 2:15). Berry 
describes the character of our submission in the following:
Until we understand what the land is, we are at odds with everything we 
touch. And to come to that understanding it is necessary, even now, to 
leave the regions of our conquest—the cleared fields, the towns and cit-
ies, the highways—and re-enter the woods. For only there can man en-
counter the silence and the darkness of his own absence. Only in this 
silence and darkness can he recover the sense of the world’s longevity, of 
its ability to thrive without him, of his inferiority to it and his depen-
dence on it. Perhaps then, having heard that silence and seen that dark-
ness, he will grow humble before the place and begin to take it in—to 
learn from it what it is. As its sounds come into his hearing, and its lights 
and colors come into his vision, and its odors come into his nostrils, 
then he may come into its presence as he never has before, and he will 
arrive in his place and will want to remain. His life will grow out of the 
ground like the other lives of the place, and take its place among them. 
He will be with them—neither ignorant of them, nor indifferent to 
them, nor against them—and so at last he will grow to be native-born. 
That is, he must re-enter the silence and the darkness, and be born 
again.17
There is in this language a profound sense that the mundane work of becom-
ing a creature and making a home—what Berry also describes as our being 
“married” to a place18—is finally work of the highest spiritual order. This is 
why the collection of poems The Country of Marriage (1973) has as its epi-
graph a quotation from John 12:24: “Except a corn of wheat fall into the 
ground and die, it abideth alone.” We cannot grow “out of the ground” or 
arrive and remain in place without a certain kind of dying to self, even a dying 
“into the ground,” that is the mark of spiritual transformation and renewal.
Mystics have often characterized this dying as an entry into darkness be-
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cause in it the self learns to shed the various forms of rationalization—the 
light of a natural reason—that would identify God with one element of cre-
ation or legitimate and justify the self in its ambitions.19 The central problem 
with our seeking to identify or claiming to comprehend God is that, in doing 
so, we think that we have access to the supreme calculus that will enable us to 
secure and legitimate our place in the world. In other words, by claiming to 
identify God, we underwrite ourselves and our ambitions. In the mystical 
dark night, however, we gradually come to sense the hubris of our attempts to 
delimit or comprehend God. We give up the desire to firmly grasp, whether 
mentally or practically, the world for ourselves.
Entering into the Dark
In The Ascent of Mount Carmel, Saint John of the Cross alludes to the dark 
night when he says that divine truth exceeds every natural light and all hu-
man understanding. He writes: “The excessive light of faith bestowed on man 
is darkness for him, because a brighter light will eclipse and suppress a dim-
mer one. The sun so obscures all other lights that they do not seem to be 
lights at all when it is shining, and instead of affording vision to the eyes it 
overwhelms, blinds, and deprives them of vision, since its light is excessive 
and unproportioned to the visual faculty. Similarly the light of faith in its 
abundance suppresses and overwhelms that of the intellect.”20 Saint John of 
the Cross is drawing a contrast between a “natural way” of knowing, which is 
dependent on the senses, and the “way of faith,” which overwhelms sight and 
comes to us by hearing the Word (Rom. 10:17). Of course, hearing is one of 
the senses too. But his point is that the object of faith is not proportionate to 
any sense object and, thus, is not the end product of any natural (self-chosen) 
desire. God cannot be seen with our eyes or comprehended in terms of the 
light of natural reason. Indeed, insofar as we claim to have grasped God using 
the various categories of the understanding, we can be sure that we have laid 
hold of an idol rather than God. God forever eludes all reasoning, knowing, 
and naming.21
When Berry talks about our entrance into silence and darkness, he is not 
simply opposing sight and hearing or natural reason and faith. His is a com-
plex darkness that suspends and calls into question a habitual disposition to 
secure the world for ourselves (often through force and violence, but also 
through native cunning and ingenuity). He is not finally opposed to reason. 
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Nor does he seek its elimination. It would be better to say that he seeks to set 
limits to it and contextualize it within a larger pattern of human and created 
life formed by love. In his poem “The Design of a House” he says:
If reason was all, reason
would not exist—the will
to reason accounts for it;
it’s not reason that chooses
to live; the seed doesn’t swell
in its husk by reason, but loves
itself, obeys light which is
its own thought and argues the leaf
in secret; love articulates
the choice of life in fact; life
chooses life because it is
alive; what lives didn’t begin dead,
nor sun’s fire commence in ember. (CP, 31–32)
Reasoning needs to be darkened so that the illumination of love’s mysterious 
light can appear and shine on our living. Much as in Saint Augustine, reason 
is subsumed within the larger movements of love, only then truly becoming 
itself.22
In the 1980 “Sabbath Poem VI,” Berry offers a meditation on precisely 
this theme:
The intellect so ravenous to know
And in its knowing hold the very light,
Disclosing what is so and what not so,
Must finally know the dark, which is its right
And liberty; it’s blind in what it sees.
Bend down, go in by this low door, despite
The thorn and briar that bar the way. (TC, 30)
Our problem is not the intellect itself but rather our ravenous nature and our 
desire to reduce all creation to a utilitarian or market-driven end. What Berry 
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opposes is the sort of scientism epitomized by modernity’s ambition to take 
control of the world by force and with the aid of technologies that mask our 
fragility and dependence on others.23 Through scientific and economic reduc-
tionism, the intellect has become blind. Though it looks, it no longer sees 
truly since it has lost the imagination to see the sanctity of created things or 
the vast and indescribably complex memberships of which they and we are 
but one part.24 Our naming of things is superficial and not detailed enough, 
which means that, in our engagement with them, we readily violate their in-
tegrity and wholeness.
And so we are instructed to “bend down.” Our bending, as the thorns 
and briars make plain, is hardly a straightforward or smooth effort since it 
must fully come to terms with the harvest of human sinfulness. As Berry 
continues: “Greed and sloth / did bad work that this thicket now conceals” 
(TC, 30). Human sinfulness is not an abstraction. It is made manifest in soil 
washed into the sea, in watersheds poisoned by the use of synthetic fertilizers 
and pesticides, in mountaintops blown up and then removed for their coal, 
and in rural communities destroyed and emptied out by the world of finance. 
When we bend down, what we are, in fact, doing is signifying a humble dis-
position that is prepared to learn from creation and is willing to be taught by 
it in the ways of interdependent living. To bend, like a servant, is to give up 
the hubristic assumption that we can live well alone and through the forceful 
imposition of our will on the world.25
It is extremely difficult to argue the case for humility in our time. We 
resist recommendations to service and fidelity because we see in them the 
potential for abuse or outright humiliation. The paradox, however, is that it 
is precisely the quest for self-assertion that has culminated in the degradation 
of creation. The evidence is clear that our desire to control the world and to 
engage it on our terms has led to its ruination. We are in need of a better way, 
a way that is more faithful and true to the biblical mandate to serve and keep 
creation. Since hubris has done so much harm, we need to rehabilitate the 
practice of humility.
O bent by fear and sorrow, now bend down,
Leave word and argument, be dark and still,
And come into the joy of healing shade.
Rest from your work. Be still and dark until
You grow as unopposing, unafraid
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As the young trees, without thought or belief;
Until the shadow Sabbath light has made
Shudders, breaks open, shines in every leaf. (TC, 31)
Before we can enter into the “joy of healing shade,” we will first need to be-
come dark and still ourselves. What does this mean?
In various places Berry speaks of our “serving the dark.” Often what he 
has in mind is the practice of tilling the soil. There is in this tilling much more 
than simply the preparation of a seedbed for a crop. If we remember that the 
word culture in Middle English usage referred not to the refinements of civi-
lization but to a cultivated piece of land, then it becomes clear that our tilling 
is, ultimately, about the preparation and formation of people so that they can 
live worthily and sustainably in a particular place.26 As Berry likes to say, there 
is no culture without agriculture. This is because the tending of plants and the 
husbanding of animals are the ideal training ground for the moral and spiri-
tual virtues that would make for a good and beautiful home (and a faithful 
mystic). True farmers and gardeners have tamed the ego by making the care 
of another their first priority. They have submitted their plans and designed 
their economies in such a way as to contribute to processes of fertility and 
growth. They have brought personal desire into alignment with the needs, 
potential, and limits of another in its particular place.
To be in alignment with creation is a complex effort that requires us to let 
go of our own personal ambitions so that we can see clearly the creation be-
fore us and, thus, enter into the presence of God. The first thing we need to 
do is give up otherworldly aspirations. In “The Wild Geese,” Berry said:
And we pray, not
for new earth or heaven, but to be
quiet in heart, and in eye
clear. What we need is here. (CP, 156)
Far from denying the idea of heaven, Berry is asking us to give up the dreams 
of wish fulfillment—how much of our imagery of heaven is precisely the end 
result of a personal dream?—and instead see the presence of God already in 
our midst.27 In fact, the desire for heaven is, in many instances, a disguised, 
Gnostic form of disdain for creation, a desire to be rid of and to escape cre-
ated, bodily life and its limits.28
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The Mystery of God and Humanity
If what we need is here within creation, this does not mean that the presence 
of God will suddenly become obvious to us. As we have already seen, though 
God is in all things and underpins them as their animating source and desti-
ny, at the same time we must admit that God is not to be reduced to or iden-
tified with anything in creation. God is everywhere and nowhere at the same 
time. God is transcendent, as Thomas Carlson helpfully puts it, “through his 
incomprehensible immanence.”29 The realization of the incomprehensibility 
of God, however, leads to the further realization that we too, as made in the 
image of God, are also finally incomprehensible to ourselves. Moreover, cre-
ation as a whole must finally also be incomprehensible since it is the concrete 
manifestation of God’s groundless yet abiding love, a divine love that is, as 
Eckhart said, “without why.”30 From our point of view, we simply do not 
understand why creation is what it is and why it moves in ways that result in 
such beauty but also unspeakable suffering and pain. And so, as we immerse 
ourselves deeply into creation, as we “bend down,” as Berry suggests, we are 
met on all sides by the darkness of incomprehension.
Divine incomprehensibility and human incomprehensibility yield a most 
important result, namely, the truth of human ignorance. This is no merely 
provisional or temporary ignorance (that will, thus, be overcome someday) 
but an essential part of who we are. In his most recent collection of essays, 
Berry has stressed the cultural necessity of acknowledged ignorance as an an-
tidote to the arrogant and destructive “corporate mind” that thinks it can 
foresee and plan a better world according to its own devising.31 What an in-
dustrial, merely economic mind forgets is that we cannot comprehend the 
orders of creation because ignorance of various forms—inherent, historical, 
moral, and scientific as well as that which follows from character weakness, 
false confidence, fear, laziness, and for-profit/for-power motivations—reflects 
a limited, even damaged mind. Even if we were to become fully human and 
realize every created capacity, we would still be faced with the incomprehen-
sibility of divine, sustaining love:
The mind that comes to rest is tended
In ways that it cannot intend:
Is borne, preserved, and comprehended
By what it cannot comprehend.
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Your Sabbath, Lord, thus keeps us by
Your will, not ours. And it is fit
Our only choice should be to die
Into that rest, or out of it. (TC, 7)
This point needs special emphasis because of what it can teach us about 
human “dominion” over creation (Gen. 1:26). For centuries, people have as-
sumed that, even though we are creatures, we are, nonetheless, special because 
God has put us over all other living and nonliving things. Among some early 
church fathers like Gregory of Nyssa and John Scotus Erigena, there was the 
view that God creates creatures “in” humanity and that humanity contains 
within itself all creatures. The logic behind this view was that, if we are made 
in the image of God, then we transcend all creatures by means of our knowl-
edge of them (as reflected in our freedom over them and our naming of them). 
For Erigena, it made little sense to say that we have dominion over creatures 
if we did not have the concept of them in our minds. Insofar as the human 
mind shares in the divine mind in its ability to see, hear, scrutinize, and pos-
sess a hold over creatures, it must contain within itself the substance of all 
created things. Human dominion, as Gregory argued, must, therefore, take 
shape in our control of creation through technological means. But this leads 
to a curious result: “The subject who cannot know its own nature at the same 
time relates to creation through an all-inclusive vision of comprehension and 
dominion.”32 We should wonder about claims to “all-inclusive” dominion, 
particularly if we take seriously the threefold incomprehensibility of God, 
creation, and humanity. If we are serious about living faithfully and atten-
tively with our creatureliness, then we will need to chasten the desire for 
complete control.
How should we think incomprehensibility and dominion together, par-
ticularly when we know that ignorant arrogance matched with great power 
leads to ever greater destruction? We need to start by acknowledging that the 
admission of systemic ignorance is at the same time a call for restraint and 
humility. Those committed to taking up a divine pattern of life in this world 
must move beyond a ravenous and rapacious intellect and into the wider 
movements of love. Love is not a sloppy willfulness but a disciplined and at-
tentive regard for another. Christians believe this because they have in mind 
the ministries of healing, feeding, forgiving, and reconciling as concretely and 
practically revealed in the life of Jesus Christ. The freedom that marks our 
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creatureliness and that makes possible our dominion reaches its most authen-
tic pitch in the love shown by Christ. The Christian’s freedom is always free-
dom “in Christ,” which means that the dispositions that guided his life—what 
I earlier referred to as the pattern of God’s continuing activity among us—
must also guide our own. Whatever technological ambitions we might have 
must be restrained and contextualized by this pattern.
This conclusion is of the highest significance because it means that the 
transcendence that we enjoy over creation by virtue of our freedom and rea-
soning capacities is turned back to creation in the form of a loving descent 
(bending down) that commits to be with its members in their need and 
pain.33 This is what Christ’s ministry teaches: that to truly and fully be our-
selves we must give ourselves away. Paul summed this up beautifully in his 
account of the kenotic, self-emptying mind of Christ, “who, though he was 
in the form of God, did not regard equality with God as something to be 
exploited, but emptied himself, taking the form of a slave, being born in hu-
man likeness. And being found in human form, he humbled himself and 
became obedient to the point of death—even death on a cross” (Phil. 2:6–8). 
This giving away of self, this loving abandon, is the definitive expression of 
the divine life. Indeed, this is precisely what created life is: a perpetual, in-
comprehensible giving away: “God’s utterance lovingly gives life; gives all life, 
all unfading freshness; gives only life, and peace, and love, and beauty, har-
mony and joy. And the life God gives is nothing other, nothing less, than 
God’s own self. Life is God, given.”34
If mystics are those who seek to take up the divine pattern of life within 
their own, then the giving away of one’s life will become a defining feature of 
mystical practice. According to Berry, we have a concrete model to learn from: 
the soil’s fertility. In the growing and the dying of things, and in their regen-
eration through processes of decomposition and recomposition, we see, even 
as we do not fully understand, the miracle of continuing life. As we contrib-
ute to the processes of fertility and growth—practically speaking, by consum-
ing food and energy in just, sustainable manners and by committing to the 
strengthening of local communities—we enrich creation and so participate, 
however inadequately, in God’s continuing creative work. Speaking of sowing 
clover and grass, Berry says in “Enriching the Earth”:
All this serves the dark. I am slowly falling
into the fund of things. And yet to serve the earth,
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not knowing what I serve, gives a wideness
and a delight to the air, and my days
do not wholly pass. It is the mind’s service,
for when the will fails so do the hands
and one lives at the expense of life.
After death, willing or not, the body serves,
entering the earth. And so what was heaviest
and most mute is at last raised up into song. (CP, 110)
Resurrection and Soil
To appreciate this view, we need to understand that soil is a marvel. It is not 
something we can make. All that we can do, besides destroy it, is cooperate 
with the dark processes at work within it—die into it—recognizing that, in 
the midst of this darkness, life is made out of death. Berry admits that, when 
talking about soil, it is hard to avoid the language of religion:
The most exemplary nature is that of the topsoil. It is very Christ-like in 
its passivity and beneficence, and in the penetrating energy that issues 
out of its peaceableness. It increases by experience, by the passage of 
seasons over it, growth rising out of it and returning to it, not by ambi-
tion or aggressiveness. It is enriched by all things that die and enter into 
it. It keeps the past, not as history or as memory, but as richness, new 
possibility. Its fertility is always building up out of death into promise. 
Death is the bridge or tunnel by which its past enters its future.35
Life continually dies into the soil and emerges as new life. And so it makes 
some sense to refer to soil as a site of resurrection. Here, we apprehend some-
thing of the hospitable character of the divine life that is forever creating 
room for others to be and to flourish, but then also to die and make room for 
yet more life.36 Divine hospitality finds its analogue in the soil: “Hospitality 
is the fundamental virtue of the soil. It makes room. It shares. It neutralizes 
poisons. And so it heals. This is what the soil teaches: If you want to be re-
membered, give yourself away.”37 The remembrance that William Bryant 
Logan is talking about is not simply of the mental sort but the re-membering 
where we fully join into the life of posterity through our bodies, into the 
memberships of creation. Through our surrender to the land and to commu-
nity we gain an entrance into the mysterious presence of God in creation. The 
supreme passivity and submission of the body to creation, seen first in our 
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need to eat and drink but then also in our dying into the earth at burial, is the 
constant, concrete reminder and tutor in the ways of spiritual submission. We 
enter into the dark ground with our bodies and our spirits and, thereby, an-
ticipate the miracle of new life:38
Let the world bring on me
the sleep of darkness without stars, so I may know
my little light taken from me into the seed
of the beginning and the end, so I may bow
to mystery, and take my stand on the earth,
like a tree in a field, passing without haste
or regret toward what will be, my life
a patient willing descent into the grass. (CP, 114)
When Berry characterizes human life as “a patient willing descent” and 
models personal growth after a young tree that is “unopposing and unafraid . 
. . without thought or belief ” (TC, 31), he is describing a way of living that 
has detachment at its core. By detachment, we can now see, he means not a 
flight or an escape from the world but our full immersion into creation, our 
giving ourselves to others so that they can more fully be. Detachment is a 
form of engagement marked by conviviality and celebration rather than con-
tention and needless destruction. Put more precisely, since we are always al-
ready (through the passivity of our bodies) within creation as one of its mem-
bers, what Berry is recommending is a way of being present to one another in 
which we see and welcome things for what they are rather than what we want 
or wish them to be. This is a way of being marked by the letting be of things, 
what Meister Eckhart described as our “releasement” into things and into 
God “without restraint.”39 Detachment, in other words, makes it possible for 
us to fully be with others since we no longer receive or engage them in terms 
of the agendas or idols we carry through life. In this respect, Berry is in agree-
ment with the definition of wisdom offered by Maximus Confessor: “Wisdom 
consists in seeing every object in accordance with its true nature, with perfect 
interior freedom.”40
When we enter the mystical path, what we are really trying to do, more 
than have some special apparition of God, is come to see (however imper-
fectly) the world as God sees it. We resist this form of seeing because it means 
that we must give up points of view that establish and legitimate our standing 
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in the world. We resist detachment because it makes us vulnerable to the con-
tingency, suffering, mystery, and unpredictability that creation itself is. We 
prefer not to serve the soil, or enter into the dark “ground” that is creation’s life 
and death, because it entails our submission to the unknown and incompre-
hensible.41 Berry’s work, however, stands as a reminder to the damage done to 
the countless bodies and memberships of creation that ensues from our failure 
to “serve the dark.” It also shines as a witness to another way, a way that might 
yet lead us into the “blessed conviviality” (“To Sit and Look at Light-Filled 
Leaves” [TC, 8]) of creation that marked the first Sabbath day.
Can we be at peace with one another and with God and so be “alto-
gether at home” in creation? Can we finally become the courteous creatures 
God intends for us to be? Berry offers no simple or painless solutions. What 
he recommends is love’s labor, a labor informed by virtues of modesty, atten-
tion, fidelity, humility, thrift, propriety, generosity, mercy, and gratitude. 
What we need to learn to do as much as possible—and for this we will need 
the help and guidance of spiritual traditions, the insights of ecology, the sup-
port of a community, and the memory of good work—is how to get ourselves 
and our ambition out of the way so that the incomprehensible, gracious giv-
ingness of God (what Berry sometimes calls Sabbath light) can shine through-
out creation and in us.
If a mystical path is one in which the traveler learns to submit to God, 
then it is the virtue of agrarian life to show us that our submission is authen-
tic only as we commit ourselves to the health and vitality of creation, for it is 
here that God’s ways, however mysteriously, are being worked out. It is here, 
in the soil beneath our feet and among countless created neighborhoods rath-
er than in some faraway celestial place, that God meets us in work and grace 
that exceeds our comprehension and our wrongdoing:
For we are fallen like the trees, our peace
Broken, and so we must
Love where we cannot trust,
Trust where we cannot know,
And must await the way-ward coming grace
That joins living and dead,
Taking us where we would not go—Into the boundless dark.
When what was made has been unmade
The Maker comes to his work. (TC, 74)
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sequent citations from the Collected Poems (hereafter CP) are given parenthetically in 
the text.
19. Here we should note that a philosophical/theological definition of idolatry is 
one in which the idol is not simply a fabricated object but the fulfillment of a human 
gaze or desire. Idols are, thus, the full extension of the self and its aspiration. They are 
mirrors to (and, thus, a confirmation of ) the self rather than an opening to the divine 
(as an icon is supposed to be). For a development of these themes, see the recent work 
of Jean-Luc Marion, including God without Being: Hors-Texte, trans. Thomas A. 
Carlson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), esp. chaps. 1–2.
20. Saint John of the Cross, The Ascent of Mount Carmel, in The Collected Works 
of St. John of the Cross, trans. Kieran Kavanaugh, O.C.D., and Otilio Rodriguez, 
O.C.D. (Washington, DC: ICS, 1979), 110 (2.3).
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of darkness: “There is no speaking of it, nor name nor knowledge of it. Darkness and 
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continue to use the metaphor of darkness as a way of describing our “unknowing” in 
the service of a more faithful and true life.
22. Augustine writes in his Homilies on the Psalms that we become fully con-
scious of God only insofar as love grows in us because God is love: “Before you had 
the experience [of love], you used to think you could speak of God. You begin to have 
the experience, and there you experience that you cannot say what you experience” 
(quoted in McGinn, The Foundations of Mysticism, 241). True intellect is humbled or, 
as Berry would say, is “bent down” (see the discussion of “Sabbath Poem VI” that 
follows in the text) because it has been overwhelmed by love and, thus, rendered 
speechless.
23. Here, Berry joins hands with other “traditionalist” critics of modernity like 
Ananda Coomaraswamy, Kathleen Raine, and Philip Sherrard. In a tribute to 
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Kathleen Raine, he describes the nihilism of modernity as the desecration of human-
ity, once thought to be made in the image of God, but now reduced to being little 
more than a “higher” animal. With this desecration came “the implied permission to 
be more bewildered, violent, self-deluded, destructive, and self-destructive than any 
of the animals” (Wendell Berry, “Against the Nihil of the Age,” Temenos Academy 
Review, no. 7 [2004]: 82).
24. Think here of Augustine, who describes how, in turning our backs to the 
divine light that sustains all things and is the sense of their truth, we darken our 
minds and bring destruction to one another and the world (Confessions, 4.30).
25. Berry observes that even our best attempts to heal are not without damage 
and pain: “An art that heals and protects its subject is a geography of scars” (Wendell 
Berry, “Damage,” in What Are People For? [New York: North Point, 1990], 7). In the 
short text “Damage,” Berry reflects on his effort to repair the destruction caused by 
his desire to have a pond midway up a slope in one of his fields.
26. For a helpful discussion of the original link between culture and land and the 
gradual eclipse of land in the name of civilization, see Jonathan Bate, The Song of the 
Earth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), chap. 1.
27. Berry notes that his primary aim in life is not to get into heaven: “Though 
heaven is certainly more important than the earth if all they say about it is true, it is 
still morally incidental to it and dependent on it, and I can only imagine it and desire 
it in terms of what I know of the earth. And so my questions do not aspire beyond 
the earth. They aspire toward it and into it. Perhaps they aspire through it” (“A Native 
Hill,” 200).
28. I have developed this theme in “Placing the Soul: An Agrarian Philosophical 
Principle,” in The Essential Agrarian Reader: The Future of Culture, Community, and 
the Land, ed. Norman Wirzba (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2003).
29. Thomas A. Carlson, “Locating the Mystical Subject,” in Mystics: Presence and 
Aporia, ed. Michael Kessler and Christian Sheppard (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2003), 213. As Carlson points out, according to Erigena, an invisible, incom-
prehensible God realizes himself in creation, thus turning it into a dark theophany 
manifesting this divine, inaccessible incomprehensibility.
30. Meister Eckhart, Sermon 81, “I Have Chosen You,” available at http://www 
.geocities.com/athens/acropolis/5164/EckSermlxxxi.htm.
31. Wendell Berry, The Way of Ignorance: And Other Essays (Shoemaker & Hoard, 
2005).
32. Carlson, “Locating the Mystical Subject,” 221.
33. The desire to ascend “beyond places and times” (ibid., 219), so much in evi-
dence in strands of Western spirituality and modern technology, must, therefore, be 
counteracted by a self-emptying descent into the heart of creation. Only then will we, 
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as Berry suggests, “grow out of the ground like the other lives of the place” (“A Native 
Hill,” 207).
34. Nicholas Lash, Believing Three Ways in the One God: A Reading of the Apostles’ 
Creed (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 104.
35. Berry, “A Native Hill,” 204.
36. John of Damascus referred to the divine act of creation as the “making room” 
within the divine life so that what is not divine can emerge. For a development of this 
theme, see my The Paradise of God: Renewing Religion in an Ecological Age (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), introduction and chap. 1.
37. William Bryant Logan, Dirt: The Ecstatic Skin of the Earth (New York: 
Riverhead, 1995), 19.
38. Again, it is agrarian imagery, imagery that has become foreign to most peo-
ple only in recent times, that conveys the sense of this submission best. By working 
with the soil, the farmer or gardener “enters into death / yearly, and comes back re-
joicing. He has seen the light lie down / in the dung heap, and rise again in the corn” 
(“The Man Born to Farming,” in CP, 103). Compare: “The seed is in the ground. / 
Now may we rest in hope / While darkness does its work” (“The Seed Is in the 
Ground,” in TC, 131).
39. See the treatment of this theme in Schürmann, Wandering Joy, 9–18, 182–
209; and Eckhart’s sermon “Blessed Are the Poor” (O’Neal, ed., Meister Eckhart, 
210–15). Berry refers to “the last labor of the heart” as the ability “to learn to lie still, 
/ one with the earth / again, and let the world go” (“Awake at Night,” in CP, 128).
40. Maximus Confessor, Centuries on Charity, 2.64, quoted in Clément, The 
Roots of Christian Mysticism, 223.
41. For an excellent discussion of the “mysticism of the ground,” see Bernard 
McGinn, The Harvest of Mysticism in Medieval Germany (1300–1500), vol. 4 of The 
Presence of God (New York: Crossroad, 2005), 83–93. Grund (ground or foundation), 
as it was employed by mystics, was intimately associated with Abgrund (abyss).

Part 3
Imagination

Christians who recite the Apostles’ Creed profess, among other things, belief 
in “the communion of saints.” Exactly what this profession means isn’t always 
clear, either to the Christians themselves or to the wider world. As a Christian, 
I have developed a greater understanding of and appreciation for the commu-
nio sanctorum by getting to know the membership of Port William in the 
fiction of Wendell Berry. This is because, as Hannah Coulter says in Berry’s 
recent novel, “the membership includes the dead.”1
Any reader of Berry’s fiction will know that its focus is a group of Port 
William farmers and townspeople so intimately related that they call them-
selves “the membership.” Though the members attribute this name to one of 
their own, Burley Coulter, it has older, theologically more explicit roots in 
Paul’s description of the church as one body with many members (see 1 Cor. 
12). Not surprisingly, the membership’s life together manifests many of the 
characteristics Paul names as attributes of the body of Christ, including pro-
found and tangible ties between the living and the dead. Thus, both the 
membership of Port William and the membership of Christ’s church are, and 
know that they are, a community that extends through time in spite of 
death.
When Christians have thought about this real relationship with brothers 
and sisters both living and dead, they have typically used the name commu-
nion of saints. Berry sticks with the term membership, but it often seems like 
he is gesturing toward the same reality. I will investigate that resemblance, 
guided by the conviction that Berry’s membership has much to teach 
Christians about how to understand and embody our conviction that we be-
long to the communion of saints.
The essay will describe four key dimensions that constitute the member-
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ship, each one able to enrich or enlighten Christian understanding of the 
communion of saints. First, Berry’s membership is placed on common 
ground. Though this emphasis on locality might seem inimical to a Christian 
sense of membership in a global church, we will see that it actually serves to 
correct a Gnosticizing tendency in modern theology. Berry can help the 
church recover the centrality of place for the communio sanctorum. Second, in 
Berry’s fiction, membership is given rather than earned. Though most of his 
members prove themselves worthy of their belonging, they do not work their 
way into the fellowship; belonging always comes as a gift. Here, Berry helps 
Christians see the communion of saints as a fruit of God’s giving and a society 
of mutual aid rather than as an exclusive club for especially gifted Christians. 
Third, Berry’s members are held together by powerful bonds that run deeper 
than affection and intention. It is their common life of shared place and labor 
and love that binds them together. This raises for Christians the question of 
whether they presently share a common life powerful enough to bind them 
together with all the saints. Finally, Berry’s members see themselves as living 
in the midst of those who have died yet remain somehow alive. The visions 
that come to Jayber Crow, Hannah Coulter, and Andy Catlett of being “sur-
rounded by such a great cloud of witnesses” (Heb. 12:1) offer consolation and 
sustain hope. Learning to rest confidently in such visions, while also striving 
hopefully toward the resurrection of the body and the renewal of all things, is 
not just their work but that of every saint within Christ’s communio. Berry’s 
fiction can help orient us to our proper work of hope.
Placed
Wendell Berry has rightly complained that contemporary Christianity “is not 
earthy enough.”2 One gospel song, titled “This World Is Not My Home,” puts 
the exclamation point on Berry’s claim. Each verse and refrain concludes: 
“And I can’t feel at home in this world anymore.” Songs like this turn our 
minds away from the Christian conviction that God has made all things well, 
and our hearts away from the given place of our lives. Unfortunately, this 
song represents an all too common tendency among Christians: they think 
and feel that they are homeless, or they believe in a heaven that competes 
with—and calls them away from—this earth.
Technically, such a view is called Gnosticism. More colloquially, we might 
call it homeless faith or dis-placed discipleship. Though judged a heresy in 
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Christianity’s second century, Gnosticism has continued to dog the church 
ever since, weaving itself into our convictions, including our understanding 
of the communion of saints. A Gnosticized understanding of the communio 
sanctorum diminishes or even negates the significance of place by affirming an 
invisible, “spiritual” relationship of all Christians everywhen and everywhere. 
As one recent study put it, the communion of saints “transcends all boundar-
ies and limitations of time and space.”3 Apparently, place does not matter at 
all.
Unlike a Gnosticized communio sanctorum, Berry’s membership is placed. 
It is the membership of Port William, not the membership of anywhere or of 
nowhere. The common ground the members share is the very foundation on 
which membership rests. We see this clearly in The Memory of Old Jack, when 
Mat and Margaret Feltner go to Cincinnati to visit Nettie Banion, their for-
mer pensioner. The visit is exceedingly awkward, even though these are people 
who care deeply for one another: “Nettie was glad to see them, but quiet, 
uncertain, strange to them suddenly, no longer held to them by any common 
ground.”4 Of course, in Berry’s fiction, common ground does not automati-
cally create community, but you cannot have real community without it.
Commenting on this visit many years later, Hannah Coulter says that 
Nettie was “not at home there, and not to be at home again in this world.” 
The only place she could have been at home “would have had to be in Port 
William” because “the Banions belonged to the Feltner place by the same his-
tory as the Feltners. . . . The two families belonged to each other.”5 Note the 
direction of belonging in Hannah’s claim: because they belonged to the place, 
they belonged to one another. This is a regular theme in Berry’s fiction: the 
members belong to their farms as much as their farms belong to them. Old 
Jack is the quintessential embodiment of this: he cares for his land “not be-
cause it belonged to him so much as because, by the expenditure of history 
and work, he belonged to it.”6
These farmers have their roots sunk so deeply in the earth that not even 
the hope of heaven can displace them. Several of them say they want to be 
buried under a tree or in a field on their own farm rather than in the church 
cemetery. Their point is not to reject Christian belief in eternal fellowship with 
God but to express their profound sense that such fellowship includes and re-
quires place. In “That Distant Land,” Andy Catlett narrates Mat Feltner’s 
death, which came on the second day of harvesting tobacco in a patch of heart-
breakingly long rows. Each time a worker finished a row, Burley Coulter would 
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sing: “Oh, pilgrim, have you seen that distant land?”7 It might appear that, by 
singing a song about going to heaven as encouragement to “go down the row,” 
Burley was disparaging Christian hope and trivializing Christian faith. But, 
given the context, in which Andy has emphasized that they continually kept 
the dying Mat in their minds while harvesting the tobacco, it is better to hear 
in Burley’s singing a double valence: the song orients them to their heavenly 
hope in and through the land rather than apart from it.
Hannah Coulter includes a key chapter titled “Our Place,” the plural pos-
sessive pronoun already suggesting the way we can belong to one another 
only in a particular place. For Hannah, love of a particular place marries 
heaven and earth: “And it is by the place we’ve got, and our love for it and our 
keeping of it, that this world is joined to Heaven.” She makes this claim over 
against the modern American dis-ease that continually looks for a better place 
while overlooking or despising one’s present place. But her point also speaks 
directly to the older Gnostic dis-ease with the placedness of our lives. For as 
Hannah sees it: “Love in this world doesn’t come out of thin air. It is not 
something thought up. Like ourselves, it grows out of the ground. It has a 
body and a place.”8 Because Hannah’s many loves were grown on this soil and 
patterned by working this place, love for the place is not in competition with 
love for her family. Instead, continuing to love the place keeps her connected 
with those, now gone, whom she has loved there and connects her too with 
the God whose love creates all things.
Andy Catlett, who like Berry left home for some years to pursue a writing 
career, tells us at the end of A World Lost that he has come to find his happi-
ness in the joining of place and saints: “Slowly I have learned that my true 
home is not just this place but is also that company of immortals with whom I 
have lived here day by day. I live in their love, and I know something of the 
cost.”9 For both Andy Catlett and Hannah Coulter, the palpability of place is 
intrinsically connected to the presence of members both living and dead. 
Berry renders this most poignantly in the final chapter of Remembering, where 
Andy Catlett returns—both physically and psychically—to the place that is 
his home: “His own place becomes palpable to him [as he drives toward Port 
William]. Those he loves, living and dead, are no longer mere thoughts or 
memories, but presences, approachable and near.” The presence that Andy 
experiences is not merely a matter of thought and memory; it is a real pres-
ence: “Now they are coming to him again, those who have brought him here 
and who remain—not in memory, but near to memory, in the place itself and 
“The Membership Includes the Dead”  177
in his flesh, ready always to be remembered—so that the place, the present 
life of it, resonates within time and within times, as it could not do if time 
were all that it is living in.”10 Clearly, Andy, whose life is now shaped by 
homecoming rather than leave-taking, could never sing “this world is not my 
home.” But he could sing “for all the saints who from their labors rest” be-
cause their long labor of love remains present in this place. In Wendell Berry’s 
membership, the communion of saints is placed on common ground.
Modern Christians would do well to learn from Berry the significance of 
a placed membership because fellowship abstracted from the common ground 
of a shared place is not real relation. Learning again the significance of placed 
“presences, approachable and near,” will not require us to invent new strate-
gies. But it will require us to learn again the significance of things we are al-
ready doing and, perhaps, to recover older Christian practices that were more 
attentive to place. Specifically, I believe that Christians may recover their 
place among “that company of immortals” by greater attentiveness to Holy 
Communion and by a recovery of the ancient practice of venerating relics.
Whether they call it Holy Communion, the Lord’s Supper, Eucharist, or 
Mass, all Christians know that this meal is placed. Christians must come to-
gether around the table if they are going to share it with one another. 
Communion can’t be done by telephone, Internet, or television; it requires 
common ground. It also creates common ground by uniting us with Christ, 
with one another, and with all God’s saints. This claim sounds at first like 
Communion is an activity that abstracts us from our particular place and 
time into some idea of universal fellowship. Instead, according to William 
Cavanaugh, in Communion “one becomes more united to the whole the 
more tied one becomes to the local.”11 Because each Communion table is 
concretely placed in space and time, it becomes the place where we realize—
not just mentally but actually—a fellowship that transcends spatial and tem-
poral limitations. So Communion becomes a place—indeed, becomes the 
place—where the communio sanctorum is most fully realized. As such, 
Protestant Christians would do well to practice it more frequently, and all 
Christians should practice it more knowingly.
We should also try to recover one of the earliest Christian expressions of 
the communio sanctorum—the practice of venerating relics. A relic was some 
part of the physical remains of a dead saint that was treasured by a congrega-
tion. The first known practice of treasuring relics is told in the second- 
century Martyrdom of Polycarp. The church of Smyrna retrieved the burned 
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bones of the martyred Polycarp in order to bury them in a place where, in suc-
ceeding years, they gathered annually to remember his “birthday” (i.e., the 
anniversary of his death). Their practice of an annual worship feast at the site 
of burial brought together story and soil in a way that profoundly “placed” 
them as a congregation. At its best, such a practice of integrating relics into the 
church’s worship life brought together the story of a faithful life with the soil 
on which that life was lived and sustained the connection between the living 
community and the deceased member. Unfortunately, in the later Middle 
Ages, relics became a real problem, partly because of superstitious beliefs about 
their miraculous power, but more fundamentally because they were being sold 
and stolen. This dislocated them from their proper place, meaning that the 
story a relic embodied became divorced from the soil on which that story had 
been lived. Such abuses do not undercut the fundamental value of a placed 
practice of relics, however, any more than binge eating undercuts the goodness 
of a bowl of fresh blueberries. Contemporary Christians would do well to seek 
ways to recover some form of treasuring relics, whether in the form of a church 
cemetery, columbarium, memory garden, or something else. Whatever form 
our renewed practice of relics takes, the point would be to restore the connec-
tion between story and soil, to recover the common ground that binds us in a 
living membership with those who have died in Christ.
Neither relics nor Communion can automatically bring us to say with 
Andy Catlett that “my true home is not just this place but is also that com-
pany of immortals with whom I have lived here day by day.” But, practiced 
with proper attention to the way they place us on common ground with one 
another and with Christ, they might help us learn what Berry’s membership 
already knows: our profound need for a beloved place.
“Altogether Given”
The entire third part of the Apostles’ Creed names what we are given in Christ. 
From “the Holy Spirit” now outpoured to “the life everlasting” now antici-
pated, all is gift, and all is given. Though Christians know this, we frequently 
fail to live it. We think and speak and live this third article, not as a gift from 
God that we are receiving, but as a given—a factual reality that we recognize 
and recite to God. The difference is whether the given is excessive gift or ob-
jective fact, whether it claims our gratitude and obligation or just our assent.
That difference is especially evident in the way we believe in the commu-
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nion of saints. We should say “I believe in the communion of saints,” not just 
to assert that this fellowship of the faithful exists, but to claim our share in 
this gift and to name our indebtedness for it. For Protestants (like me), this 
can be difficult. The heritage of the Reformation leaves us worried that any 
recognition of the communio sanctorum as God’s gift, as grace in action, will 
compete with and detract from the saving grace of Jesus. Of course it doesn’t, 
any more than recognizing the good creation as God’s gift could eclipse Christ 
as God’s full self-giving (see John 1:1–3). But our suspicion lingers, leaving us 
uncertain what good the communion of saints might be or do. So we name it 
in the creed as mere given rather than given gift.
Catholics can also distort the gift character of the communio sanctorum, 
though for different reasons. They have retained the early Christian sense that 
the holy lives of particular saints are gifts God gives the church. Moreover, 
they have nurtured an awareness of present relation to individual saints who, 
though they have died, are alive in Christ. This present relation allows 
Catholics (and Protestants too) to ask one of the faithful departed to continue 
to give us the gift of his or her prayer. But herein lies the danger, for, when we 
concentrate on what this or that saint might do for us, several problems too 
easily follow. First, we lose the larger sense of the communio sanctorum as a 
fellowship, a belonging to one another in Christ. Second, we lose the early 
Christians’ sense that the communio is the gift of mutual aid, or giving and 
receiving in both directions. Finally, we risk transforming the communio sanc-
torum from gift acknowledged into reality understood, with the temptation 
to develop technologies for using and exploiting that reality. When my fam-
ily had difficulty selling our house, a neighbor advised us that, if we would 
bury a statue of Saint Joseph upside down in the yard, it would sell immedi-
ately. Such an outlook epitomizes through caricature the loss of real commu-
nion with the saints. The given is no longer gift, but . . .
In his fiction, Berry illuminates the way membership is given as a gift. 
The novels Jayber Crow and Hannah Coulter narrate how their protagonists 
are given the gift of belonging to the membership of Port William. But the 
most poignant accounts of membership as gift are found in two short stories 
about Elton and Mary Penn. The first, “A Jonquil for Mary Penn,” tells how 
they began their marriage on a rented farm in the Cotman Ridge neighbor-
hood. There they were given tutelage in the arts of housewifery and hus-
bandry, learning the economy of farming through the shared work, wisdom, 
and laughter of their neighbors. Disowned by her parents for marrying Elton, 
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Mary learns to think of herself as belonging here through the mutual sharing 
of the neighborhood and especially of her five female neighbors. Her sense of 
belonging thus comes as an unexpected, unasked gift, eliciting in her a holy 
gratitude. One fall day “she had stood on the highest point and had seen the 
six smokes of the six houses rising straight up into the wide downfalling light. 
. . . It was like watching the rising up of prayers or some less acknowledged 
communication between Earth and Heaven.”12
Berry is telling us that membership is a belonging that is given through 
shared place, shared labor, and shared love. That belonging is itself a gift, 
apart from any benefits that it might produce. Yet it clearly produces benefits 
that are economic (Mary describes it as “a wonderful provisioning”), emo-
tional (“Oh, I’m wonderful”), and educative (“She came knowing little, bare-
ly enough to begin, and they taught her much”).13 Berry’s narrated descrip-
tion of the membership is remarkably similar to the claim of Pope Leo XIII 
that “the communion of saints is nothing else but a mutual sharing in help, 
satisfaction, prayer and other good works.”14 Berry’s fictional membership can 
help us recover that clear sense that the communion of saints is a gift given 
for sharing good work and mutual satisfaction. We are given both belonging 
and benefit in integral relation.
If Mary Penn embodies the way the gift of membership naturally evokes 
our gratitude, Elton epitomizes the way we resist receiving what is given. 
From the time he left home at age fourteen, Elton had been fiercely indepen-
dent. When Jack Beechum tries to leave his farm to Elton and Mary, an inci-
dent narrated in the novel The Memory of Old Jack and the short story “It 
Wasn’t Me,” we see Elton’s “longing for independence” collide head-on with 
his indebtedness for belonging. His struggle “between gratitude and resent-
ment,” played out in conversation with Wheeler Catlett, provides us insight 
into the economy of membership and instructs us on the obligations of 
belonging.15
In order to fulfill Old Jack Beechum’s dying wish, Wheeler helps Elton 
buy the Beechum farm at auction. Old Jack chose the Penns because, as his 
tenants, they had proven faithful both to the farm and to him. “He thought 
you were worthy,” Wheeler explains. Others think so too. Later that year, 
when the male membership gathers in the tobacco-stripping room that once 
was Jack’s but now is Elton’s, Burley Coulter assesses Elton in the words of 
Old Jack: “By God, son, you’re a good one!”16 Wheeler tells Jack’s daughter: 
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“Clara, I don’t know anybody more worthy to walk in your daddy’s tracks 
than Elton Penn.”17 Indeed, Elton is worthy and gifted.
But “It Wasn’t Me” is not primarily a story of how good people get what 
they deserve, of how the gifted will finally win out. Instead, it contrasts the 
economy of price, where value is calculated and merit rewarded, with an econ-
omy of gift, where there is a giving and receiving that is “not accountable.” It 
invites us to realize, along with Elton, that life and love and membership are 
“goods and services that we didn’t make, that can’t exist at all except as gifts.” 
In the end, the best things we want and need are given to us, not earned or 
deserved. This is a difficult discovery for Elton, who tells Wheeler: “I want to 
make it on my own. I don’t want a soul to thank.” In response, Wheeler helps 
Elton see that belonging is not earned but given. Wheeler tells Elton: “You 
have it because I’ve given it to you. . . . I gave it to you because it was given to 
me.” Here given precedes giving. Berry’s members recognize that they stand in 
a succession of gift that “has been here since the evening and the morning were 
the third day.”18
Thus, in the course of the story, Elton comes to see that, though he may 
have bought a farm, he is being given a belonging. “It Wasn’t Me” is a story 
of election into membership (and Berry uses the theological term election).19 
Its outcome matters, not just to the Penns, but to all the saints of the Port 
William membership. As Wheeler explains it: “What has happened has been 
desirable to a lot of people we never knew, who lived before us.”20 His point 
is not unlike that of the author of Hebrews, who tells in chapter 11 of all the 
faithful saints who, nonetheless, “would not, apart from us, be made perfect” 
(Heb. 11:40). This suggests finally that membership in the communion of 
saints is not just given to us but also meant to be given through us to others.
Elton’s acceptance of membership as a given gift may help us negotiate 
one of the most difficult aspects of some theologies of the communion of 
saints—the notion that some of the saints may have earned their place. 
Though, technically, all Christians believe that we are saved because of what 
Jesus Christ has done, some Christians have believed that some of the saints 
are so holy that they are in a different category than the rest of us. One way 
that idea has played itself out is the belief that the holy saints go directly to 
heaven when they die while the rest of us wait in purgatory. Another way is 
the idea of a treasury of merit. This is the notion that these holy saints have 
been so worthy that they have extra good works that they don’t need but that 
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we do. If appropriately requested, their excess can be credited to our deficit in 
the economy of salvation. Either way, these understandings of the commu-
nion of saints separate the “good ones” from all the rest of us in inappropriate 
ways.
“It Wasn’t Me” drives home the point that belonging to this membership 
is a gift that is not earned. Though worthy, Elton and Mary Penn become part 
of the membership just like everyone else: by receiving what is given. Likewise, 
though we are indebted for being given membership in the communion of 
saints, “it’s not payable” and “it’s not accountable”21—neither by us regular 
folk nor by the most holy ones in our midst. With Elton Penn, we can learn 
to renounce independence and embrace election, trying neither to earn our 
entrance nor to deserve our inclusion but instead to continually live in the 
economy of the gift. With Mary Penn, we can learn the joy of recognizing our 
belonging to this fellowship. For, finally, all is gift, given to us by God through 
those who have gone before us, and given through us by God to those we wel-
come in God’s name.
Bound
In a culture of isolated individuals, Christians regularly sing their connection 
to one another in songs like “Blessed Be the Tie That Binds.” According to the 
doctrine of the communion of saints, the central tie that binds the saints to-
gether is Jesus Christ. In Berry’s fiction, the members are bound together by 
place, work, and love. Hannah Coulter names the first two when telling how 
she came to be a member of Port William: “I had my place and my work 
among them. They let me belong.”22 Having already considered place as the 
binding ground of community, let us take up work as its binding activity.
Work is the most obvious bond of the membership. Work is so central in 
Port William that Hannah Coulter can say: “Our life and our work were not 
the same thing maybe, but they were close.” It is not just that they are all 
people who do the same thing for a living—in this case farming. Rather, it is 
that their way of farming requires them to work together, a shared activity 
that not only requires them to be present with one another but also binds 
them to one another. Hannah describes the membership as “a whole compa-
ny of people [who], at different times, in different combinations, might be at 
work on our place, or we might be at work on theirs.” The membership is not 
just an idea of belonging to one another but belonging embodied in and 
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through shared work. It was while working together that Burley Coulter 
“would preach the membership,” that is, proclaim to the members the iden-
tity and significance of the Port William membership.23
This central role of shared work in binding the membership together is 
especially evident, as Hannah narrates, “during the tobacco harvest, when we 
would all be together.”24 Andy Catlett describes the tobacco cutting itself as 
“a sort of ritual of remembrance, too, when we speak of other years and re-
member younger selves and the absent and the dead—all those we have, as we 
say, ‘gone down the row with.’”25 Here, the sharing in work binds together 
not just those alive and present but those members who have died.
In this way, Berry’s membership resembles the early Christian sense of the 
communion of saints, which Michael Perham describes as characterized by 
such a strong “sense of belonging to each other” that not even death could 
break the fellowship. Perham emphasizes that this was easier because “those 
who had died were those whom they had known and honoured and loved in 
this life. The communion of saints meant fellowship not with distant figures of 
previous centuries and cultures but with contemporaries who had died for the 
faith and in the faith.”26 In short, the early church’s understanding of the com-
munion of saints was strongly rooted in a common life of shared activity.
Without love, however, place and work are insufficient to bind together 
a genuine community. Love is the third—and most important—bond of the 
membership. Berry’s members love their farms and their farming; they are 
“farmers by calling and by devotion.”27 Because of this, they also love one an-
other. Burley Coulter, credited with coining the term membership, exemplifies 
this bond of love through the changes of his life. In his younger, wayward 
days, he was a member because “the people who cared about him and were 
troubled by him” continued to want him to belong. That is, the love of others 
made and retained his membership. “Later, he was a member because he 
wanted to be,” caring about and caring for the membership.28 That care—
both as affection and as action—constitutes Burley’s love for “the daylit mem-
bership of kin and friends and households.”29
The love that binds the membership is not something that they produce, 
however; it is something in which they participate. When Jayber Crow has a 
vision in the Port William church of “all the people gathered there who had 
ever been there,” he says: “I seemed to love them all with a love that was mine 
merely because it included me.”30 Hannah Coulter helps us see that this sur-
rounding, including love is God’s love. She calls it the room of love: “The room 
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of love is the love that holds us all, and it is not ours. It goes back before we 
were born. It goes all the way back. It is Heaven’s. Or it is Heaven, and we are 
in it only by willingness. By whose love, Andy Catlett, do we love this world 
and ourselves and one another? Do you think we invented it ourselves? I ask 
with confidence, for I know you know we didn’t.”31 Hannah’s rhetorical ques-
tion to Andy reminds readers that love for the dead is sustained by the prac-
tice of remembering. Here, Berry helps Protestant Christians see that the 
Catholic practice of venerating saints might best be understood as a practice 
of loving memory, a re-membering that that is “a form of love.”32
Hannah Coulter brings together work and love and remembering when 
she reflects on what it means to do chores today that she first learned from 
and did with her Grandmam: “It is hard to say what it means to be at work 
and thinking of a person you loved and love still who did that same work 
before you and who taught you to do it. It is a comfort ever and always, like 
hearing the rhyme come when you are singing a song.”33
Through shared labor and love, Berry’s membership is bound together in 
ways tangible enough to bring awareness, comfort, and direction. Is there a 
correlate binding in the communion of saints? Do we adequately know, feel, 
and perform the bonds that constitute us as members of one another? The 
obvious correlate to the work of farming is our sharing in the labor of liturgy, 
the common work of worship that enacts and enables our love of God, elicit-
ing at the same time our love of one another. The problem is that few 
Christians now experience their lives as structured by and bound to worship 
in anything like the degree to which Berry’s membership find their lives 
shaped by farming. The love and labor of farming binds the membership to-
gether because it makes them who they are. Modern Christians, on the other 
hand, have identities authored by other labors and other loves, which leaves 
us, if not unbound, then at least imagining that we are connected by our deci-
sions and affections rather than by our common life. In reciting the Apostles’ 
Creed, we confess ourselves bound to the communion of saints, but, gener-
ally, we do this against appearances and experiences. Yet, occasionally, singing 
an old and favorite hymn, or praying an ancient prayer, we may experience 
the rhyme that Hannah Coulter names: us doing now in the same place what 
those we loved did here before us and taught us to do. Perhaps the most obvi-
ous “rhyme” of our Christian labor and love is the practice of baptism, as we 
now bind new members with the same words and action that bound us (and 
every Christian) to Christ and, thus, to one another.
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The Hereafter in the Here
The communio sanctorum lives in hope, which means that it “bears the faith 
conviction that death is not the end of the ‘communion of saints’; it extends 
beyond this age.”34 The creed suggests this by immediately mentioning three 
dimensions of the Christ future toward which we go: “the forgiveness of sins, 
the resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting.”
Do we find analogous hope and faith orienting the lives of Berry’s mem-
bers? Yes, though it is not always easy to perceive. There is a certain ambiva-
lence in the way members talk about final things. On the one hand, they of-
ten sing songs about heaven or life after death. For example, “Watch with 
Me” ends with the bedraggled neighbors singing “O the land of cloudless 
day,” and Jayber Crow tells us that he “loved to hear them sing ‘The Unclouded 
Day’ and ‘Sweet By and By.’”35 On the other hand, as Burley Coulter puts it 
in a letter to his nephew Nathan, the members’ “knack is for the Here” far 
more than it is “a knack for the Hereafter.” Burley goes on to say: “And surely 
the talk of a reunion in Heaven is thin comfort to people who need each 
other here as much as we do. I ain’t saying I don’t believe there’s a Heaven. I 
surely do hope there is. That surely would pay off a lot of mortgages. But I do 
say it ain’t easy to believe. And even while I hope for it, I’ve got to admit I’d 
rather go to Port William.”36 While Burley’s theme here is how little comfort 
talk of heaven provides in the immediate circumstance of a loved one’s death, 
his “I’d rather go to Port William” suggests that the primary orientation of the 
membership is not heaven but home. More important, Burley seems to sug-
gest that death is the end of real fellowship between the living and the dead.
Yet if we read Berry carefully—listening to Jayber Crow, Hannah Coulter, 
and Andy Catlett—we find that they hope in heaven and know that even now 
the membership includes “lives dead, living, yet to be.”37 Toward the end of 
his story, Jayber reminds us that it has been “a book about Heaven,” though 
it almost turned “out to be a book about Hell.” What has made it finally 
about heaven is forgiving love. Jayber tells how he has forgiven others—some 
of this forgiving easy, some “that was harder and took longer.” But, while he 
can forgive others, the question lingers whether and how he can be forgiven: 
“There is Hell enough, maybe, just in the knowledge of what you might call 
the leftovers of my life: things I might once have done that are now undoable, 
old wrongs, responsibilities unmet, ineradicable failures.” That same question 
holds for each member and for the membership as a whole: Will there finally 
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be enough forgiveness to make things right? In a sense, the answer has already 
been given to Jayber in two visions. In the first, napping in the back of the 
church building, he has a vision of the church gathered in and by an includ-
ing love. In the second, sitting in the quiet of the cemetery after a day of 
cleaning graves and remembering the dead, he sees “the community as it 
never has been and never will be gathered in this world of time. . . . I saw 
them all as somehow perfected, beyond time, by one another’s love, compas-
sion, and forgiveness as it is said we may be perfected by grace.” 38 In these 
visions, and in his life story, Jayber shares his hope that even now we live in a 
surrounding love that will finally make all things well.
Hannah Coulter’s story is of learning to live without expectation, though 
not without hope: “Love, after all, ‘hopeth all things.’ But maybe you must 
learn, and it is hard learning, not to hope out loud.” Not surprisingly, then, 
Hannah doesn’t often explicitly articulate her Christian hope. She does aver: 
“Some day there will be a new heaven and a new earth and a new Port 
William coming down from heaven.” She does speak of being “buried up on 
the hill at Port William beside Nathan, to wait for the Resurrection with him 
and the others.” Yet her orientation is primarily not to a hoped-for future but 
to the presence—even now—of eternity in time. In “telling over this story,” 
she brings into mind “the whole membership, living and dead.” Her mind 
itself “has started to become, it is close to being, the room of love where the 
absent are present, the dead are alive, time is eternal, and all the creatures 
prosperous.”39
The fullest expressions of hope in relation to the communio sanctorum 
come from Andy Catlett. On the final page of A World Lost, Andy names the 
members who have died. He then asks: “But how can I deny that in my belief 
they are risen?” He goes on to imagine them “waking, dazed, into a shadowless 
light in which they know themselves altogether for the first time.” This light 
is true and beautiful, and “in it they are loved completely, even as they have 
been, and so are changed into what they could not have been but what, if they 
could have imagined it, they would have wished to be.” In this passage, a 
member confesses belief in forgiveness, resurrection, and eternal life. Indeed, 
Andy’s imagination of risen life includes both final judgment and a purgatory 
of sorts. The light in which the risen find themselves “is merciless until they 
can accept its mercy; by it they are at once condemned and redeemed. It is 
Hell until it is Heaven. Seeing themselves in that light, if they are willing, 
they see how far they have failed the only justice of loving one another; it 
“The Membership Includes the Dead”  187
punishes them by their own judgment.”40 This is not far from Catholic theol-
ogy’s view of purgatory as when the dead “experience as a burning anguish 
their own lovelessness when faced with God’s love. Thereby they will be 
cleansed ‘as through fire’ (1 Cor. 3:15) by means of the infinite love of God 
that embraces and heals them.”41
For Andy, and I think for Berry too, it is crucial to notice that the tense 
of resurrection faith is not future but present: not “they will rise,” but “they 
are risen.” Resurrection is not so much a still future reality toward which the 
membership goes as a present reality for those who have died, a reality that 
permeates our present if we have eyes to see it. The description of the vision 
that concludes Remembering makes this clear. In the vision, Andy Catlett sees 
“Port William and its countryside as he never saw or dreamed them.” He sees 
the dead membership alive, beautiful, ripe, at peace. His resurrection vision is 
not of what will be but of what is: “He sees that they are the dead, and they 
are alive.” It is not what we will see at the coming of Christ and the general 
resurrection of the dead but what we can see now if we have eyes to see it: “He 
has come into the presence of these living by a change of sight.” What Andy 
perceives is the presence of eternity in time: “He has entered the eternal place 
in which we live in time.”42
In Jayber, Hannah, and Andy—Berry’s most theologically aware charac-
ters—we see that the Port William membership does not reject the hereafter 
in favor of the here but rather knows and celebrates the hereafter in the here. 
Their awareness of eternity’s presence in time is conditioned by memory and 
place and love. But it is an awareness of a reality that does not depend on 
memory, is not produced by longing, and is not confined to the mind. It is a 
real communion, very much like the early Christian understanding of the 
communio sanctorum as N. T. Wright describes it: “The church on earth be-
lieved itself privileged to enjoy an intimate fellowship with those who had 
gone on ahead. . . . Christians here are to be conscious of their communion 
with the redeemed in heaven, who have already experienced the fullness of 
the glory of Christ.”43
Berry’s profound vision of the membership of Port William offers the 
Christian church an opportunity to rediscover the meaning and significance 
of its own identity as communio sanctorum. Through the many stories that 
finally constitute their one story, these members remind us that we are given 
belonging, placed on common ground, bound together by the work of wor-
ship, and, thus, live each day in the company of immortals.
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Introduction: Christian Hope and Its Misrepresentation
Christian belief calls for a distinctive kind of hope, one directed toward the 
enrichment that God’s love does and will provide. Christian hope is an ex-
pression of the confidence that God’s love is powerful enough to make that 
enrichment possible. To state this compactly, Christians hope for God and in 
God. Such hope can enhance life, sustain it in the face of unavoidable tragedy, 
and foster the courage to face the many challenges life presents.
I have no doubt that this hope, with its twofold relation to God’s enrich-
ing and empowering love, has found expression in the lives of countless believ-
ers. But I also believe that Christian pastors, teachers, and theologians have 
sometimes failed this hope. The failure I have in mind is one of misrepresenta-
tion, a failure adequately to articulate its features and its reach and scope. 
Without a tedious catalog, let me briefly suggest some of those failures.
One misrepresentation would be that of subordination, if not neglect. I 
have in mind here the way hope has become something of a stepchild in the 
way the triad of Pauline Christian traits—faith, hope, and love—has been 
used to shape pastoral and theological concerns. To cite just one historical 
example, the Reformation-Counterreformation debates over the doctrine of 
justification stressed faith or love, with hope receiving minimal attention. 
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Another misrepresentation is a serious narrowing of its scope. Scripture envi-
sions a heavenly new creation, which includes a new earth, but the voices of 
homilists have often restricted hope to a concern for the salvation of indi-
viduals. The miraculous, world-transcending dimension of Christian hope 
has spawned more problems than simply the issue of hope’s scope and reach. 
Pastors and theologians have sometimes played off that transcendent dimen-
sion against worldly involvement. Much as this essay’s epigraph from Mayeroff 
captures the contrast between hopes that play off a rich future against an im-
poverished present, Christians have sometimes presented the hope for a tran-
scending end-time as an escape from the everyday. And, in reaction to such a 
distractive presentation of the eschatological dimension of Christian hope, 
Christian activists have often reduced its reach to one of worldly transforma-
tion. Recently, Christian futurists, trying to preserve the transcendent dimen-
sion of Christian hope while keeping its social relevance alive, have treated it 
as a revolutionary dynamic, constantly disrupting the present. This is a differ-
ent way of letting the discontinuities override possible continuities between 
present hopefulness and an imagined, boundless future.
It would be presumptuous to claim that Wendell Berry offers an antidote 
to all the misrepresentations of the twofold way that Christian hope relates to 
God and to the complexities of relating hope to this life and not merely the 
life to come. But it is my contention that his treatment is profoundly relevant 
to addressing the pastoral and theological quandaries and misrepresentations 
that attend any presentation of Christian hope. For one reason, he is a pro-
found student of love, the wellspring of Christian hope. Second, he is insis-
tent that proximate, localized relationships are the critical arena for imagining 
and discussing Christian invocations of God’s mysterious fullness. In this es-
say, I refer to this feature of his treatment of hope as its embedded character.
To indicate the relevance of Berry’s treatment of Christian hope I provide 
two discussions. First, after making some observations about hope in general 
and Christian hope in particular, I offer a detailed display of his embedded 
approach to hopefulness. I discuss the way natural, social, and spiritual dy-
namics contribute to his perspective. The second discussion offers a brief 
comparison of his approach to the treatment of Christian hope provided by 
Thomas Aquinas. The convergence and divergence I see between these differ-
ent Christian voices should indicate that Berry can offer a corrective to an 
authoritative treatment of the Christian virtue of hope.
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Clarifications: Christian Hope and General  
Features of Hoping
As I noted, Christian hope rests on some very specific claims about God. Yet 
the twofold relation of Christian hope to God and the classical association of 
Christian hope with virtues needs clarification. A brief look at the general 
features of hoping may help.1
All hopes express a desire for some good. But this general feature helps 
us to understand a specific hope only when we discover the specificity of the 
good in question and the importance with which that good is held. Ephem-
eral goods ground tepid, transient hopes, whereas vital goods spawn pro-
foundly intense hopes. One might think that very specific goods would fall 
into the ephemeral category, but that could mislead. It is true that some 
hopes for general goods are of such basic, wide-ranging importance that we 
do not sense the need to spell out the object of such a hope. For example, if 
one states that a person has “lost hope,” we generally mean that she has lost 
the hope of finding meaning and fulfillment. In such cases, the spelling out 
of the object of hope is unnecessary. But very specifically targeted hopes can 
also address vital, wide-ranging goods. Such is the case with Christian hope 
for God. Christians believe that it is important to specify that their hope 
is for the God who promises abundant life, yet that specifically targeted 
hope is properly understood to be for a good that is of fundamental, life- 
transforming importance.
Hopes relate to more than desired goods. Hopes, unlike wishes (which 
can entertain the fanciful or idle), express desire for goods we believe we may 
possibly realize. This belief rests on the existence of some power or agency 
deemed to have strength to achieve the good. The powers or agencies them-
selves can be diverse—natural powers of healing, those of human skills, and 
so forth—and the strength they possess can range from the weak to the over-
whelming. Thus, hopes vary, not only with regard to the importance of the 
good they target, but also in the degree of confidence they exhibit. So one can 
generalize that all hopes exhibit a double reference; they are both for some 
targeted good and invested in some power of the possible. What is unique 
about Christian hope is that the target and the agency of the possible overlap. 
It is God who provides both the goodness and the power to make Christian 
hope both profound and confident. I like the way the theologian Julian Hartt 
compactly captures this overlap. He observes: “Christian hope is properly 
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transcendental when one apprehends in faith the end toward which the whole 
creation is being moved as the very thing in which one’s own being is to be, is 
being perfected. . . . Christian hope thereby relates the actualities of self, soci-
ety and cosmos to an unseen reality.”2
Hartt observes what Berry will note in his view of “membership”: one 
cannot separate one’s own goodness from the whole goodness that God em-
braces. And he captures the overlapping double reference to God by noting 
that God is the “unseen reality” that both perfects and moves the seen reality 
in which one participates.
An additional feature of hoping that illuminates the unique character of 
Christian hope is its persistence. Some hopes not only have a durable, persist-
ing presence in a person’s affections and attitudes but also persist in a manner 
that shapes the very identity of that person. In such cases, we refer to the 
persons as hopeful. Of course, persons can be hopeful in an episodic way, be-
ing hopeful about a range of specific projects and events. Yet some persons 
have a stance toward life as such that can be designated as hopeful. We distin-
guish such a person from one who is typically despairing or presumptuous. 
Christian hope belongs in this class of hopes. Saint Thomas Aquinas treats 
faith, hope, and love as qualities having this persisting character. Thus, he and 
his fellow scholastics referred to these persisting qualities as virtues, compa-
rable to the moral qualities that persist to mark a person’s moral character. I 
use the term hopefulness to suggest this virtue-like quality, an affective disposi-
tion so rooted in a person’s psychology that it becomes a basic, persisting part 
of her identity. I believe that this is the kind of hope that Wendell Berry sees 
as appropriate to the reciprocities we experience and engage.
Berry’s Embedded Hopefulness: Hope Cycling  
into and toward God’s Love
I begin my discussion of Berry’s embedded hopefulness with a caution. My 
aim is to show how his account counters possible misrepresentations of 
Christian hope, and to do that it is imperative that I show how he embeds 
hopefulness in God’s love. Yet his account of such a love-shaped hope is some-
times difficult to discern precisely because it is embedded. He refuses to 
isolate our experience of hope in and for God from our more tangible experi-
ences of loving relationships. Berry apprehends reality as a dynamic complex-
ity in which various part-whole relationships exhibit a mutual reciprocity. As 
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he states it: “Each part is connected to every other part.” And those connec-
tions spawn effects that move “backward and forward, up and down, round 
and round, compounding and branching as they go.” His account of hopeful-
ness is one in which the enabling and enriching love of God moves in a 
“spherical network” of “concentricities.”3
This suggests that Berry wants to avoid any hierarchy of importance 
where only the last cycle, which explicitly invokes the divine, is the religious 
or spiritual component. Just to illustrate, in referring to “that Heaven of 
which we have heard,” he describes memories of his mother’s patient, forgiv-
ing love.4 Just so, as we peel back some of the layers of Berry’s embedded ac-
count of hopefulness, we must remember that each layer has its own integrity 
even as it cycles into larger relationships.
Hopefulness in the Cycle of Nature
Berry portrays nature as a place of hopefulness. Nature provides a horizon of 
goodness even as its resident powers enable us confidently to attend to its 
promise. He will not use my abstraction of nature to make this point. He 
explores the sexual and medical dimensions of being physical. Woodlands 
and flowing rivers are also prominent in his explorations of the natural world. 
His pronounced attention to agricultural life exhibits the goodness and en-
abling power of natural reality.
The agronomist Sir Albert Howard provides Berry with a metaphor for 
showing the dependence of farming on the goods and powers of the natural 
world. Howard refers to nature as the wheel of life, and Berry employs this 
metaphor to insist that farming must remain attentive to the particular cycles 
and limits of nature if the practice of farming is to yield nature’s goods over 
the long haul.5 Berry also speaks frequently of wilderness. Clearly, one sig-
nificance of wilderness follows Howard’s suggestion. The rhythms of wilder-
ness provide a cycle of limits and possible goods that are practically important 
for good farming. But, if the “wheel of life” is to inform our farming, it must 
be attended to in a sustained, attentive way. If nature’s wheel is not engaged 
in this disciplined way, the possible goods are exploited or abused. Thus, na-
ture can yield despairing or presumptuous responses without this discipline. 
What, then, does Berry mean by a disciplined practice?
Nature, social life, and our religious relation to mysterious wholeness of-
fer both the goods and the powers that can yield a virtue-like hopefulness. 
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But Berry is no romantic who believes that we easily recognize and nurture 
the possible goods in these intersecting reciprocities. We can tragically ig-
nore or confound the possible goodness in these relationships. Moreover, he 
is not a promethean who believes that, out of their own inherent rationality 
and power, humans can wrest possible goodness from the neutral dynamics 
of reality. Rather, disciplined practices become the mediators by which pos-
sible goodness is recognized and brought to fruition in our experience. But 
Berry does not convey the critical role of disciplined practices in an abstract 
way. He not only displays the role of practices by describing such practices 
as farming, marriage, and poetry but also lets a morally compelling account 
of the practice of marriage become his paradigm for discussing any particu-
lar disciplined practice. So let us return to the example of farming and see 
how its marriage-like qualities can disclose the enrichments and possibili-
ties that ground hopefulness.
Berry farms some marginal, sloping land. But he is committed to making 
that farm flourish, attentive to and appreciative of the good gifts that land can 
yield. So fidelity and humble, attentive knowing inform the way he engages 
the land. He decides that a dam bulldozed carefully into one of his hillsides 
would contribute to the land. But the thoughtful pond-building project fails. 
He misread the limits of the land, and the broken dam damages or wounds 
the land. There was no presumption in his pond building. He was attentive 
in his attempt; still, his knowledge was inadequate. Having failed the land, he 
finds that the possibility of capitulating to those limits looms large.6 But Berry 
does not despair; his fidelity to the land and his trust that there are powers in 
nature to heal the wounds he has inflicted sustain his relationship to that 
land. The hope is difficult because the temptations to presumption and de-
spair remain. But nature’s goodness and enabling capacity sustain his mar-
riage-like farming, and his marriage-like farming enables those possible goods 
to reemerge.
Berry’s sensitivity to the need for morally attuned practices in order for 
the goods of nature to be experienced and protected explains some of his ag-
ricultural critiques. Industrial agriculture ignores the limits that must be ob-
served if the goods and enabling powers of nature are to be respected. 
Embedded hopefulness is schooled by the real but limited powers operative 
in nature and the real but limited goodness that nature provides. Industrial 
agriculture is fueled by presumptive practices and becomes destructive of the 
land and the communities that nourish marriage-like farming. His critique of 
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scientism has the same backdrop. Berry is not opposed to science. He knows 
that generalized knowing of nature needs to be gathered, stored, and utilized. 
But the scientific method can be used to destroy other forms of wisdom that 
are born of communal traditions of wisdom and care. Faithful attentiveness is 
required to experience nature’s healing goods and to respect its resilient but 
limited powers. Scientific appeals to value neutrality can obscure the practices 
required to see nature as a place of hope.7
I conclude this examination of how Berry sees the dynamics of nature 
related to the goods and possibilities that nurture hopefulness by returning to 
the theme of wilderness. I indicate above that Berry sees more than nature’s 
practical guidance in wilderness. It is also a venue for mediating a sense of the 
mysterious holiness of existence. The Sabbath poems are a good illustration of 
this. Berry certainly cherishes the value of good work that is nurtured by the 
discipline of farming, but these poems express his recognition that we also 
need a retreat from the practical. Wilderness can offer such a sense of the 
transcendent. That is one reason why he insists that the Bible is an “outdoor 
book”; it calls attention to a holiness that is not isolated from any of our 
natural or social engagements.8 Wilderness can lift the imagination to a sense 
of enriching possibilities that temporal conditions and social commitments 
preclude. A good illustration is the way Jayber Crow and Mattie Chatham 
expand the horizons of their loving relationship by sharing the mystery yield-
ed by a patch of wilderness, tellingly named the Nest Egg.9
To summarize, nature is dynamic. Its rhythms harbor guidance to the 
good gifts of land. Our disciplined attentiveness to those rhythms makes na-
ture itself a place of hopefulness. But nature points beyond itself because it is 
also the place of God. Nature, like intimate love, harbors the miraculous to 
yield a greater, more unbounded hopefulness.
Hopefulness and the Cycle of Social Life
There is significant symmetry between the way the goods and powers of na-
ture require appropriate disciplines to foster hopefulness and the way social 
relationships depend on disciplines to provide a pathway to hopefulness. I 
will touch briefly on Berry’s treatment of social life and temporality, provide 
an illustration where Berry’s sensitivity to tragedy and death is evident, and 
close with the way social relationships can evoke a sense of the holy. My aim 
is, in parallel to the previous section, to show how social relationships can be 
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places of hopefulness even as they shape the Christian imagination to sense a 
greater whole for their loving.
A recent writer has argued that we face a sharp choice with regard to ex-
periencing time. No one, he claims, can avoid sensing the past as utterly gone. 
Our only choice is to regard the present either as a means to an unbounded 
field of improvement or a brief moment of meaningful defiance of an inexo-
rable, arbitrary future.10 Berry would reject this manner of describing our 
temporality. It is not a matter of choosing between a stark optimism or pes-
simism; rather, it is the way we handle our “littleness” in the midst of the great 
sweep of natural and historical powers. On the one hand, we can capitulate 
to our smallness and give in to despair, becoming either passive subjects to the 
flow of time or defiant, destructive rebels. On the other hand, we can engage 
in the opposite but equally untenable ignoring of our limited but real “au-
thorship,” in which case we become presumptuous. Berry suggests that there 
is another path. We can accept our partiality as part of a larger whole that 
graces us. In such a case, the person “sees the truth, recognizes his true heir, 
honors his forebears and his heritage, and gives blessings to his successors. He 
embodies the passing of human time, living and dying within the limits of 
grief and joy.”11
This pathway of hopefulness differs from the alternatives of optimism 
and pessimism. Berry refuses to let our partiality be turned into an isolated 
individualism. Just as we are part of the wheel of natural life, so are we parts 
of a social wheel—connected in limited but real ways to the past and the fu-
ture. Just as disciplined practices enable us to respect nature’s cycling as a 
template for receiving limited but real gifts, so do disciplines that honor our 
heritage and our faithful relations to unknown future generations foster a 
hopefulness that guards our limited powers of authorship from squandering 
stances of presumption or despair.
Berry’s sensitivity to limits does not yield to hopelessness. Yet he refuses 
to offer an account of hopefulness that is blind to the fragility of our lives. 
There is no better way to illustrate this sensitivity than to show how some of 
his characters deal with tragedy, defeat, and death.
Berry’s story of Ernest Finley and Ida Chopp illustrates the way marriage 
can sustain hopefulness in the face of tragic death. But it also illustrates how 
a hope can be illusory and lead to a tragic retreat from social bonds. Ernest is 
one of the interesting bachelors who populate Berry’s fiction.12 The tragedy in 
Ernest’s case is that he cannot overcome a grievous loss to his wholeness. 
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Crippled by war, Ernest returns with a wound that is more than physical. As 
Berry puts it, he is “defeated” by his lameness. There is no destructive lashing 
out against this defeat, nor does he presumptuously ignore his limitation. But 
he lets the wound direct his life, and he builds a realm of social possibility that 
gives in to that wound. Ernest builds his life around his considerable skill as 
a carpenter. But his life is like his little carpentry shop, built to accommodate 
his lameness. To be sure, he attains a social “membership”—he is a cherished 
family member and respected craftsman. But his work does not carry him 
into deep exchanges of friendship or marriage or flow beyond itself to build 
its own, fuller place. In a revealing description, Berry notes that he “perfects 
his silence.”13
Ida Chopp is also wounded. Violence, in the form of a natural disaster, 
has killed her only child and driven away her husband, Gideon, in a grief-
stricken attempt to escape his wound. Ida does not let her wounds prevail. 
Marriage and shared work have opened her to a life of enriching possibility. 
In resuming her daily chores and daily visits to an empty mailbox, she main-
tains a fidelity to those goods that shape her hopefulness. Even though her 
world is damaged, she refuses to despair. To recall Berry’s parameters of social 
life, she lives hopefully “within the limits of grief and joy.”
Ernest’s and Ida’s lives intersect when community leaders assign Ernest to 
help repair the flood-damaged buildings on the Chopp homestead. Exposed 
to Ida’s appeal, industry, and hospitality, Ernest allows himself to imagine 
their relationship becoming a marriage of mutual love and shared nurturing 
of a place. He knows deep down that Ida’s fidelity makes his hope illusory, but 
his need for intimacy and wider membership is too powerful to resist. At the 
same time, this false hope has revealed the shortcomings of his previous social 
connections. Berry describes Ernest as “caught” between a restricted world 
and an illusory world. When that visited mailbox finally rewards Ida with a 
letter from Gideon, Ernest sees no alternative to his two, failed social worlds. 
As Gabriel Marcel, the philosopher of hope and despair, would say, he saw his 
future as all “plugged up.”14 Ernest’s suicide is tragic, and I think we can even 
describe it as a case of social despair. But I do not think Berry would call it a 
case of complete despair. The manner of Ernest’s suicide affirms his bodily 
connection to the earth, and Berry, who refuses to let our imaginations final-
ize death, sees the ground as “the body’s bride.”15 Ernest Finley affirms a pos-
sible goodness in serving the earth with his death, but that death also signals 
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Berry’s sensitivity to the power of wounds, the ones we inflict and the ones we 
suffer.
Gabriel Marcel suggests that hopefulness emerges only when we have 
been genuinely tempted to despair.16 I am not sure that Berry would concur, 
but he is certainly attentive to the way partialities can beckon us beyond their 
boundaries. He insists that we acknowledge and respect limits even as he cau-
tions us to not let those limits trap our lives and imaginations. We noted this 
in the case of wilderness. Wilderness offers its own beauty and power, but it 
can also transport us into the enrichment and power of holiness. The same is 
true of our social relationships of faithful love. A mother’s love can be a venue 
for the transcendent. Hannah Coulter will look back on her marriage with 
Nathan, dwelling on the losses, difficulties, and joys that marked it. Then she 
declares: “This love would be one of the acts of the greater love that holds and 
cherishes all the world.”17 Social life offers its own gifts, which empower and 
enrich. We can hope in and for our own loves. Yet those loves call us into holy 
mystery. Or as Berry states it:
Nothing
is given that is not
Taken, and nothing taken
That was not first gift.
The gift is balanced by
its total loss, and yet,
And yet the light breaks in,
Heaven seizing its moments
That are at once its own
and yours.18
Hopefulness and the God-World Cycle
The reference to a God-world cycle is another abstraction open to misinterpre-
tation. It is simply meant to convey the way Berry holds God’s transcendence 
and presence in a dynamic interaction with the interactions that define the 
world. I have illustrated his refusal to let God’s transcendence lead to a dual-
ism that isolates God from the dynamics of nature and social life. In an in-
sightful study, the theologian P. Travis Kroeker describes Berry’s Christian 
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thought as “sacramental” and “radically incarnational.”19 Those theological 
categories are helpful as long as they capture the part-whole dynamic used to 
portray a divine reality at once present and transcendent. Wary of both ab-
stractions and theological labels, Berry describes himself as a “bottom up” 
religious thinker and elaborates on that approach by noting: “To preserve our 
places and to be at home in them, it is necessary to fill them with imagina-
tion. To imagine as well as see what is in them. . . . To see them with the 
imagination as belonging to the Creation. . . . In that imagining, perhaps we 
may begin to see it in its sacredness, as unimaginable gift, as mystery—as it 
was, is, and ever shall be, world without end.”20
In exploring Berry’s explicitly religious imagination, it is imperative to 
keep in mind his sustained critique of a dualism that would shut down the 
role he ascribes to the Christian imagination. Berry will let things stand on 
their own, but never divorced from imagining them as gifts and possibilities 
of the holy. Christian hopefulness is directed toward and invested in God’s 
love. If I am going to claim Berry’s account of hopefulness as Christian, I 
must show that it is rooted in an understanding of God’s love. An evocation 
of divine love raises the question of what theologians call eschatology, a con-
sideration of the last things or, more helpfully, the consummation of all things. 
In recalling Julian Hartt’s summary account of Christian hope, I suggested 
that God’s perfecting culminates in an end, a finality. I have noted Berry’s 
penchant for the eschatological reference to the heavenly, which raises the 
question of whether his insistence on the inextricable relationship between 
the earthly and the heavenly leaves him with a compromised eschatology.21 
Stated more simply, does Berry tie God’s consummating mystery too closely 
to his grasp of the worldly? I believe my answers will foster the conclusion 
that he provides us with a Christian view of hopefulness that is invested in the 
enabling and enriching love of God and, further, a view that does not com-
promise God’s consummating work.
An exploration of Berry’s imaginative vision of the holy must first ac-
knowledge his refusal to reference only Christian sources. Berry ranges wide-
ly over religious and nonreligious sources to explain the integrated reciproci-
ties he portrays. Chinese, Islamic, and especially Buddhist allusions dot his 
works. But this openness does not result in some amorphous spirituality or 
hydra-headed religious eclecticism. He firmly embraces the Christianity he 
was “born to.”22 This serious engagement with his inherited religious place 
surfaces in many ways. Christian poets like Dante, Milton, and Herbert are 
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important resources for Berry’s Christian imagination. But one is most struck 
by his rich knowledge and use of the Bible. One repeated reference, for ex-
ample, is to a passage in the book of Job (34:14–15) in which the dependence 
of the world’s existence on the presence of God’s spirit is professed. But I find 
the most telling scriptural resource for his Christian vision to be the Gospel 
of John. He tells us quite forcefully: “I take literally the statement in the 
Gospel of John that God loves the world. I believe that the world was created 
and approved by love, that it subsists, coheres and endures by love. I believe 
that divine love, incarnate and indwelling in the world, summons the world 
toward wholeness, which ultimately is reconciliation and atonement.”23 This 
biblically based theology of divine love helps explain some of the “embedded” 
or “interpenetrating” connections I have indicated. Wilderness can transport 
a human love to a level of mystery because that mystery is affirmed to express 
divine love. Nature can be imagined as a realm of gift giving because it ex-
presses and coheres in a greater economy of love. And his mother’s love and 
Hannah Coulter’s love can be designated as heavenly because they both ex-
press and beckon toward that greater love. Berry’s character Hannah makes 
utterly clear that her worldly love opens her to God’s love. She states that the 
mystery of God’s presence creates a “room of love” where the “absent are pres-
ent, the dead are alive, time is eternal and all the creatures prosperous.”24
Berry will describe himself as a “marginal” Christian. I think this may be 
due to the fact that he resists so strongly the dualistic Protestantism in which 
he was raised.25 But I would resist the view that his theology of love is mar-
ginal. The love at the center of this theology makes Christian hopefulness vi-
able, for it is God’s love that enriches, and it is God’s love that opens the 
possibility of that enrichment under the conditions of limitation or under 
conditions of unbounded fullness. Berry’s God-world cycle is a reciprocal 
movement of love and, therefore, a cycle that fosters hopefulness.
I turn now to the theological issue of Berry’s eschatology. I suspect that 
way of putting the problem makes it sound very academic, something for 
armchair Christian thinkers to debate. But the implications for Christian be-
lief and practice are real. Pastoral conversations at bedsides and funeral ser-
mons are not armchair matters. Does divine love actually shatter the finality 
of death, or is eschatological language only a collection of metaphors that 
remind us of a life well lived? More to the point, does Berry so fear dualism 
and so insist on world-God connectedness that a consummation beyond all 
limits is untenable for him? To start, it must be clear that Berry has serious 
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reservations about how the final consummation is sometimes portrayed. He 
remarks that some of his boyhood exposures to views of the end-time were 
“bloodcurdling.”26 Such alienating eschatological views may explain his sym-
pathy for the way his fellow Kentuckian artist Harlan Hubbard could quite 
literally declare of the local woodlands: “This is Heaven.”27 But it would be a 
mistake to put Berry’s references to heaven on the same level as Hubbard’s. 
The numerous ways in which Berry invokes heaven, including those I have 
noted and others unmentioned—like Jayber Crow’s reference to the book 
about his life being a book “about Heaven”—are more subtle.28 He is making 
a point about knowledge and imagination. He is not denying the possible 
existence of some consummating, boundless blessedness. Nor is he really en-
dorsing Hubbard’s willingness to collapse the unseen into the seen. He is 
making his often-repeated religious point that life cannot be understood 
without the larger horizon of divine love and that, without experience of 
woodlands, gifts of the land, intimate love, and a mother’s patience, we can-
not make sense of a love that surpasses seen reality. In technical terms, he is 
making a point about religious epistemology. He states, for example, that he 
refuses to let his religious imagination carry him “beyond” what he knows 
about the earth, but in the next breath he insists that his religious imagination 
must go “through” the earth.29
Berry affirms: “Beyond reach of thought / Let imagination figure your 
hope.”30 He realizes that the full reach of God’s love goes beyond thought to 
depend on an imagination figured by our experience of tangible love. At the 
same time, it would be presumptuous to finalize our experiences of love and 
isolate them from a transcendent implication. The Christian philosopher Paul 
Ricouer makes the same point. Commenting on the Christian use of eschato-
logical language, he suggests that such language follows the “law of super-
abundance.” That is, it addresses the unreachable fullness of God’s working by 
denying or removing any restriction or contradiction we know from our ex-
perience of abundance. So, in effect, we move from known abundance to the 
unknowable abundance by removing all negativities.31 Berry’s funding of the 
Christian imagination follows a similar pattern. There is no collapse of the 
transcendent into the worldly, nor is there any presumptuous finalizing of the 
worldly.
My exploration of the interwoven strands of Berry’s spherical network of 
reciprocities is now complete. Each strand is relevant to understanding his 
view of Christian hopefulness. But the interweaving of the strands into his 
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Christian convictions about God’s love is the core. That divine love is enrich-
ing and beckoning of a greater enrichment. But that love is also empowering. 
It opens possibilities even in the face of our known limits. It is a compelling 
view of Christian hope in and for God. Its worth will be even more visible if 
we compare it to an authoritative theological account of the virtue of Christian 
hope.
Saint Thomas Aquinas: A Transcendent but Narrowed 
Hope in and for God
In many ways, this is a curious juxtaposition. I do not know of any direct 
dependence of Berry’s on the medieval giant of Scholastic theology. Berry 
does write on the great chain of being, an intellectual tradition that shaped 
Thomas and the Thomistic tradition. But that does not build a bridge be-
tween their projects. Perhaps no Christian projects are more disparate: a con-
temporary Christian artist and critic intent on shaping the Christian imagi-
nation in relation to very concrete relationships, and a medieval Christian 
intellectual attempting to combine scriptural insights, Augustinian theology, 
and a freshly discovered ancient philosophy into an instructional instrument. 
Different projects indeed.
Yet each is a serious Christian, and each is trying to make sense of how 
critical Christian traits should be understood and connected. It can be in-
structive to juxtapose disparate Christian voices whose projects overlap, par-
ticularly when one, like Thomas, has founded a long and respected way of 
approaching and articulating the features of Christian hope.
The convergence I discuss centers on the twofold reference of Christian 
hope to God’s love. Berry is not particularly interested in the analytic maneu-
vers involved in showing that double reference. He simply employs it, show-
ing how God’s love enables and summons even as it provides foretastes of its 
enriching wholeness. Thomas, however, is a theologian for whom analytic 
distinctions are a critical stock in trade. What is interesting in the case of 
Thomas is that he initially did not see the need for or the importance of fea-
turing this double reference. But he does develop it, to some extent against 
the grain of his own systematic tendencies.
Initially, Thomas features one reference to God. His initial work treats 
Christian hope as a hope for God. This is understandable. He adopts a gen-
eral approach that shows all reality in a profound arc of returning movement. 
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All reality is on an unfolding journey of return to God. Couple this vision 
with a philosophical method that explained movement and behavior in terms 
of fulfillment of a built-in, defining purpose, and one can understand why his 
treatment of discrete topics is so end oriented, so teleological. To illustrate, 
the three theological virtues are understood as sequential, ever developing 
stages in a trajectory culminating in ultimate blessedness. It is no surprise that 
he first treats hope exclusively in terms of the desire for the ultimate good that 
God provides. To be sure, that goodness is also qualified as difficult, future, 
and possible. But the stress remains on God as the appropriate target of our 
longing for our own good. There is no special spelling out of what enables 
that movement toward God. God’s attractive desirability (as the generous 
Good) is deemed sufficient.32
Thomas’s later discussions of Christian hope indicate a decided shift. God 
is no longer just the singular, yet-to-be-realized end of hope. He is also the 
enabling power on whom the believer relies, the helper to whom the believer 
adheres. It is clear that it was not an easy shift to make, as is evidenced by the 
shifting technical vocabulary for presenting God as both present helper and 
yet-to-be-realized good. In one comment, Thomas simply states that Christian 
hope has “two objects,” a significant remark for a systematic thinker who has 
stressed the singularity of ends. In that same treatise, he designates one object 
as “formal” and the other as “material.”33 He shifts his terminology to the 
arena of causation in his most famous work, calling God’s blessedness the 
“final cause” and God’s help the “efficient cause.”34 Some commentators 
might find this shifting categorization troublesome, but I think that it simply 
evidences a significant change that he would not forgo simply on the grounds 
that it was awkward to describe. Thomas does not explain why he makes this 
shift, but I find Bernard Lonergan’s suggestion persuasive. Lonergan notes 
that Thomas became increasingly sensitive to the charge of semi-Pelagianism, 
a charge that believers were not portrayed as sufficiently dependent on God’s 
present and operative grace.35 There is a bit more to state about how Thomas 
uses Aristotle’s views on friendship to introduce this second reference to God, 
but the point here is clear. Thomas is willing to alter a systematic tendency 
and method in order to make a more important theological point. Berry and 
Thomas converge on the important Christian stance that its hope must dis-
play a twofold character, confidence in the power of God’s love to open pos-
sibilities and the enriching quality of that same love.
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The approaches diverge on the important issue of how the self relates its 
own good to the full goodness that God’s love encompasses. Thomas relates 
Christian hope to a regard for one’s own good that is separate from regard for 
the goodness of others. And the help from God that grounds the confidence 
in possibility that is expressed in Christian hope is also narrowly focused on 
the subject of hope. To put it in Berry’s terminology, Thomas lets the partial-
ity of Christian hopefulness be understood apart from the wholeness in which 
that partiality participates.
This narrowing of the concern that informs Christian hope stems from 
an effort to give a completing primacy to the Christian virtue of love, of cari-
tas. Faith begins an abiding stance because it opens the believer to the truth 
of God’s goodness. Since faith grasps the fullness of that goodness, it never 
departs from the relationship of believer with God. But the virtue of hope is 
presented in a gateway role. The subject of hope sees that divine goodness 
solely through the lens of self-fulfillment. And the divine help that opens the 
possibility of self-flourishing is portrayed in terms of a form of secondary 
friendship, a friendship that Aristotle portrayed as solely based on the mutual 
seeking of self-advantage. Given this narrowed focus on the self and its lim-
ited function of moving the believer into the higher relationship of full love 
with God, the virtue of hope dissipates and disappears once the virtue of love 
with and for God is realized. The blessed can maintain hope for others, but 
that hopefulness would arise from the virtue of love, not the now unnecessary 
virtue of hope.36
There is nothing amiss in the aim to highlight the primacy of God’s en-
compassing love. The misrepresentation of Christian hope arises because 
hopefulness is not fully integrated with the form of that love. If Berry and 
Hartt are correct that the believer must grasp his or her goodness in terms of 
a love that is and will make all things flourish, then a separation of self and 
other distorts the goodness that God offers. Nor can God’s gracious, enabling 
love be grasped as focused on one’s own well-being in a narrowing way that 
ignores the plenitude of that grace. Logically, one cannot hope for what has 
been realized, but, if the self is connected to a larger wholeness, as Berry in-
structs us, then one’s own goodness is forever bound up with the time-bound 
and time-transcending flourishing of the whole creation.
The separation of the individual’s goodness from a grasp of the larger real-
ity of social and natural dynamics is not typical of Thomas.37 Yet his integra-
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tion of hopefulness with God’s empowering and enriching love perpetuates a 
misrepresentation of Christian hope.
The importance of Berry’s embedded treatment of Christian hopefulness 
is visible in the corrective it provides. For Berry, the place of God is a place of 
hopefulness because the place of God is a place of love. God’s love empowers 
a plenitude of possibility, and God’s love draws our partiality into the healing, 
flourishing mystery of wholeness. Berry’s treatment of Christian hopefulness 
is an abiding contribution to the shaping of the Christian imagination and to 
Christian reflection on that virtue.
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One of the nice things about war, at least from the American perspective, is 
that it offers a comfortable sense that violence is localized and that its locale 
is over there. This secret comfort usually comes with a sense that the violence 
is also inevitable, which means that it is doubly important to keep over there, 
where it is engaged in by foreigners and people in uniforms. So much of the 
initially enthusiastic Christian response to the current war in Iraq seemed to 
rest on those assumptions. But there are good reasons for Christians to ques-
tion both these descriptions of the violence we meet in the world. Most vio-
lence is, in fact, neither so neatly localizable nor so comfortingly inevitable. I 
want to explore the possibility of alternatives to that neatness and that com-
fort by holding up for examination a case of violence that is much harder to 
look at, precisely because of its ubiquity and its apparent inevitability as a 
component in the lives of those of us who don’t wear uniforms. That example 
is electricity—and, more specifically, the radically extractive method of pro-
ducing electricity-generating coal known as mountaintop removal, in which 
the tops of mountains are simply sheared off in order to expose coal deposits 
beneath.
Violence in Appalachia
In the summers of 1920 and 1921, southern West Virginia was the scene of 
some of the most historically significant and at the same time largely unre-
membered domestic unrest in U.S. history. I myself was raised in West 
Virginia and first learned the particulars of it only as a nearly grown man in a 
movie theater during a showing of Matewan, John Sayles’s cinematic vision of 
the seminal events of what would later be called the mine wars. The Battle of 
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Matewan, between union coal miners and Baldwin-Felts private detectives 
who had been hired in this particular case to evict union miners from com-
pany housing, resulted in the death of several men, including the mayor of 
the town of Matewan, and made a folk hero of the police chief, Sid Hatfield 
(yes, he was one of those Hatfields). Hatfield was later indicted on murder 
charges in nearby McDowell County and shot, as they say, in cold blood by 
company detectives on the McDowell courthouse steps. This, in combination 
with the imprisonment by the Logan County sheriff of some union organiz-
ers, led to the climax of this particular mine war at the Battle of Blair Moun-
tain. There, union miners had a full-scale engagement with the military of the 
U.S. government, having disregarded an ultimatum from President Warren 
G. Harding to return to their homes.
One would think that such a momentous event as an armed insurrection 
would have been on prominent display in the required West Virginia history 
class that we all took as eighth graders here. It was not. This is not to say that 
I had no idea that strange and violent things had taken place in the process of 
taking, for example, my coal-mining grandfather from abject poverty to rela-
tive prosperity over a period of fifty years or so. There were, I was told, occa-
sions when it was necessary for him and others to travel to work armed with 
rifles. There was another in which he himself had beaten a mine foreman to 
within an inch of his life for admonishing my one-armed great-grandfather 
over the speed (or lack thereof ) with which he loaded his coal. And there was 
yet another, decades later, in which that same foreman showed up on my 
grandfather’s front porch seeking his forgiveness for years of workplace abuse.
These stories—both the larger story of the United Mine Workers of 
America and the more personal ones involving my grandfather—were and in 
a certain sense still are stories that seemed to take place on another planet. 
They seem alien, not only because of the nakedness and the nearness of their 
violence, but also because most of us have very little real experience with the 
kind of poverty that might lead to such violence. But, more than that, I think 
that the stories seem alien because most of us would rather not face the his-
tory of violence that makes our current consumption of electricity possible. 
Light-switch tripping is, in a certain sense, underwritten by the sorts of vio-
lence that I’ve related only in skeletal form here, which is only another way of 
saying that electricity runs on coal and that, to a certain extent, coal runs on 
bygone violence. The violence of the mine wars, the violence of previous 
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schemes to deprive Appalachians of the mineral rights to their lands (an in-
justice that has never been meaningfully put right), the violence of workplace 
injustice and the struggle to right it even after the unions had been estab-
lished for several decades are all what we might call the constitutive violences of 
the coal and electric power industries.
I’ve described these constitutive violences as bygone, and there is a cer-
tain sense in which that is true. They happened before most of us were born. 
The original subjects of the outrageous injustices of early coal mining are for 
the most part dead. There is, of course, another sense in which the violences 
are ongoing. The fact that West Virginians tend to benefit so very little in 
real terms from coal is one set of examples of this. Given the richness of the 
natural resources in places like West Virginia and the dramatic need for those 
resources outside the state, one might expect that public universities in such 
places would rival the Ivy League. They do not. One might further expect 
that the last thing such places would require is state-funded taxing of the 
poor and unwise in the form of gambling to subsidize the state budget. But, 
strangely, they do. So there is a sense in which coal continues, in my view, to 
do violence to the place from which it is extracted. But to make that point 
in this way is to invite more controversy than one might want. Some might 
take issue with my accounting of what benefits ought to accrue to the deni-
zens of such places in view of our capitalist political economy. Others, wiser 
in my estimation than the first group, would point out that there could be 
great harm done to West Virginians, Kentuckians, and Montanans (to name 
only a few examples) in having them become subnational versions of the 
United Arab Emirates. Such a situation would improve them financially, 
but, taken alone, that form of improvement tends not to produce any other 
improvements.
The other problem is that this sort of violence remains hidden because it 
is clothed in relative prosperity. The violence is no longer naked in the way it 
was ninety or one hundred years ago and is, therefore, more difficult to talk 
about. People in Appalachia and elsewhere really are and have been fed, 
clothed, and sheltered well by their work in the coal mines. That is why we 
don’t talk about Blair Mountain in the eighth grade. The fact that this is mea-
ger recompense is easy to hide in the face of having such necessities met. So 
the violence of coal has been, up until very recently, difficult to describe, even 
for the people who have inherited it in Appalachia.
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I say up until very recently because, in the past several years, the violence 
has once again become naked. The landscape has once again become alien in 
a way that those who observe it cannot fail to recognize. Just as the story of 
Blair Mountain shocks us into the knowledge of past violence, so mountain-
top-removal methods of coal extraction make our experience of our own 
landscape interplanetary. Mountaintop removal is a relatively new process for 
gaining access to coal seams using so-called drag line equipment. This is a 
process in which, as one might expect, mountaintops are simply sliced off in 
what can be described only as a kind of radical terraforming. This reshaping 
of the landscape is made all the more jarring by the concomitant process of 
valley filling. Again, the practice is well named. When one cuts off the top of 
a mountain to reach a coal seam and has removed the coal, there’s a great deal 
of former mountain stuff left over. This is disposed of by depositing it in for-
mer streambeds, thus filling in what had been a valley. It’s hard to imagine 
more intensive rearrangements of local mountain landscapes than the kind 
that mountaintop-removal coal extraction entails.
But it would be a mistake, and an intellectually dishonest one, to regard 
that rearrangement as somehow self-evidently evil. Landscapes are certainly 
wonderful things to look at, but it seems an open question whether the pres-
ervation of a scenic vista should stand in the way of any use of the land, even 
if that use radically transforms it. One of the things that has to be resisted, it 
seems to me, is the knee-jerk impulse to keep things in the natural world ex-
actly the way they are in order to continue looking at them. There’s a kind of 
eco-pornographic vision going on in that kind of reaction that, rather than 
regarding the natural world as the site of an interaction that produces mutual 
benefits (say, in the way that farming does or used to), views the natural world 
(as though we could regard it as another world) as something simply to be 
viewed, an image or object that can be regarded without having to undergo 
the risk of real relationship with it. Now, the kind of interaction that moun-
taintop removal entails might seem so destructive and radically transforma-
tive of the land as to fail as an example of a mutually beneficial relationship 
between human beings and the so-called natural world. It certainly seems 
that way to me, but it’s a controversial point.
Far less controversial is the idea that such landscapes cannot be attacked 
in such a way without doing violence to things other than the landscape itself. 
One simply cannot remove the top of a mountain and fill in a nearby stream-
bed without disrupting other things. Those other things are, invariably, hu-
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man communities. Consider the following assessment of that disruption: 
“The impact of mountaintop removal on nearby communities is devastating. 
Dynamite blasts needed to splinter rock strata are so strong they crack the 
foundations and walls of houses. Mining dries up an average of 100 wells a 
year and contaminates water in others. In many coalfield communities, the 
purity and availability of drinking water are keen concerns. Blasting and 
shearing mountains have added to the damage done to underground aquifers 
by deep mines.”1
It’s hard to imagine a more fundamental devastation for a community to 
absorb than one that attacks its ability to have shelter and to drink safely. To 
refer to such devastation as an environmental problem is, in a certain sense, to 
miss the point. It isn’t an attack on something around human beings—their 
environs. It is an attack on the human beings themselves and involves them 
at the level of their livelihood just as surely as the early labor wars did. It is in 
this sense, as well as the more literal one of landscape destruction, that the 
strange violence of electricity production has once again become undeniable 
in its visibility and in its power to alienate human beings from their own 
landscapes by making them simply uninhabitable. Someone has violence done 
to them when we trip light switches and always has. Only inattention can any 
longer keep that violence invisible.
Christianity and Inevitable Violence
Now that’s a depressing story if one takes it seriously. It’s even more depress-
ing if that seriousness is honest in admitting that each of us is implicated in 
it. Most of us use lots of electricity, even those who know about its violence, 
and the truth is that most of us don’t know how to stop doing so. What’s 
worse is that this business with electricity is only one example of a kind of 
violence that makes our lives as they are currently shaped possible. We seem 
to have a similar problem with oil, paper, national security, and corn. Our 
lives are constructed in such a way that we can’t imagine them without a great 
many things that seem impossible to procure without supporting all kinds of 
violence that we would normally deplore. The deplorability becomes even 
more intense (one hopes) when the “we” in question is “we Christian minis-
ters and laypeople.” This raises the question of how we narrate such violence 
in light of the life and teaching of Jesus of Nazareth. In other words, how do 
we who claim to understand the world through the cross of Christ and hope 
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to have our lives shaped by anticipation of Christ’s Kingdom account for the 
fact that so many (apparently fundamental) components of our lives are 
dependent on the kinds of violence that Christ refused? Or, put more sim-
ply, how do we respond to the apparent inevitability of the violence in our 
lives? I’d like to think about that question with the help of a writer who has 
spent considerable time wrestling with it and others similar in kind, Wendell 
Berry.
One might almost say that Berry takes such a question as the engine for 
his whole authorship. Certainly, if you began to read Berry, as I did, with 
“Why I Am Not Going to Buy a Computer” and its companion piece, 
“Feminism, the Body and the Machine,” you will have seen its importance in 
understanding not only his work but also a great deal of modern life and its 
neglected dependencies. “Why I Am Not Going to Buy a Computer” begins 
modestly enough with the following description of Berry’s own situation: 
“Like almost everyone else, I am hooked to the energy corporations, which I 
do not admire. I hope to become less hooked to them. In my work, I try to 
be as little hooked to them as possible. As a farmer, I do almost all of my work 
with horses. As a writer, I work with a pencil or a pen and a piece of paper.”2
Berry goes on to narrate for his readers the pressure to deepen his connec-
tion to the energy corporations by beginning to employ a computer. He 
claims that “a number of people” have tried to convince him of the usefulness 
of such a switch (one might imagine that this is the same “number of people” 
who now want very badly for us all to have cellular phones). What follows 
that is a list of “standards for technological innovation” that Berry thinks 
should be applied to any contemplated improvement in our daily tool set. 
They are as modest as his description of his own life, beginning with, “The 
new tool should be cheaper than the one it replaces,” and ending (perhaps a 
trifle less modestly) with, “It should not replace or disrupt anything good that 
already exists, and this includes family and community relationships.”3
Several things can be learned from Berry’s way of handling the practical 
problem of a computer, it seems to me. The first of them is its confessional 
nature. Berry begins by admitting that he is implicated in the problem he’s 
trying to solve, granting that there isn’t any place of electricity-free purity for 
him to stand any longer. There isn’t, in a sense we’ve perhaps already rehearsed 
well enough, any getting out of the problem of coal and electricity. We’re 
hooked to it, to use Berry’s phrase, in a way that can seem inevitable. If that 
were true—if our connection to electricity were, indeed, inevitable—there 
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would be little point in moving to the second essential component of Berry’s 
response to the computer—the articulation of a hope that things might be 
different.
The hope of becoming less hooked to the energy corporations is, to most 
of us, only a fool’s hope, or at least a hope that is clearly and determinedly 
defied by present circumstances, so powerful is our connection to electric cur-
rent. But Berry hopes this hope anyway, which is already an astonishing act. 
Even the publication of his essay implicated him all the more in the kinds of 
violence he hopes to avoid, one would think. Yet it turns out not to be an 
utterly foolish hope inasmuch as he tells us what he can do to begin to make 
that hope shape his own life. Write with pen. Farm with horse. Edit and cor-
rect writing with spouse’s help. Do what you can when and where the oppor-
tunity presents itself even if it’s small (which it will not always be). These are 
practical responses to a common problem and are no less practical and no less 
responsible in not entirely solving the problem they address. This is, at least in 
part, the meaning of having a hope about something.
Finally, Berry recognizes that it isn’t enough to be able to articulate one’s 
hope in terms of specific practices, although it is a necessary beginning point. 
One must also be able to say what sorts of general constraints having this 
particular hope would put on the life of the one who hopes it, what sorts of 
standards would have to be visible in the economy of the household that an-
ticipates it. In the case of Berry’s hope to unhook from the electric company, 
the generalities that point to that hope are “cheaper, smaller, more modest 
and preservative of communities,” to name a few. Other people who hope 
other things will live with different constraints and standards, many of which 
will conflict with Berry’s. The evidence of this can be found just about any-
where there’s a television, but a more direct indication is in the acerbic letters 
from readers that Berry’s little essay provoked. In them, he was called sexist 
(because his wife edits his work), judgmental, foolish, and unrealistic because 
he wants to write with a pen rather than a computer. So even his tiny “I’ll 
keep writing with a pen rather than a computer because electricity has a num-
ber of serious drawbacks that my hand doesn’t” rebellion was intolerable to 
many who read of it. Why?
Certainly part of the reason is that, despite the relative obviousness of the 
fact, people do not like to be reminded that their dependence on coal is also 
a dependence on violent practices such as mountaintop removal, something 
that is possible in its current configuration only because of a prior depen-
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dence on a great many labor and land injustices. But that is not the whole 
reason. At least some of the reason for resisting Berry’s modest handling of the 
problem of electricity is that it avoids a couple of false and idolatrous options 
in confronting violence that, despite the fact that they are false and idola-
trous, continue to be the ones with which even Christians are most comfort-
able. In short, I think that Berry’s response to the violence attending coal and 
electricity is particularly Christian in form inasmuch as it lives out the hope 
for an alternative without resorting to still further violence.
There are at least two deep temptations for people who take seriously 
problems like the ones associated with the extraction of coal. One is to regard 
the violence that we do to one another in the midst of such processes as in-
evitable in the most straightforward sense. In other words, we say something 
like, “Well, the world’s a fallen and imperfect place. It just seems to be the 
case that, in order for there to be indispensable good x, we’re going to have to 
be willing to face up to suffering y.” We could even put a really convincing 
theological spin on it that would make it seem more faithful or at least reli-
gious than it really is. We could say that, after all, God is the only one who 
can act without loss, which is really just a pious admission that nobody’s per-
fect. Or we could say that the cross of Christ and the Kingdom that his life 
rehearses is an impossible possibility that stands at the edge of history as its 
judge rather than as its true story. That would give us a kind of Niebuhrian 
permission to at least feel good about the fact that we regret a thing like 
mountaintop removal even though there’s nothing to be done about it (this 
always seemed like the only practical point one could take from the so-called 
serenity prayer). As a practical matter, we’d go on doing mountaintop re-
moval; we’d just regret its necessity. The fact that someone like Wendell Berry 
has no overarching or wholesale solution to the problem of electricity is an 
indication of its inevitability, according to this view. This, it seems to me, has 
been the general mood of the conservative response to radically extractive 
industry among Christians, and its complacency is legendary.
The other temptation is to believe that, if only the proper legislation were 
put into place, if only the proper ideological underpinnings could be pro-
vided to our ecological policies, the end of the violence we do to one another 
in the name of energy (and so many other things) would be at hand. Christ 
has left his work up to us, and we’d better get busy, and the solutions we’d 
better get busy with had better be global. If the solutions aren’t wholesale and 
programmatic, then they cannot be real solutions. This, we might say, has 
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been the general mood of the liberal response to radically extractive industry 
among Christians, and the violence of its immodesty is legendary.
But the problem with these two temptations is not that they are false, 
ineffective, complacent, or immodest, although they are those things often 
enough for it to be worth saying. Nor is the problem that they are too conser-
vative or too liberal. The problem is, rather, that neither of them is fully 
Christian in their understanding of the world’s violence or what it would 
mean to live in hope in the face of it.
On the one hand, to regard violence of any kind as somehow ontologi-
cally built in to the structure of the world is to despair of Christ’s lordship 
over the world. To say “we must have the coal because we must have electric-
ity because electricity is necessary for life and the coal can be gotten only with 
violence and therefore violence must inevitably be done and that is simply 
how the world is” is to despair of providing a description of the world as head-
ing toward its redemption in Christ. In the first place, it grants a kind of ul-
timate significance to something—electricity—that doesn’t merit it. We know 
this because our Lord has taught us that even food doesn’t have this kind of 
significance. Our very lives are insignificant in the face of the possibility that 
we should fail to have them conformed to God’s Word, which would mean 
avoiding as a matter of greatest urgency the kind of violence to our brothers 
and sisters that electricity production so often entails. There are no good war-
rants for turning away from this obligation. If food doesn’t have this signifi-
cance, surely electricity does not. Surely it is one of the more silly sorts of 
idolatry to regard the violence of coal extraction, for example, as somehow 
sanctified by the fallen condition of the world. It isn’t and can’t be, to quote 
John Howard Yoder, “if Christ is truly Lord.”4
On the other hand, to place faith in a theory of how history can be made 
to unfold so that the aforementioned violence won’t be necessary at all is to 
deal in fool’s gold and worse, once again to rehearse an idolatry. If the previ-
ous view fails to understand the world (as opposed to individuals’ little souls) 
as heading toward redemption, this one fails to see the world as headed not 
toward redemption but perhaps only toward being repaired. The problems of 
energy consumption will not be solved in any final or permanent sense by a 
sweeping or programmatic policy or an ideology or a set of educational re-
forms of human devising. Why would we trust such an enterprise to deliver? 
The legislation, the government effort that prohibits the type of coal mining 
that serves as our example here already exists. It was passed under the Carter 
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administration in 1977, which is why coal companies must continually ap-
pear before federal judges to get special permits to do it. Recently, two such 
permits were issued for Blair Mountain itself. Now, that ghastly fact might 
well provide us with another opportunity to speak and act about this prob-
lem. The point is that there’s no way of knowing, nor any point in trying to 
guarantee, that such speaking and acting will be efficacious or even knowing 
what such efficacy would mean. The mistake is to believe that such speech 
and such action are themselves salvific.
What Christians are awaiting is Christ’s return, which means that they 
live in a hope that, like Wendell Berry’s hope, provides them with standards 
for discernment now even if the fullness of that hope isn’t here yet. Because 
the object of our hope isn’t yet here in its fullness, we may well get worse than 
nasty letters for letting the standards it provides guide us into electricity or 
draft or Wal-Mart resistance. The world doesn’t share these standards with us 
most of the time, which is why it needs a witness rather than a strategy for 
social engineering. Christians ought not to be awaiting a further set of tech-
nologies or ideologies that will end the apparently inevitable violence to which 
we are hooked up. Wholesale attempts to fix those problems simply reenact 
the same impatience with the world that mountaintop removal does with a 
coal seam. The refusal to recognize that some seams should remain beyond 
our reach drives us to tear open the mountain because we regard some kind of 
violence as inevitable in defiance of our claim to faith in Jesus.
There is no inevitable violence. Even if it seems to be so for now, those 
whose hope is in Christ cannot ever grant such inevitability to anything oth-
er than the redemption of the world. Nonetheless, the world is violent, and 
there is often very little that we know to do about it for now, which doesn’t yet 
mean that we do nothing. It’s not an easy or comfortable position to be in, I 
grant. But it’s difficult to see what else Christian faithfulness in the face of 
lives shaped by such violence could demand if it wants to respond to evil in 
the way God has—with patience.
Let me put some flesh on that abstract description by offering up an 
example from the small-town Appalachian church of which my wife is the 
pastor. Recently, in that church of about fifty people, there was a mild con-
troversy about the possible purchase and installation of air-conditioning for 
the sanctuary (which is positively sweltering in the summer months). The 
opposition to this expensive proposal came largely from older members of 
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the congregation. I unfairly assumed they objected to it because of the kind 
of too-fresh memories of bygone harder times that make any expenditure 
suspicious.
At the meeting in which the proposal was discussed, one of these older 
members stepped forward to say a word. Max, a man in his late seventies 
whose family has been living in this part of West Virginia for generations and 
many of whose children and grandchildren attend that church, mildly asked 
permission to share with the rest of the congregation some of his memories of 
its history. He quietly pointed out the place in the sanctuary where the wood-
fired furnace, which had at one time been the sanctuary’s only source of heat, 
once stood. He also explained how fans (the kind powered by hands and 
wrists) had once occupied every hymnal slot in the pews to stave off the heat 
of worship in July. In his humble way, he was able to remind us that, within 
the span of his memory, the notion that the worship of God would require 
electric-powered comfort would have seemed obviously absurd. Only a deep 
confusion about what is really necessary in our response to the good news of 
Jesus Christ could possibly make something called electricity seem so very 
urgent. We do not require large amounts of electric power (or any amounts—
but that may be too ambitious just yet) in order to be faithful to God on 
Sunday mornings. If we don’t need electricity for that most important of ac-
tivities, then how could it possibly be indispensable in any other context? Max 
reminds us of this question, and that reminder liberates us from having to 
take such power seriously.
I don’t know whether Max is conservative or liberal in his politics, al-
though I suspect the former. I don’t know whether he thinks of himself as an 
environmentalist, although I suspect not. What I do know is that his hope for 
Christ’s return, his commitment to love God above all things, rightly relativ-
izes the importance of electric power in his life in a way that allows him to be 
a nonviolent witness against that particular idolatry. Max’s testimony (and 
what else would we call it?) invited those of us in the room to join him in 
responding to the violence of electricity production and other violence in the 
way that God has—with patience. It clarifies the church’s mission to be Max 
for the world, which of course really means being Christ for the world. The 
only way to refuse the violence of energy production without resorting to still 
more violence is to show the world an alternative. Such an alternative wit-
nesses to the redemptive possibility that we don’t need to live violently.
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Living the Divide—a Personal Preface
I have lived and continue to live the fissure between theology and practice. 
The work of Wendell Berry has helped me begin to heal that divide in my life 
and in my theological work, which are little by little becoming a unity.
I felt called to pastoral ministry when I was seventeen. This caused an 
abrupt change in my college plans. Instead of going to a secular liberal arts 
university to study music, I headed to Anderson University, a Christian lib-
eral arts university. There I studied Bible, religion, and philosophy and fell in 
love with the academic life. I remember the day I learned that the differences 
among the accounts of Jesus’ life in the first three Gospels constituted a “prob-
lem.” Far from being horrified, as were many of my classmates, I was fasci-
nated. I was also fascinated by my philosophy professor’s articulation of pro-
cess theology’s solution to the “problem” of evil, which I learned was another 
fascinating intellectual problem. I purchased with eagerness Charles Harts-
horne’s Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes, while the woman at the 
check-out register expressed dismay that professors at a Christian university 
would have students read such books.1
I went on to enjoy the pleasures of academic life in seminary. After grad-
uation from seminary, I earned a Ph.D. in theology and ethics. In the mean-
time, I continued to pursue ordination as a United Methodist minister, imag-
ining that I would live out my call to ordained ministry as a college or semi-
nary professor. While various ordination committees along the way expressed 
reservations about my intentions to teach, doubting my commitment to pas-
toral ministry, I progressed along the path toward ordination.
During the years of my doctoral work it became clear that about the time 
I would finish there would be a position in my alma mater’s religion depart-
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ment. The other option would be for me to take a pastoral appointment. I 
had a foot in both worlds—the academic and the pastoral, the world of the 
theologian and the world of the clergyman—and I had to pick one. All the 
indications seemed to point me in the direction of the academy. I eventually 
had a campus interview at Anderson University. My old professors there as-
sured me I would be offered the job in a few weeks.
Then I read Wendell Berry’s Hannah Coulter, where I saw in the protago-
nist’s description of her son Caleb a mirror of my own life. Caleb grew up on 
the Coulter farm and loved farming more than any of his siblings. He seemed 
at home on the farm, and his parents assumed that he would return from col-
lege to continue the work. But things changed for him at college. His mother 
imagines what he might have encountered there: “And I know, I can almost 
hear, the voices that were speaking to him, voices of people he learned to re-
spect, and they were saying, ‘Caleb, you’re too bright to be a farmer.’ They 
were saying, ‘Caleb, there’s no future for you in farming.’ They were saying, 
‘Caleb, why should you be a farmer yourself, when you can do so much for 
farmers? You can be a help to your people.’” I had heard very similar voices 
myself: “You can have a much greater impact on the church by teaching 
people who want to be pastors than you can by being a pastor yourself.” 
Hannah continues:
And what of Caleb? Caleb eventually became Dr. Coulter. He became a 
professor, teaching agriculture to fewer and fewer students who were 
actually going to farm. He became an expert with a laboratory and ex-
perimental plots, a man of reputation. But as I know, and as he knows 
in his own heart and thoughts, Caleb is incomplete. He didn’t love farm-
ing enough to be a farmer, much as he loved it, but he loved it too much 
to be entirely happy doing anything else. He is disappointed with him-
self. He is regretful in some dark passage of his mind that he thinks only 
he knows about, but he can’t hide it from his mother. I can see it in his 
face as plain as writing. There is the same kind of apology in him that 
you see in some of the sweeter drunks. He is always trying to make up 
the difference between the life he has and the life he imagines he might 
have had.2
When I read those words, Berry’s novel became for me lectio divina, “sa-
cred reading,” through which I was given a glimpse of what my own life 
might become. I did not want anyone to be able to say of me, “He is always 
trying to make up the difference between the life he has and the life he imag-
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ines he might have had.” This passage returned me to that sense of vocation I 
had when I was seventeen. Taking an appointment as a local church pastor 
was threatening for me—after all, I hadn’t taken any “practical” courses in 
seminary—but it was also the path that seemed the most faithful.
That night I called my friend, the chair of the Religion Department at 
Anderson University. “I’m surprised I’m calling you,” I said. “But I won’t be 
taking a job at Anderson. I’ll be asking for an appointment in a local church.” 
He replied, “I’m not surprised. When you were at our house visiting a few 
months ago, after you left, my wife said to me, ‘Don’t be disappointed or 
surprised if Roger decides to go into the local church.’ We saw it coming.”
I do not want to suggest that I could not have found a way to heal in my 
life the division between theology and practice as a college professor, or that I 
will never find myself as a teacher, or that others have not found faithful ways 
to heal this division as academics. I am only saying that, in my case, the pas-
toral setting seemed to be the place where theology and practice might find a 
unity in my life.
This division, which I continue to experience, runs deep. It is embodied 
in the academic divisions in seminaries between the theological disciplines 
(biblical studies, theology, history) and the practical disciplines (ethics, pasto-
ral care, ministerial formation, spirituality, preaching, worship, and evange-
lism). And, just as the theological disciplines often make up the majority of 
courses in the first years of a seminary education, to provide both a founda-
tion for the practical disciplines and the storehouse of theory to be applied, 
this division—and hierarchy—is often reproduced within the practical disci-
plines themselves. We are constantly asking how to “apply” theology in prac-
tice. How in a homiletics course is a theology of preaching put into practice? 
How in worship does a theoretical understanding of worship take shape in 
the actual liturgy? How in evangelism is a theological account of the Gospel 
and the church’s mission put into practice? These questions, often explicit, 
sometimes not, create the governing, if unmentioned, framework in which 
these disciplines operate.
In this essay, I will address one instance of this division—the tendency to 
apply the doctrine of the Incarnation to questions of enculturation in the 
field of evangelism—before showing how what Wendell Berry has written on 
breeding sheep can point toward a healing of that divide through the pastoral 
work of shaping communities. I hope, however, that its usefulness is broader, 
for I hope that the other disciplines, even theological education as a whole, 
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can learn from this glance at a single instance of the division between theol-
ogy and practice in a theological discipline and a vision of its healing.
Division in a Discipline—Incarnation and Enculturation 
in Evangelism
It is announced so often that it is almost a platitude in the literature on evan-
gelism to say that, to be effectively proclaimed and faithfully embodied, the 
Gospel must become enculturated. The Gospel, as God’s universal grace, re-
quires translation into the various languages and customs of the culture in 
which it is hoped that Christianity will take root and flourish. This important 
point was missed by Western missionaries of centuries past, who assumed 
that the spread of the Gospel meant the spread of Western civilization as well. 
In the wake of such colonialism masking as evangelization, writers on evan-
gelism are quick to point out that the Gospel and the Christian practices it 
implies cannot be identified with any one culture but, because of the very 
universal nature of the Gospel, can be at home in any culture.
In one sense, such claims seem almost obvious. One can see empirically 
that the Gospel can and has taken root in numerous cultures. The Gospel it-
self does not dictate such things as styles of worship or dress. Go to any coun-
try in the world or any town in North America, and you can witness empiri-
cally the truth that the Gospel and the Christian practice it implies can be 
embodied in the indigenous ways of a culture. As an empirical reality, encul-
turation seems obvious and unavoidable. It was precisely the mistake of 
Western missionaries to assume that their Gospel, and its embodiment in 
practice, was not enculturated but that their form of Christian expression was 
identical with the Gospel itself.
But the claim that the Gospel must be enculturated is more than an em-
pirical claim—it is also a missionary strategy. Those engaged in ministries of 
evangelism are charged with enculturating the Gospel well to facilitate its tak-
ing root in a host culture. They must be trained to recognize which aspects of 
their own expression and embodiment of the Gospel are essential to its core 
and which are expressions of their own cultural situation. Thus, the mission-
ary strategy of enculturation involves a balancing act. As Dana Robert says: 
“The gospel takes shape from the local setting or else it cannot be understood 
by people in the particular culture. Fixing upon a balance between contextu-
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alization and remaining faithful to the core of the gospel is an ongoing strat-
egy in missiology.”3
Writers on evangelism point to the Incarnation as the theological ratio-
nale for the missionary strategy of enculturation. Scott Jones puts the rational 
most succinctly: “Since Christ is God put into human flesh, the gospel can be 
put into other languages and cultural forms as well.”4 When evangelists imag-
ine ways to enculturate the Gospel in a particular culture, they are performing 
a missiological imitatio Dei—the Incarnation itself being God’s own mission-
ary strategy, God’s own way of enculturating the Gospel.
Tex Sample, in a book about ministry in the culture of working-class 
whites, also points to the Incarnation as the model of enculturation:
[Jesus] was a carpenter, an occupation of his time. He went to the mar-
ginal people of his world, who were illiterate, and he taught them in 
parables. He was a faithful Jew and participated in central practices of 
his faith, although he also opposed some of those practices. He spoke 
Aramaic, thus taking up the language of his people. His teaching used 
images from that world in terms of lilies, fish, sowing and reaping, mus-
tard seeds, the weather, and much more. . . . I contend that there has 
never been an authentic expression of Christian faith that was not also 
indigenous. In fact, serious tragedy attends the missionary work of the 
church when it refuses to be indigenous. . . . To pitch tent is intrinsic to 
the incarnate activity of the Triune God made known in Christ who 
works through the Spirit. One task of the church as the body of Christ 
in the world is to instantiate such incarnational activity.5
From this, it can be seen that the Incarnation works in two ways as a rationale 
for enculturation. First, the very fact of the Incarnation points to the necessity 
of enculturation—the Son’s becoming human points to the possibility of a 
universal Gospel being incarnated in different cultures—and the way Jesus 
expressed his humanity—through the cultural practices of his day, especially 
his Jewishness—provides theological rationale for modern-day strategies of 
enculturation. This is what Darrell Guder calls the “incarnational princi-
ple”—“the humanness of Jesus, and the example of his life, are seen as para-
digmatic for the mission activity of the church.”6 In some ways, I suppose all 
this seems obvious.
Yet it is precisely this notion of the “incarnational principle” with its use 
as a theological rationale for the missionary strategy of enculturation that I 
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suggest recapitulates the divide between theory and practice that haunts the 
so-called practical theological disciplines. When the Incarnation is used this 
way, as a rationale for missionary strategy, I think two mistakes are being 
made that make the pastoral question, “How can the Gospel be effectively 
enculturated in this context?” exactly backward.
Stripping Jesus
The first mistake is that this use of the Incarnation as a rationale implies a 
universal, un-enculturated Gospel that needs to be enculturated; such a uni-
versal Gospel does not exist. The very grammar of the question—“How do 
you enculturate the Gospel?”—points to a pure Gospel essence that needs to 
be enculturated. The quotation from Dana Robert given above about how to 
enculturate the Gospel while staying true to the core of the Gospel points to 
just such an essence. But it would be impossible to name or articulate such an 
essence because the very instance such an essence is named it is named in a 
particular language. This fact cannot be gotten behind or around. As Lesslie 
Newbigin has written: “The idea that one can or could at any time separate 
out by some process of distillation a pure gospel unadulterated by any cul-
tural accretions is an illusion. It is, in fact, an abandonment of the gospel, for 
the gospel is about the word made flesh.”7 The attempt to name the essence 
of the Gospel usually requires abstractions like love and grace that God ex-
pressed in the language of the Incarnation and that we express in our own 
enculturation of the Gospel. When this happens, however, the particularity of 
the story of Jesus becomes one cultural expression of the Gospel, even if the 
paradigmatic one, that itself must be left behind if the Gospel is to take root 
in ever new situations. For instance, Terry Persha writes:
Jesus Christ, after all, was an historical being bound to one culture and 
one society in a given time and moment of history. Because of that, he 
could not possibly have expressed the mystery of grace in all its historical 
unfolding and multifaceted dimensions. He could only have expressed 
the meaning of God’s involvement with humanity through the limits of 
his culture, language, and symbols. Everything, in fact, that the early 
Christians themselves learned of God in Jesus Christ was shaped by the 
linguistic, moral, spatial, political, and psychological structures of their 
time-bound, spatially situated condition in history.8
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Here, grace is a universal abstracted from the story of Jesus and the particular-
ity of his life—from the Incarnation—the cultural particularities of his own 
day being something that need to be abandoned as the Gospel is proclaimed 
in ever new and different cultures so that grace might find expression in them 
as well. For true enculturation to take place, the Gospel itself must be un-
bound, it seems, from Jesus’ own cultural limitations. Jesus must be stripped 
to his naked, untarnished, universal humanity so that he might then be re-
dressed in new cultural clothes as the proclamation of the Gospel encounters 
new cultures.
But the Gospel is and has always been enculturated all the way down, so 
to speak. To assume that there is a pure or essential Gospel that needs to be 
enculturated ironically repeats the very mistake of the imperialist missionaries 
who assumed their expression of the Gospel was the pure version, untar-
nished by culture. It repeats the move of liberal Christianity, most clear in von 
Harnack’s What Is Christianity? that a core of Christianity can be identified 
when the layers of cultural husk are stripped away. But this essence does not 
exist. We are stuck with Jesus, bound as he is “to one culture and one society 
in a given time and moment of history.” When this is realized, the missio-
logical question can no longer be how to maintain a balance between encul-
turation and staying true to the core of the Gospel. A much more fundamen-
tal and startling question takes its place: “What in the world do we do with 
the Jew Jesus?”
The second mistake is that, when the Incarnation becomes a rationale 
and model for the missionary strategy of enculturation, the Jewishness of 
Jesus becomes accidental to the Gospel and to the Incarnation itself. Using 
the doctrine of the Incarnation as a missiological strategy answers the ques-
tion, “What in the world do we do with the Jew Jesus?” by stripping him of 
his Jewishness. This second mistake is the necessary corollary of assuming a 
universal Gospel. As we have seen Tex Sample suggest above, Jesus’ Jewishness 
was a tactic, a way of embodying the culture in which he found himself. Now, 
in order to find out how to embody the Gospel in other cultures, Jesus must 
be stripped of his Jewishness. This way of applying theology in evangelism, 
this way of turning the Incarnation into a principle to be applied, saves mis-
sionaries, evangelists, and pastors from facing the embarrassing fact of Jesus’ 
Jewishness by making it merely tactical and, thus, accidental to the Gospel 
rather than constitutive of the Gospel itself. Consider Persha again: “Here the 
228  L. Roger Owens
universality of Christ can best be appreciated. By virtue of his resurrection, 
Jesus is no longer bound by time, history, or culture. He becomes, in fact, the 
totally transcultural one, present to all of creation through the grace of his 
Spirit.”9 Here, I think, one should read transcultural to mean “no longer 
Jewish.”
When, however, the particularity of Jesus as the Jewish Messiah is ac-
knowledged and affirmed as constitutive of and not accidental to whatever we 
mean when we say Gospel, then Jesus no longer needs to be unbound or freed 
from his cultural particularity. His being Jewish can no longer be viewed as an 
embarrassment to be overcome, for, when he is stripped of that Jewishness, 
when the Gospel as the “mystery of grace” is freed from this particular culture, 
then there is no Gospel left. As John Howard Yoder puts it:
It was the Jewishness of Jesus, the rootage of his message in the particu-
lar heritage of Abraham, Moses, and Jeremiah, which as we have seen 
made it good news for the whole world. . . . Only the Jew Jesus, by an-
nouncing and accomplishing the fulfillment of God’s promises to the 
Jews, could send out into the world a people of peace open to the 
Gentiles. Only the Jewish claim that the one true God, known to 
Abraham’s children through their history, was also the Creator and sus-
tainer of the other peoples as well, could enable mission without provin-
cialism, cosmopolitan without empire.10
When the use of the doctrine of the Incarnation implies a universal Gospel, 
untouched by culture, a naked Gospel that needs to be dressed in the indig-
enous forms of a particular culture, then of course the most pressing pastoral 
question will be how to go about such cultural undressing and dressing of the 
Gospel. But, when we resist, as I think we should, such an application of the 
Incarnation, when we deny the division between theology and practice that 
makes it possible, and when we see the Incarnation, not as a rationale to jus-
tify a strategy or a paradigm to be imitated, but as the preeminent fact of 
Christianity—as God’s way of opening the blessing of his covenant with the 
Jews to Gentiles through the flesh of Jesus, the Jewish Messiah, without re-
quiring those Gentiles themselves to become culturally Jews—then the most 
pressing pastoral question changes. The question is no longer, “How do you 
enculturate the Gospel?” but, “How do you en-Gospel the culture?” The sur-
prising fact of the Gospel is not that it is capable of wearing any cultural dress 
but that cultures being confronted with the Gospel do not themselves have to 
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strip in order to participate in the blessings of the body of Christ, God’s cov-
enant people.
And that surprising fact leads to the pastoral question, “How do you 
shape communities faithful to the shape of the life of Jesus the Jewish Messiah 
without requiring the community to abandon its own cultural particularity?” 
The Incarnation is not a principle to be applied; it is a reality to be partici-
pated in. And the reality in which we are able to participate is the humanity 
of the Jewish Jesus.
Let the Place Judge
The healing of the divide between theology and practice in evangelism will 
begin when evangelism as the discipline of disciplemaking and community 
formation makes this realization and begins to address the more fundamen-
tal—and difficult—questions that I have suggested above.
One of the reasons I have been able to find a healing between theology 
and practice in my life as a pastor is because I have found that theological 
work in a parish setting is not about getting theology right and then applying 
it but about shaping a community to conform to the life of the one in whom 
it participates without forcing that community to abandon its own local 
identity. It is the particularity of Jesus that secures the particularity of the 
community and the positing of a universal Gospel that puts such communal 
cultural particularity in jeopardy—as history has shown. The pastor who tries 
to shape a community faithful to the Jewish Messiah whose life they embody 
must think carefully about which aspects of that community’s culture—its 
particular and manifold ways of speaking, acting, relating, and gathering—
are consistent with the shape of the life of Jesus and which are not, but the 
emphasis must be on letting the particularities of the place take the lead in 
how the shape of the life of Jesus will take local shape in that place if that 
cultural situation is going to be appropriately en-Gospeled.
And that brings me back to Wendell Berry, whose account of breeding 
sheep in the essay “Let the Farm Judge” can serve as a metaphor for the pas-
toral work of shaping communities that conform to the humanity of Jesus in 
which they participate. In that essay, Berry expresses delight over the fact that, 
in Great Britain, there are more than “sixty-five British sheep breeds and ‘rec-
ognized half-breeds’” and wonders what such a fact says about agriculture and 
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the importance of place.11 The success over hundreds of years of British farm-
ers to adapt sheep so beautifully to their specific localities points, for Berry, to 
the core work of good farming: “The goal of intelligent farmers, who desire 
the long-term success of farming, is to adapt their work to their places” (57). 
Intelligent pastoral workers who want to learn faithfully to shape Christian 
communities have something to learn from intelligent farmers like Berry who 
take seriously the need for local adaptation.
In this extended metaphor, let place stand for culture. Often, culture is 
thought of in broad terms, as in, “One must understand North American 
culture to effectively proclaim the Gospel”—but I have learned that, as it is 
often painted in large brushstrokes, North American culture has little to say 
about the shape of life in rural communities like the one where I pastor in 
northern Franklin County, North Carolina. Place as culture helpfully limits 
the scope of what we are talking about. So, when Berry says that the farm, the 
place itself, must “enforce its judgment” (58), he is helping us see the implica-
tion of the fact that, as I have already argued, Gospel means at least that a 
particular place does not need to abandon its particularity in order to be en-
Gospeled. When one is trying to help Christianity take root and flourish in a 
place—doing the pastoral work of shaping a community to conform to the 
shape of the life of the Jewish Messiah, Jesus—the place itself will be respect-
ed and listened to; it cannot be stripped, but its own particularities—its in-
digenous practices—will go a long way toward determining the shape of the 
community’s health and faithfulness. This is not a question of balancing faith-
fulness to the core of the Gospel with the need for enculturation, for the 
Gospel itself demands that the place not be stripped of its particularity. 
Rather, the embodiment of the life of Jesus will be done through that place’s 
particularity. As Berry puts it: “But the farm too must be permitted to make 
and enforce its judgment. If it is not permitted to do so, then there can be no 
local adaptation. And where there is no local adaptation, the farmer and the 
farm must pay significant penalties” (58).
For Berry, a particular phenomenon of the commercial demand for “ide-
al” animals militates against letting the farm judge. “In our era,” he writes, 
“because of commercial demand and the allure of the show ring, livestock 
breeding has tended to concentrate on the production of outstanding indi-
vidual animals as determined by the ideal breed characteristics or the ideal 
carcass” (58). The production of such an ideal animal—judged by the un-
placed standards of the show ring—requires standards of production that are 
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not in harmony with what most farms are capable of sustaining without det-
riment to the farm. This reminds me of the tendency in the literature of 
evangelism to think that one size fits all—to try to reproduce in a particular 
place what has produced outstanding results in another place, which usually 
means reproducing techniques that helped make another church big. The 
show-ring church has tricked the rest of us into thinking that the shape of 
faithfulness to the life of Jesus in which we share is to get bigger and look as 
much as possible like the most talked-about church of the decade. But be-
coming that church, for most of us, would require the application of tech-
niques at odds with the way of life embodied in the culture of our particular 
places. It would require the stripping of the culture—which, as we have seen, 
is opposed to the story of Jesus. I might be able to produce a show-ring com-
munity in the place where I am, but I doubt that I can do it while respecting 
the place’s right to judge, to have its say—and that is a judgment both the 
place and Jesus demand the place have. As Berry puts it: “I am saying only 
that the show ring alone cannot establish and maintain adequate standards 
for livestock breeders. You could not develop locally adapted strains if your 
only standards came from the show ring or from breed societies” (61). And, 
when it comes to the Gospel as embodied in particular communities, local 
adaptation is all there is.
The show-ring sheep or cow also reminds me of the so-called universal 
Gospel—Persha’s mystery of grace—because it is an animal abstracted from 
any locality. It does not bear the marks of a place but seems to have derived 
from no place whatsoever. And so it could likely not live well in any place 
without accounting for the enormous cost of maintaining its viability and the 
cost that maintenance would have on the farm.
When “Let the Farm Judge” turns to the Berrys’ own work of breeding 
sheep on their farm in Kentucky, I see a beautiful image of the patient, pasto-
ral task of shaping evangelistic communities that are conformed, precisely in 
their particularity, to the life of the Jewish Messiah, Jesus, a life that made 
possible these communities’ participation in the body of God’s people with-
out needing to abandon their own particularities and cultural identities. Berry 
recounts the problems of adapting a flock of Border Cheviot ewes to a farm 
in the lower Kentucky River valley. Because heavier animals often damage the 
hillsides, the Berrys decided that their farm needed sheep. In 1978, they 
bought six Border Cheviot ewes and a buck. In 1997, they had thirty ewes. 
He notes: “Our choice of breed was a good one. The Border Cheviot is a hill 
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sheep, developed to make good use of such rough pasture as we have. 
Moreover, it can make good use of a little corn, and our farm is capable of 
producing a little corn. There have been problems, of course. Some of them 
have had to do with adapting ourselves to the breed. These have been impor-
tant, but just as important have been the problems of adapting our flock to 
our farm” (59).
To the extent that raising sheep is like cultivating Christian communities 
in a particular place, Berry helps us see that the adaptation is mutual. While 
the Gospel does not require a place to strip itself of its particularity in order 
for it to participate in Christ’s body, the Gospel also has a judgment of its own 
to make. The community being cultivated is a Christian community, and the 
shape of that community will challenge some indigenous practices of any 
culture. But the important point here is that, even with those cultural prac-
tices challenged, the community itself will still be recognizably of that place.
Berry continues:
Our farm, then, is asking for a ewe that can stay healthy, live long, breed 
successfully, have two lambs without assistance, and feed them well, in 
comparatively demanding circumstances. Experience has shown us that 
the Border Cheviot breed is capable of producing a ewe of this kind, but 
that it does not do so inevitably. In eighteen years, and out of a good 
many ewes bought or raised, we have identified so far only two ewe 
families (the female descendents of two ewes) that fairly dependably 
perform as we and our place require. The results of identifying and keep-
ing the daughters of these ewe families have been very satisfactory. This 
year [1997] they made up more than half of our bred ewes. Presumably 
because of that, our lambing percentage, which previously hovered 
around 150 percent, increased to 172 percent. This year we also reduced 
our winter hay-feeding by one month, not beginning until the first of 
February.
Over almost twenty years of watching and careful breeding, the Berrys have 
shaped their own flock of sheep to be healthy and productive by the standards 
of their farm. These sheep would not be healthy or productive on a farm any-
where else. But in that place they are just right. Neither would these sheep 
win prizes in show-ring competitions: “Some of the qualities we are after 
simply are not visible to show ring judges” (60).
Berry is offering what philosophers would call a nonfoundationalist ap-
proach to breeding sheep. There is no universal, perfect sheep, no Platonic 
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ideal sheep—not even a blue-ribbon winner in the show ring—that can be a 
standard for health and productivity of all sheep everywhere. Health is largely 
relative. It is determined by how particular sheep fare under the circumstances 
of a particular place. And, with patience, over several years, the health and 
productivity of the sheep in a particular place can be improved by adapting 
the sheep to the local conditions and by adapting, when possible and neces-
sary, the local conditions to the sheep. Saying that there is no universal healthy 
sheep by which to judge the health of other sheep is not the same thing as 
saying that the health of sheep cannot be judged. But that judgment will be 
made by the wisdom of a practitioner and not against the standards of an 
archetype.
I am suggesting that we should think of shaping Christian communities 
like adapting sheep to a farm. This image of adapting sheep to a place is more 
helpful to Christian mission and the pastoral work of shaping missional com-
munities than is the language of enculturation. As we saw above, the language 
of enculturation implies a universal Gospel, itself untouched by any culture 
(a show-ring Gospel), that can wear the dress of any culture. But, just as there 
is no universal standard for a healthy sheep, so too there is no Gospel or 
Christian community that is not always and already enculturated. The health 
and productivity of a Christian community can be determined only with 
reference to its place and not to a universal Gospel or show-ring church. And, 
as with the health of sheep, so it is with the health of communities. Saying 
there is no universal expression of Christianity by which to judge the health 
of a Christian community is not the same as saying such health cannot be 
judged. But the judgment will be made by the wisdom of the pastor who knows 
the place, not against the abstract standards of a putative un-enculturated 
Gospel.
Evangelism in Place
How have we come from how writers on evangelism use the Incarnation to 
justify certain accounts of strategic enculturation of the Gospel to talk about 
raising sheep as a metaphor for the pastoral work of shaping communities of 
faithfulness? We got here by changing the pressing question. After we have 
abandoned the hope of locating a universal Gospel essence, the pressing prac-
tical question can no longer be, “How do you balance the need to enculturate 
the Gospel with the need to maintain the core of the Gospel?” Since the 
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Incarnation does not provide a principle to be applied but is a reality to be 
participated in, the pressing question becomes, “How do you shape commu-
nities faithful to the shape of the life of the Jewish Messiah, Jesus, in whose 
body they participate?”
Christianity has a Jewish Messiah who was and is still Jewish—a fact of 
embarrassment to some. Theologians of Christian evangelism have argued 
that Jesus needs to be unbound from his Jewishness so the universal Christ 
can be enculturated everywhere. We should no longer allow this mistake to be 
made. We should begin to wrestle with the fact that, whatever we mean by 
Gospel, Jesus’ Jewishness is not accidental to it. It is not that, once you strip 
early Christianity of its Jewishness, you find that it can wear any cultural 
dress—that Jesus means something other than or beyond his being Jewish. 
Rather, the good news is that Gentiles have been invited to participate in the 
body of the Jewish Messiah without themselves having first to be stripped of 
their own cultural particularity.
Since this is the case, I want to offer one final reformulation of the guid-
ing question for pastoral shapers of Christian communities: “What will be 
the communal shape of our faithfulness to and participation in the flesh of 
the Jew Jesus, given the particularities of this place, so that ours will not be a 
misplaced faithfulness?” Incarnation means it makes little sense to say that the 
Gospel must be enculturated because there is no unenculturated Gospel to 
enculturate. If I proclaim the Gospel in English to a group of Spanish speak-
ers, the problem is not that the Gospel I am proclaiming is not enculturat-
ed—it certainly is. The problem is that it is the wrong sheep on the wrong 
farm. It is a misplaced Gospel embodiment. When this new question be-
comes the most pressing question for theologians of the church’s evangelistic 
task—as it is now for me as a pastor and a theologian—then what I called the 
divide between theory and practice will have no place. Our modus operandi 
will no longer be making theological principles relevant to our practice. We 
will either be shaping or giving guidance to those who shape communities as 
they try, not to apply theological principles, but to embody the life of Jesus 
the Messiah.
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Part 4
Moving Forward

The question of how Christians should participate in the politics of America 
has been posed lately with a special urgency, although with little clarity. Al-
most everyone has something to say on the matter. Yet, if one listens a while, 
the talk seems to break apart into little bits of propaganda, drawn from one 
or the other side of the culture wars. In theological circles, however, the dis-
cussion has taken a particularly interesting turn of late, after the publication 
of Jeffery Stout’s Democracy and Tradition.1 Stout sets about to ask the big 
question, What, after all, is democracy in America? And he answers that it is 
not a great idea, or even a system of government, but rather a tradition. An 
important result of his defense of the tradition of democracy in America is his 
call for Christians, particularly Christians like the well-known American 
theologian Stanley Hauerwas, to participate in the tradition.
To be honest, Stout does more than invite Hauerwas into the democratic 
tradition; he excoriates him for criticizing democracy (and liberalism) in a 
reckless way so as to diminish a tradition that Stout himself loves dearly and 
thinks needs strengthening, particularly at this time in American history. All 
this has not been lost on Hauerwas, who has responded to Stout’s critique at 
some length. In this essay, I want critically to consider both Stout’s and 
Hauerwas’s viewpoints on America and democracy. As Hauerwas has re-
sponded to Stout, another big question has risen to the surface: Who are 
Christians, and what is the church? This, actually, is a bigger question than 
Stout’s, What is (American) democracy? We cannot hope to settle it in the 
few pages that follow. Yet it is important to get both questions out on the 
table, for they are what is at stake in the current discussion, not just between 
Stout and Hauerwas, but in the cacophony of voices one hears today swirling 
around them. With regard to these other voices, this essay has another point 
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than carefully considering what Stout and Hauerwas have to say. One voice 
in particular—that of Wendell Berry—stands apart from the sloganry and 
folderol about America, democracy, and the Christian church. I hope to move 
the discussion in Berry’s direction. Doing so will correct and sharpen what 
both Stout and Hauerwas have to say about the big questions posed above.
Discussing Democracy and Tradition
In Democracy and Tradition, Stout opposes what he calls the “anti-modern 
traditionalist” critique of modern democratic societies, namely, that these so-
cieties have become “morally and spiritually empty.”2 The “traditionalism” 
whose criticisms of democracy Stout means to oppose encompasses the likes 
of Edmund Burke and Pope Pius IX but also the “new traditionalists,” in 
particular the triad of John Milbank, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Stanley Hauer-
was. Of these, Hauerwas seems a special target. With him, Stout’s critique 
takes on a personal urgency and extends over almost two chapters, while 
Milbank and MacIntyre get only one apiece. As Hauerwas later says in re-
sponse: “Stout’s criticisms of Milbank and MacIntyre serve to introduce his 
critique of my position.”3
Stout’s strategy to oppose these three so-called traditionalists is to show 
that democracy in America is, in fact, a morally substantive tradition, one 
that remains alive today, even if in need of the concerted attention of civi-
cally minded Americans. If Stout can convincingly show this, he can blunt 
the criticisms of democracy from the traditionalists—since, after all, democ-
racy in America has what they think is necessary for a viable social commu-
nity. Moreover, he can turn round to generously offer the traditionalists a 
place at the democratic table, where, he thinks, their voices are both welcome 
and needed.
Stout’s defense of democracy in America is an interesting one. He accepts 
the postmodern critique of an Enlightenment rationality that sees history or 
tradition as a moral encumbrance to the establishment of a good and just 
society. Like his three stated opponents, Stout believes that “tradition”—
which is to say, roughly, the passage of a body of virtues and moral practices 
and a discourse about human life and society from one generation to the 
next—is essential to the establishment of a just and proper social order. 
Furthermore, like Hauerwas and the others, Stout acknowledges that many 
defenders of democracy have missed this point and, armed with a skewed and 
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narrow understanding of what “reasonable persons” believe, have tried to dis-
miss religious traditions from the democratic conversation. Finally, Stout’s 
defense of democracy in America is interesting because it is honestly critical 
of it. While he defends it against the attack of the three theologians, Stout 
acknowledges that the modern democratic tradition is not presently in the 
best shape in America, where the plight of the poor is largely being ignored 
and we are retreating into enclaves defined by race or lifestyle.4
Perhaps partly because of this last point, Stout chastises the new tradi-
tionalists, not only for failing to identify democracy as a rightful tradition, 
but also for thoughtlessly damaging its best elements by refusing, as religious 
thinkers, to take a place within it as valuable members of a coalition for a bet-
ter American society. Stout recalls such coalitions personally:
I came of age ethically, politically, and spiritually in the Civil Rights 
movement, where I acquired my democratic commitments from pro-
phetic ministers. In college, when I moved rapidly down the path that 
leads from Schleiermacher to Fauerbach, Emerson and beyond, I found 
myself collaborating mainly with dissenting Protestants, secular Jews 
and members of the radical Catholic underground in the struggle against 
U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. I have known since then that it 
is possible to build democratic coalitions including people who differ 
religiously and to explore those differences deeply and respectfully with-
out losing one’s integrity as a critical intellect. This book is offered in the 
hope that similarly diverse coalitions and equally full expression of dif-
ferences remain possible in democratic culture today, if we can only 
summon the will to form them.5
This is the problem with Stanley Hauerwas—and perhaps the main rea-
son Stout’s criticisms are directed principally at him. He is not summoning 
his will. If he would, he could do a great deal of good since he is, according 
to Stout, “the most influential theologian now working in the United States.”6 
But he is not using this influence in America rightly. To the contrary, in his 
teaching and writing, he is turning out a generation of students and readers 
whose attentions have been taken in other directions entirely, some of them 
apparently quite antithetical to the democratic hope that Stout so personally 
and poignantly expresses.
One might be surprised after reading Stout’s book that he and Hauerwas 
are friends. In Hauerwas’s most developed response to Stout, he reports that, 
when he finished reading the book in manuscript form, he “called Jeff asking 
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where I could possibly find his democracy materially instantiated. He replied 
I could find his democracy instantiated in the same place you could find my 
account of the church.”7
I take it as interesting that these two could have this conversation and 
that both could laugh knowingly. In the conversation, each presses the other 
for concreteness, albeit at different locations. “Show me the body!” they say 
to each other. It is interesting because each is otherwise known, indeed, seems 
to want to be known, as a sort of pragmatist who champions the concrete and 
particular.
Hauerwas otherwise offers Democracy and Tradition high praise. Indeed, 
he suggests a practical outcome, a sort of next step: “Put bluntly, this is a 
position with which we Christians not only can, but should want to, do busi-
ness. Stout does try to give an account of democratic life that is not in the first 
place state theory. I am extremely sympathetic with that project. Stout’s un-
derstanding of practical reason, the centrality of the virtues, as well as the 
democratic tradition not only makes it possible for us to have a conversation, 
but makes such a conversation imperative.”8
Hauerwas reminds us here of the significance of what Stout has done. His 
defense of democracy in America does not rest on nebulous terms like freedom 
or individual rights. Rather, Stout tells a story of a democratic tradition in 
America that he self-consciously and passionately claims. He believes as well 
that this tradition is at least partly sustained by Christians who think and act 
as if theology matters, and he welcomes their voices, even solicits them. 
Philosophically, he avoids such invented ideas or terms as the original position 
of John Rawls, turning instead to a historically continuous community that 
carries along a triad of virtues (piety, hope, and love), a company of heroes 
(Emerson, Whitman, and Dewey), and a variety of practices, including play-
ing and coaching athletics in places like Princeton, New Jersey. (Stout, in fact, 
dedicates his book to a soccer coach in that place.) Christians in America 
need such an account, not only to compare with their own commitments—
for instance, Christians might ask how the love in Stout’s triad relates to Paul’s 
account in 1 Corinthians 13 or Aquinas’s in the Summa—but also to remind 
them of the many ways their own lives are sustained by good and concrete 
American practices they neither invented nor exclusively sustain.
That Hauerwas considers Stout’s position one Christians need to do busi-
ness with suggests that more talk is yet to come. American democrats and 
Christians should welcome the prospect that the likes of Stout and Hauerwas 
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will continue their discussion. But the point remains from the phone conver-
sation. What could it mean for Hauerwas to ask, with sense, for the “instan-
tiation” of Stout’s democratic tradition? And why could Stout turn this 
around, also with some success, and ask for something similar from Hauerwas 
about the church? It is on these points that I think help is needed from 
Wendell Berry. To extend the doing-business metaphor, if Stout and Hauerwas 
decide to sit down to share a business lunch, I should like to see whether I can 
get Wendell Berry invited. There is indication that both Hauerwas and Stout 
would welcome Berry’s presence. Hauerwas’s recent writing is dotted with 
positive references to Berry.9 In Democracy and Tradition, Stout offers Berry’s 
work high praise, calling him “a gifted practitioner of observational social 
criticism.”10 Yet, despite this awareness and good feeling, there is less evidence 
in Stout’s and Hauerwas’s work that they have listened to Berry as carefully as 
they might, as I hope we shall see in what follows.
Piety and Memory in America—Stout to Berry
Throughout his book, Stout works to disassociate the democratic tradition he 
defends from the broad scope of the term liberal; indeed, he wishes that 
Hauerwas and others would simply stop using the word. Yet the connection 
may not be so easy to break. In his response to Stout, Hauerwas sees fit to 
recall two points that he came to understand about liberalism in his own in-
tellectual journey—both still relevant. The first point is about the disembodi-
ment implied by the liberal understanding of human agency whereby an ac-
tor’s bodily actions and his agency could be held at a distance. The second 
point, linked to the first, is about the irrelevance of memory to what he calls 
“liberal politics and ethics.” He speaks biographically about coming to see 
this point:
I became convinced that any attempt to recover the significance of the 
virtues required a moral psychology that displayed how our actions are 
constituted by our agency. It seemed to me at the time that most ac-
counts of moral action, accounts I think that reflected a moral psychol-
ogy thought necessary to sustain liberal regimes, made it also impossible 
to recover Aristotle’s understanding of activity. This is because most lib-
eral theory, both political and ethical, depended upon being able to sepa-
rate action from agent. That separation, moreover, had everything to do 
with the liberal attempt to form a politics and ethics without memory.11
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Hauerwas does not systematically pursue his comments about disembod-
ied agency and memory and never takes them directly to Stout’s text. However, 
he makes a further remark about each that helps fill out the picture. Regarding 
embodiment, he observes:
[The] problem was not whether liberalism could give some account of 
the virtues, but rather what virtues were recommended. I long ago sug-
gested, for example, that one of the primary intellectual virtues for lib-
eralism is cynicism. I thought such a virtue to be correlative of the de-
mand for autonomy that assumes I must always be able to step back 
from my engagements. What I “do” is, therefore, not “who I am.” As a 
result my body is only secondarily “me” because my body is primarily 
something I use. To be habituated to be “free” in this sense makes it dif-
ficult for those so formed to recommend how they have learned to live 
to others. We each have to become the managers of our lives.
With regard to memory, he comments further:
The fundamental problem with liberalism, and I suppose I mean by 
liberalism primarily liberal theory, has been the attempt to suppress 
memory in the interest of eliminating conflict. Yet I believe it impossible 
not to be what we were made to be, whether we are Christian or not, 
which means we cannot live without memory. Indeed I think there is a 
kind of “natural law” effect—that is, there will be negative results—
when people attempt to suppress the wrongs of the past in the interest 
of cooperation. I do believe, after all, that the cross is the grain of the 
universe.12
Somewhat surprisingly for him, in these comments Hauerwas suggests 
that certain things are natural about us as human beings—and, therefore, ir-
repressible. We suppress them to our great peril. And the two liberalism sup-
presses are our bodies and our memories. Put in relation one to the other, if 
we hope to remember well, we will need first to recall that we are more than 
mere spirit: we are body.
Memory and embodiment both are necessarily communal. As Alan 
Verhey marks: “The body itself links us to others, first on the level of natural 
relationships. Everyone is someone’s child. No one is a self alone.”13 Verhey 
worries that, as we have forgotten that we are bodily in the modern world, so 
we have forgotten our connectedness to one another. Recollection of our-
selves as bodily creatures keeps our delusions of self-sufficiency and indepen-
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dence in check since it is impossible to think that we are the makers of our 
own bodies. Indeed, we receive our bodily life not from just anyone but from 
two particular people, namely, our mother and father. And this connection to 
our parents reminds us that we are the inheritors of a past, a specific past, to 
which we are linked throughout our lives by memory. Memory, in fact, be-
gins in family and extends outward to clan, tribe, and people. Hauerwas’s 
comments suggest that the liberal self disconnects us from these things, from 
the concrete communities that tie us by our bodies to a particular past. So 
liberalism will of necessity encourage in us a fundamental forgetfulness of 
what has gone before.
The relevance of this point to Stout’s democracy is simply that we shall 
need to check its body and memory, especially if, as Stout hopes, it styles itself 
as a tradition. Specifically, we shall have to check its connection to a past. 
Stout is aware of this and addresses it in the final section of his first chapter, a 
section entitled “Piety Reconceived.” As he tells us, of the three cardinal dem-
ocratic virtues—piety, hope, and love—piety is the one that “looks toward 
the past.”14
Piety has traditionally related to what we owe to specific parties who have 
gone before us in life, such as our parents. Aquinas takes it to be about our 
parents and, he adds, “our country” since both have given us “birth and nour-
ishment.”15 The relations of piety in Confucianism are even more specific and 
elaborate. Piety, or hsiao in that tradition, extends over the father-son, the 
brother-brother, the prince-subject, the friend-friend, and the husband-wife 
relations. It governs these relations in subtly different ways, although, as 
Herbert Fingarette notes, they all are “ultimately sanctified by virtue of their 
place in li,” which is, as he elaborates, a kind of ceremonial performance that 
gathers up social relations, bestowing on them a sacred and transforming 
power. Piety in Confucianism, therefore, regards not only specific relations 
but also how gifts are given and received within them in such specific settings 
as a family meal. Fingarette quotes Confucius in the Analects, “merely to feed 
one’s parents well . . . even dogs and horses are fed” (2.7), and adds this gloss: 
“To be devoted to one’s parents is far more than to keep the parents alive 
physically. To serve and eat in the proper way, with proper respect and ap-
preciation, in the proper setting—this is to transform the act of mere nour-
ishment into the human ceremony of dining.”16
The specificity of Aquinas or Confucius is lacking in Stout’s account of 
democratic piety. He gives no clear direction about to whom piety binds us, 
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nor does he say how it governs and directs what is done in our relations with 
them. Rather, he opens his discussion by telling us that Walt Whitman was 
much concerned with “how the poets of democracy ought to conceive, and 
respond to, the sources of our existence and progress through life. This con-
stituted much of his literary business. Hence, he has much to say about piety. 
For piety, in the sense at issue here, is virtuous acknowledgement of depen-
dence on the sources of one’s existence and progress through life. When tra-
ditionalists conclude that democracy is antithetical to piety itself, they must 
be assuming that piety consists essentially in deference toward the hierarchi-
cal powers that be.”17
Stout makes two unfortunate moves in this passage; even more unfortu-
nately, they stay with him throughout his treatment of democratic piety. First, 
he settles on the phrase “sources of our existence and progress through life,” 
which becomes almost formulaic in the section, never admitting of substitu-
tion or further elaboration. Its meaning is actually quite difficult to decipher. 
For instance, how are we to understand what he means by “progress through 
life”? Is it simply that we are making it along the way, from birth to death? Or 
are we progressing in the sense that we are getting better, better than when we 
ourselves began, and better, progressively, than those who went before? 
Beyond this, however, the phrase specifies no one in particular to whom our 
piety is owed. As we have been discussing, piety needs specification. Who or 
what are these “sources” toward which democracy trains me to be pious?
This lack of specificity is accented later when Stout relates piety to grati-
tude: “Gratitude, not loyalty or deference, is, for the tradition of Emersonian 
perfectionism, the better part of piety.”18 This move, from piety to gratitude, 
seems fitting. In the Summa, for instance, Aquinas turns to gratitude almost 
immediately after discussing piety. They are related. Yet, perhaps even more 
than piety, gratitude requires a target. We are grateful for specific gifts given. 
But, since Stout’s vague “sources of our existence and progress through life” 
have guided piety, they must stand in as well for gratitude. But what does 
gratitude offered to these sources mean, concretely? And, moreover, does grati-
tude or piety offered to these “sources” bind us communally in any clear way?
There is a second problem. In the quote given above (and elsewhere), 
Stout sets his democratic, self-reliant piety over against another sort of piety 
that he thinks includes “deference towards the hierarchical powers that be.” 
Democratic piety is “a kind of piety entirely distinct from acquiescence in the 
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dominant practices and institutions or their natural setting simply because 
they are there. It is a self-conscious identification, undertaken on the part of 
the individual who, thinking for him- or herself, acknowledges that on which 
his or her self-reliant judgment depends.”19 Moreover, Stout assumes that his 
three new traditionalists operate with a notion of piety that is of the second 
sort, the “deference piety.” As the quotation given above reads: “When tradi-
tionalists conclude that democracy is antithetical to piety itself, they must be 
assuming that piety consists essentially in deference toward the hierarchical 
powers that be.”
Stout operates here with a caricature of traditionalist or religious people 
that has nothing to do with his three opponents. Anyone who knows them or 
their work also knows that it is simply impossible to find Stout’s kind of def-
erence in anything Milbank, Maclntyre, and Hauerwas have said or done. 
Stout here falls into conventional assumptions all about power and subservi-
ence and authoritarianism by means of which he dismisses what he takes to 
be an overly traditionalist outlook on the past. A corrupt “hierarchical power” 
might try to use piety to family or country or church to make his minions 
serve his every whim. But that is not how piety works in Confucius, or in 
Aquinas, or, for that matter, within any vital religious tradition. Rather, such 
relations—including the deference shown within them, which is always sub-
tle and varied—matter because they sustain the rich and specific moral land-
scape in which the particularities of human relations of various sorts can be 
worked through. As a start, they sustain the relations between parents and 
children that enable moral training to occur, wisdom to be passed on, and 
gratefulness to be specifically extended.
In sum, Stout’s portrayal of democratic piety heightens rather than allays 
concerns expressed by Hauerwas about liberalism’s loss of embodiment and 
memory. It deepens worries that Stout’s democratic tradition will treat the 
past as largely faceless, gathering it into time-honored principles like respect 
for persons or gratitude for vague companies who contributed to our “prog-
ress through life.” Put another way, if the alleged democratic tradition does 
not tie each of us to embodied human beings who have given us our lives, it 
is difficult to imagine what piety or gratefulness can even mean. Such loose-
ness and lack of specificity among a people can easily be turned, as one might 
argue has occurred in America, to talk about personhood or freedom that can 
be shouted but never parsed. Hauerwas’s cleverly titled article “My Uncle 
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Charlie Is Not Much of a Person but He Is Still My Uncle Charlie” is pointed 
exactly at this faceless tendency in modern life.20 We need a way to speak 
about what we owe to Uncle Charlie, and Stout’s democratic piety does not 
provide it.
If both piety and gratitude need specific targets, memory also does, even 
more so. Memory, after all, is carried by story, and vague principles or un-
specified allegiances carry no memory at all.21 For Wendell Berry, healthy 
human living must connect to the remembered past, a past that is not ours to 
make or reform as we see fit but rather a story to which we belong: “If we were 
lucky enough as children to be surrounded by grown-ups who loved us, then 
our sense of wholeness is not just the sense of completeness in ourselves but 
also the sense of belonging to others and to our place; it is an unconscious 
awareness of community, of having in common. It may be that this double 
sense of singular integrity and of communal belonging is our personal stan-
dard of health as long as we live.”22 If we are to belong in Berry’s sense, our ties 
to the past through memory must be particular and direct. We must be able 
to name the ones who hold us in this pattern of timeful human life. We be-
long not to everyone but to our family, our neighborhood, and our people. 
We belong not to any place but to a specific one.
In Berry’s novelette Remembering, Andrew Catlett loses his right hand in 
a picker when he and other men from Port William are harvesting corn for a 
neighbor in need. The loss wounds him deeply, as it should. He needs to find 
his way back to wholeness, health, although this obviously cannot happen by 
the restoration of his hand. In this state of bodily loss, Andy is tempted by 
another kind of loss or alienation. Although he remains tied by family and 
land to Port William, he is an academic agriculturalist who travels in the 
floating world of academic papers and conferences that could be held any-
where. Much of the story takes place in a hotel room in San Francisco—al-
though it could have been anywhere. Here, Andy is tempted to translate his 
rage at the loss of his hand into the modern alienation from body that occurs 
in strange hotel rooms and cities across America where countless, nameless 
men and women traverse back and forth, back and forth, without leaving 
footprints.
A decisive turn in the story comes when the organizer of an academic 
agricultural conference Andy recently attended (he remembers all this in his 
troubled sleeplessness in the hotel) introduces him as from “Fort” rather than 
Port William. This unleashes Andy’s anger, and he begins his speech as fol-
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lows: “What we have discussed here this morning is an agriculture of the 
mind. No farmer is here. No farmer has been mentioned. . . . The real interest 
of this meeting is in the academic careerism and the politics and the business 
of agriculture, and I daresay that most people here, like the first speaker, are 
proud to have escaped the life and work of farmers, whom they do not ad-
mire.” He goes on to tell the conference participants about his grandmother, 
Dorie Catlett, who, together with her husband, had received a bill from the 
warehouse for $3.57 at the end of the farming season of 1906. A year’s hard 
work on the land, and they earned a negative $3.57. Dorie had turned this 
bill over, the same bill Andy later found in an old bureau drawer, and written, 
“Oh, Lord, whatever is to become of us?” and then, “Out of the depths have 
I cried to thee, O Lord.”23
Andy concludes his speech with a list of names that those who have read 
Berry’s many novels immediately recognize: “I speak for Dorie Catlett and 
Marce Catlett. I speak for Mat and Margaret Feltner, for Jack Beechum, for 
Jarret and Burley Coulter. . . .”24 The point that Andy (and Berry) is making 
is that he is not Andy alone but with all these others; he does not live and 
farm in any place but rather Port (not Fort) William. What Andy cannot 
initially see, what Berry takes the novelette to show him and us, is that shar-
ing with these others means also sharing in their deep disappointments and 
grief. He must learn to cry out with his grandmother “Out of the depths have 
I cried to thee, O Lord”—that is, if he is once again to become whole without 
his right hand. He can do this only as he learns to remember not only his own 
history but also that of those who went before, stretching back to his grand-
parents, who had lost $3.57 for the year, but also to the generation before that 
had first come to the land and worked it.
It is the specificity of this story remembered, and its location in the life of 
particular bodies and land, that keeps memory from being cheapened into 
nostalgia. (Indeed, if there is a “natural law” outcome to the loss of memory 
in our modern context, it is this: the growth of nostalgia.) Moreover, as Berry’s 
story suggests, as specified, truthful memory cannot but enter into the loss, 
failure, disappointment, and even sinfulness that is part of human life and 
community. For Andy in Remembering, the connection to this past brings 
him round to recognizing his own sin, his failure, for instance, to trust his 
wife, Flora, who held their life together as Andy in his anger was strongly 
tempted to sink into the modern sea of forgetfulness surrounding him.
One might suppose that the sort of connection to the past that Berry 
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portrays in his story Remembering is only about farming life, where particular 
families pass on particular land. Yet this is a mistake about what I believe 
Berry is pressing in all his Port William stories. Without Port William, there 
is no America—which is to say, not merely that America is built on places like 
Port William (which is true enough), but, more significantly, that participa-
tion in the place we call America is facile, unreal unless one does it in and 
through a place such as Port William.
So this is what I wish Stout would learn from Wendell Berry. Insofar as 
democratic piety requires us to name no names, to connect with no specific 
neighbors or parents or grandparents or children, it floats over the land that 
is America like the disembodied spirits we have seen Hauerwas earlier men-
tion. The democrat who is grateful for no more than the “sources of [his] 
progress through life” dangles detached, even cynical, imagining that, with a 
brief bow and a wave to the past, he can get on with that progress as he him-
self defines it.
Moreover, such a person will be tempted to smugly imagine that the 
conflict of the past can be kept there, and, thus, as Hauerwas worried, democ-
racy will “suppress memory in the interest of eliminating conflict.” Wendell 
Berry’s book about racism in America, The Hidden Wound, has rightly caught 
Jeffrey Stout’s attention as exemplary.25 Stout has throughout his career spo-
ken out against the evils of slavery in America. And, to his credit, the second 
chapter of Democracy and Tradition deals not with Emerson, Whitman, and 
Dewey but with James Baldwin and Ralph Waldo Ellison, black storytellers 
who, Stout thinks, fit squarely within the democratic tradition. Theirs are 
stories that arise in the midst of suffering, the specific and named suffering of 
slavery and racism that was visited on one people by another in America.
However, Stout has not learned from Berry’s book as he might. His inter-
est in Ellison or Baldwin is less about how they might help us remember and 
name a great sin whose effects we have all endured and more about how 
Ellison and Baldwin show that democracy makes room for measured critique, 
a critique that does not go so far that it cancels itself in a contraction. It does 
this by holding on to a “hope of making a difference for the better by demo-
cratic means.”26 But what sort of hope is this? Like Stout’s piety, this hope 
names no names, refers to no bodies. It seems to dangle in the air, perhaps the 
stale air of an academic meeting room in a hotel somewhere in America.
Stout has missed that the reason Berry’s Hidden Wound is “the best book 
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on race by a white writer” is because it does not speak in abstractions about 
race but is rather Berry’s quite personal attempt to understand his own and his 
family’s complicity in the sin of racism, primarily through the quite real person 
of Bart Jenkins, a violent slave trader to whom Berry’s great-grandfather once 
sold a slave and who later was eulogized by a white Southern writer named 
Mosgrove as a model of the best in Southern virtue.27 Included within it is the 
story of the quite real black man named Nick Watkins who came to work on 
Berry’s grandfather’s farm when Berry was three years old. Berry came to love 
Nick, although even as a young lad he felt the sad racist distance that sepa-
rated them.
In sum, if democracy in America is, indeed, a tradition (Stout does well 
to try to show that it is one, less well in actually convincing us on the points 
mentioned), it cannot be carried along in our minds by an unspecified grate-
fulness for our “progress through life” but must rather draw us into direct 
contact with what we have inherited, the good and the bad, from particular 
people to whom we are connected (like it or not) by story. Short of that, piety 
and memory in a democratic society are ripe for takeover by formal and vacu-
ous ideas or sappy and nostalgic sentiments. Both will bar the door to either 
gratitude for the good gifts we have received from those who have gone before 
or truthfulness about what curses we bear.
Body and Work in the Church: Hauerwas to Berry
Stout is deeply distressed that his friend Stanley Hauerwas, with his resound-
ing critique of liberalism and his talk otherwise about “letting the church be 
the church,” has in effect convinced Christians to retreat into the church, set-
ting aside any sense of responsibility for the state of democracy in America. 
While it is clear throughout Hauerwas’s corpus that he wants to convince 
American Christians that their principal loyalty must be to the church and 
not to America, he does this a good bit because they seem to think otherwise. 
Or, perhaps better put, they have, many of them, even forgot that the church 
is a distinct community at all whose charge is to be the body of Christ in the 
world.
Hauerwas’s principal questions—about what it means for the church to be 
the body of Christ in any place and how, in a particular place like America, it 
should join in the people’s life—are intrinsically more difficult and theologi-
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cally intricate questions than those Stout asks about democracy in America. 
Moreover, initially, it is less clear what he might learn from Wendell Berry about 
what the church is, especially since Berry does not seem to belong to one.
Nevertheless, his writing is actually full of insights about the church that 
Berry presents by criticizing it—what one might call a sort of negative ecclesi-
ology. He shows us churches in America that have failed. Or, alternatively, he 
shows us vital communities that aren’t the church but might be.
In The Unsettling of America, which Stout calls the “most important book 
on environmental ethics ever written,” in the extraordinary essay at the center 
of the book entitled “The Body and the Earth,” Berry refers once again to 
health—the same health to which, after losing his hand, Andrew Catlett must 
be restored by remembering.28 Here, he draws out the connection between 
the human body and the body of the earth: “If the body is healthy, then it is 
whole. But how can it be whole and yet be dependent, as it obviously is, upon 
other bodies and upon the earth, upon all the rest of Creation? . . . Our bod-
ies are also not distinct from the bodies of other people, on which they de-
pend in a complexity of ways from the biological to the spiritual.”29
For Berry, the abuse and waste of the environment is tied directly to the 
waste of the physical human body. Moreover, this is tied to a mentality (per-
haps even a tradition) that he associates with “institutional religion”:
It is clear to anyone who looks carefully at any crowd that we are wasting 
our bodies exactly as we are wasting our land. . . . Our bodies have be-
come marginal; they are growing useless like our “marginal” land be-
cause we have less and less use for them. . . . This separation of the soul 
from the body and from the world is no disease of the fringe, no aberra-
tion, but a fracture that runs through the mentality of institutional reli-
gion like a geographical fault. And this rift in the mentality of religion 
continues to characterize the modern mind, no matter how secular and 
worldly it becomes.
These comments remind us that (as Hauerwas agrees) the loss of memory and 
the loss of body are related losses. Both also include a loss of the deep depen-
dency we have one on another, by body and through time. On Berry’s view, 
the geologic fault in modern thought and life separating body from soul ac-
counts for both. And their division has deep root in religious faith of one kind 
or another. Berry goes on to make his point more exactly and also to qualify 
it vis-à-vis the Bible:
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But I have not stated my point exactly enough. This rift is not like a 
geological fault; it is a geological fault. It is a flaw in the mind that runs 
inevitably into the earth. Thought affects or afflicts substance neither by 
intention nor by accident, but because, occurring in the Creation that is 
unified and whole, it must; there is no help for it. The soul in its loneli-
ness hopes only for “salvation.” And yet, what is the burden of the Bible 
if not a sense of the mutuality of the influence, rising out of the essential 
unity, among soul and body and community and world? These are the 
works of God, and it is therefore the work of virtue to make or restore 
harmony among them.30
Berry’s alienation from institutional religion may rest somewhat uneasily with 
his love for the Bible. Yet we can see what has offended him. The salvation 
that Christians have sometimes offered has been a kind of death precisely as 
it detaches the saved soul from body and land. Healthy people whose lives 
depend on one another and the land will resist it.
Berry’s novel A Place on Earth is a long and subtle story of how the people 
of Port William cope with sad losses that come with drastic disturbances such 
as war or flood or even those that come more quietly like the loss of strength 
in old age. Mat and Margaret Feltner are at the center of the story; early on in 
it their son Virgil is reported missing in action in World War II. Shortly after 
the news comes, they are visited in their home by Brother Preston, the local 
minister. They greet him warmly, as is their way, and sit with him politely as 
he offers words of consolation. Yet they do not really listen:
The preacher’s voice, rising, rides above all chances of mortal and world-
ly hope, hastening to rest in the hope of heaven. In the preacher’s words 
the Heavenly City has risen up, surmounting their lives, their house, the 
town—the final hope, in which all the riddles and ends of the world are 
gathered, illuminated and bound. This is the preacher’s hope, and he is 
moved to it alone, outside the claims of time and sorrow, by the motion 
of desire which he calls faith. In it, having invoked it and raised it up, he 
is free of the world.
This is neither Mat’s nor Margaret’s faith or hope. The conversation, such as 
it is, stalls and mercifully ends. After it, Brother Preston returns to his church: 
“Unviolated now by any presence but his own, the old church seems to 
Brother Preston to stand erect and coherent, enclosing him. As though the 
racket he made opening the door signaled a division between the church and 
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the town, the sanctuary is now filled with quiet. He returns to his church 
where he can be alone.” He senses that the visit has not gone all that well. 
What he hoped would be a conversation had become a sermon: “This was the 
history of his life in Port William. The Word, in his speaking it, fails to be 
made flesh. It is a failure particularized for him at the church door every 
Sunday morning—the hard dark hand taking his pale unworn one in a ges-
ture of politeness without understanding. He belongs to the governance of 
those he ministers to without belonging to their knowledge, the bringer of 
the Word preserved from flesh.”31
Berry is speaking as a theologian in these passages but also in criticism of 
the church. Many of us will receive his critique gladly, accustomed as we are to 
the critiques of individual soul salvation. And it is a critique of that. Yet there 
is something more here. As Berry believes, the body is land. If the Word be-
came flesh, it also became soil, dirt. And this means that the Word must work 
with the dirt, share the toil of the day—which is the difficult but redeeming 
work of caring for the land and for one another in our local communities. This 
is what Brother Preston holds himself above, with his pale, unworn hands. 
Burley Coulter later reports in a letter to his nephew Nathan, who is also at 
war in Europe, that he knew all of what Brother Preston had to say to Mat and 
Margaret, and its emptiness, since the minister had visited him before when 
his own son Tom had died: “None of it quite fit. . . . Here in a way he’d come 
to say the last words over Tom. And what claim did he have to do it? He never 
done a day’s work in his life, nor could have. He never did stand up in his ache 
and sweat and go down the row with us. He never tasted any of our sweat in 
the water jug. And I was thinking: Preacher, who are you to speak of Tom to 
me, who knew him, and knew the very smell of him?”32
The church is not the land, but it must work with the land if it is to speak 
to the people whose lives depend on it. If, indeed, as Hauerwas rightly sees in 
his critical comments about liberalism in response to Stout—that it is an at-
tempt “to form a politics and ethics without memory” and, thus, also without 
embodiment—then he may need to consider more thoroughly how the body 
and the land come to play in Christian memory.
One thing this will involve is that Christians will need to confess, with 
others, their complicity in the abuses of the land, which is not merely an en-
vironmental point. As Berry does in The Hidden Wound, Christians in America 
will need to ask about their own participation in racism. Insofar as one is born 
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on and nourished daily by the land that is America, the same land whose 
wealth in Lincoln’s time—and, thus, also even yet today in our own—was 
“piled by the bondsman’s two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil,” 
then the remembering is also not only participatory but required for all who 
continue to live on this land.33 If you are an American, you are obliged to 
know and care about American slavery and its deep and scarring effects. The 
church cannot insulate or hold us aloof from this.
To return to the debate between Hauerwas and Stout, here is where Stout 
has a point. Hauerwas’s fiery and trenchant critique of liberalism sometimes 
seems to hold him aloof from accounting for America as a history and a land, 
as if the two, liberalism and America, could be dismissed as a twin set of bad 
ideas, perhaps even as the same bad idea. (Indeed, at one point in his book A 
Better Hope, Hauerwas follows Maclntyre in labeling America as “not just a 
country but a metaphysical entity.”)34 Stout is better off chiding him on this 
point, rather than that he should feel obliged to join in the democratic pro-
cess in order that we can together “make a difference for the better by demo-
cratic means.”35 The appeal must be that, insofar as Hauerwas has lived his 
whole life long off the soil of this land, insofar as he was, like Berry, born a 
white man in the American South, insofar as he today crisscrosses this wide 
but bounded land speaking in each engagement to an assortment of locals 
who are not just church people but American teachers or businesspeople or 
doctors and nurses who daily live and remember the particular American 
story of that particular locale, then he cannot opt out of what one might 
simply call his patriotic obligations. (Here I leave what is patriotic open, for 
there is great danger in circumscribing it too narrowly. The best way to put it 
is that, as an American, Hauerwas owes other Americans an explanation of 
how what he says and does contributes to America’s common life.)36 It seems 
to me, in other words, that Hauerwas is tempted—as I have also suggested 
Stout is tempted, although in a different way—to forget that his body is part 
of America’s body.
Hauerwas is not unaware of this challenge. In the first few pages of A 
Better Hope, he says: “I am also an American. As much as I might like—as a 
Texan or as a Christian—to deny or avoid that I am an American, I know that 
such denial would be self-deceptive.”37 This seems like a genuine and moving 
profession. Nevertheless, as Stout observes, the index of that book “contains 
more than twenty listings under the term ‘liberalism.’”38
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Hauerwas has claimed, with some sense, that liberalism is actually not his 
main target, even in his attacks against liberalism: “The object of my criticism 
of liberalism has never been liberals, but rather to give Christians renewed 
confidence in the convictions that make our service intelligible. From my 
perspective the problem is not liberalism but the assumption on the part of 
many Christians that they must become liberals or, at least, accept liberal 
political principles and/or practices to be of service in America.”39
I do not mean to imply that Hauerwas, a churchman, should not try to 
protect the church by opposing certain ideas or people who threaten its life. 
But it seems to me that he can and should do so directly, without the excur-
sion that draws up different standards for who can be expected to think what. 
Features of what Hauerwas calls liberalism are dangerous to our common life, 
at various levels, and ought to be opposed in the various ways they threaten, 
both in and outside the church. When we do this, however, it seems unneces-
sary to accent that the origin of the dangerous idea is in liberalism. Perhaps 
the best, most embodied thing to do is simply to name the person carrying 
the idea and try to show him and others why it is wrong.
In Berry’s story “Fidelity,” a man named Kyle Bode comes sniffing 
around Port William. He is a cop who has come to investigate the disap-
pearance of Burley Coulter (in his eighties in this story), who was vegetat-
ing helplessly in a hospital and so has been taken secretly (and illegally) by 
his remaining son, Danny, back to his own place, where he can die in peace 
and communion. Burley’s relatives, friends, and neighbors in Port William 
resist Bode’s intrusions. Better put, they resist the terms in which his intru-
sions are phrased. Bode is full of what Hauerwas would call liberal moral-
isms, all about violations of rights and the following of proper procedures.40 
The people of Port William do not like him one bit. Yet they endure him. 
When he visits their homes, they answer his questions and extend to him 
the courtesies of a guest—albeit without great enthusiasm. They even wel-
come him to their final gathering in Wheeler’s law office after Danny, hid-
den from the view of the intrusive Bode by the community’s resistance, has 
laid Burley to rest in a grave he dug for him by hand. During the gathering, 
Bode forgets himself for a moment as he glimpses the deep humanity that 
runs round the circle of gathered family and friends. He is drawn in by the 
memories they share of Burley’s life, each remembered story lovingly yet 
also truthfully told—important since Burley was no saint. This way of 
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speaking, of a people gathered together to remember in words the real life of 
a man lived out in the community and on its land, is all new to him, but also 
somehow familiar.
These Port William citizens treat Kyle Bode directly as a human being, 
one who has come into their neighborhood. To be sure, they bristle at his 
stupidities that show how wildly he misunderstands their lives, and they mark 
quite directly where and why they cannot adopt his language. He is a liberal 
in the sense that he carries with him a notion of individual freedom and rights 
that makes Burley’s death a murder, one nameless person of another, rather 
than an act of faithfulness of a son and his community to a dying father and 
friend. But they do not think of him first as a liberal; rather, he is Kyle Bode. 
As his weakening in the last scene shows, perhaps he is less liberal than he 
appears.41 Insofar as he is an embodied human being here in the midst of this 
circle of friends, that is enough; it is the basis, anyway, on which they will deal 
with him. The greatest resource that holds him and them in this position is 
that they share a common life on the land and the memory of what has gone 
before that holds them in this place.
The embrace that Bode feels in this final gathering is evangelical. Indeed, 
the gathering in Wheeler’s office is ecclesiological. Unlike Brother Preston, 
all those who gather here (save Bode) knew Burley, as he once knew Tom. 
That is how they can speak truthfully, one by one, out of their memory of his 
particular life. Theirs is an embodied love; their words are made of flesh.
Christians in America would do well to aspire to the sort of church that 
is not really a church but behaves like one, namely, Berry’s Port William com-
munity. As Berry believes, they are knit together in body, which is possible 
only as they share local work, work that connects them together to the land. 
If they know that land well and the local community, they will also know how 
its story is truthfully told, including the contributions made to its life by 
those who have gone before (and now rest in its earth), and what are its par-
ticular local sins. If America is not merely an idea but a collection of local 
communities, and if democracy within America is really a living local tradi-
tion, then the church in those communities will need to speak not only to 
them but within them, and in so doing they will speak to and within America. 
Hauerwas is right that the church needs to be the church. As I think Wendell 
Berry helps us see, the church in America needs to be the church in (various 
local places in) America.
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